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Introduction
This thesis investigates both, theoretically and empirically, the effects of hetero-
geneity on cooperation in social dilemma situations. Studying social dilemmas has
a long history in economics with the prisoner’s dilemma, the public goods problem,
and the tragedy of the commons being the most prominent examples. The crucial
peculiarity of such social dilemmas is that they are characterized by a conflict of
interest between individual and collective benefit. As a result, the socially efficient
provision of the common good often does not take place (Samuelson, 1954; Olson,
1965; Hardin, 1968). The reason is that by definition nobody can be excluded from
the consumption of a common good even if he or she has not contributed to its
provision. As a consequence, everyone has an incentive to hope that others provide
the common good leading to the famous free-rider problem. Because cooperation
failure may have substantial detrimental effects on social welfare, “understanding
the proximate and ultimate sources of human cooperation is a fundamental issue in
all behavioral sciences”(Ga¨chter and Herrmann, 2009).
Typical applications of social dilemmas in the social and economic life are man-
ifold ranging from important challenges such as environmental protection, national
defense, depletion of natural resources, participation in collective action, tax com-
pliance, and charity donations to social interactions at the workplace or at home
such as teamwork. Naturally, such situations concern many people who generally
differ with respect to a variety of characteristics such as culture, convictions, pref-
erences, resources, qualifications, attitudes, and motivation. As such, the existence
and formation of homogeneous group environments can be regarded as an excep-
tion, rather than the rule. Studying to what degree collective action is affected
by inequality among group members is therefore crucial to understand and predict
human behavior in heterogeneous societies. Yet, most studies on collective action
have focused on situations where agents with identical characteristics interact with
each other. While abstracting from heterogeneity is often legitimate to investigate
the underlying logic of collective action problems, this may also be problematic if it
neglects important characteristics that influence cooperative behavior.
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In general, far less is known about cooperation in heterogeneous than in homo-
geneous environments, and the evidence that exists for the former is not clear-cut
and discussed controversially. While some studies argue that heterogeneity within
groups facilitates collective action (cf. Olson, 1965; Hardin, 1982; Oliver et al., 1985),
some other studies find rather negative effects of group diversity on cooperation (cf.
Ostrom et al., 1994; Bardhan and Dayton-Johnson, 2002; Reuben and Riedl, 2013).
Overall, the results show that “the social role of within-group heterogeneity is com-
plex” and that “depending on context, heterogeneity can increase or reduce social
cooperation” (Heckathorn, 1993).
Following this, using concepts and instruments from behavioral and experimen-
tal economics, all chapters of this thesis aim at shedding light on different aspects
of this topic by investigating how different sources of heterogeneity affect people’s
willingness to cooperate in social dilemma problems. In particular, we are inter-
ested in whether the knowledge and insights from cooperative behavior in homoge-
neous groups can be transferred or extrapolated to heterogeneous environments, or
whether there are important interaction effects which influence people’s willingness
to cooperate in non-trivial ways. In Chapter 1, we therefore analyze the interac-
tion of heterogeneous abilities and inequality in wealth on public goods provision.
Chapter 2 studies heterogeneity in agents’ capabilities and preferences and compares
their influence on cooperative behavior when informal sanctions are available or not.
In Chapter 3, we investigate how people’s willingness to cooperate depends on the
information they receive about heterogeneous public goods contributions of others.
Finally, in Chapter 4 we examine whether differences in the framing of a decision sit-
uation affect the level of cooperation in a two-person social dilemma game.1 Based
on our findings, we derive practical implications for the development of institutions
that help to increase efficiency by fostering cooperation. In the following paragraphs
I will briefly introduce the field of behavioral and experimental economics, motivate
the research questions of each chapter, summarize the main findings, and explain
how they relate to each other.
Although all of economics is meant to be about human behavior, there is a fairly
young but growing sub-field called behavioral economics whose objection is to incor-
porate insights from related disciplines such as sociology and psychology to increase
the explanatory power of economic analysis by providing it with a more realistic
foundation of human decision making. Usually, studies in behavioral economics re-
lax one or more of the simplifying assumptions of the neoclassical model describing
1Chapter 1 has been developed in collaboration with Dirk Sliwka and Nannan Zhou and is based
upon Ko¨lle et al. (2011). An earlier version of Chapter 2 can be found in Ko¨lle (2012). Chapter 3
is joint work with Bjo¨rn Hartig and Bernd Irlenbusch.
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mankind as a fully rational and completely self-interested utility maximizer. Espe-
cially over the last three decades, research in this area has spawned a substantial
literature covering a variety of topics such as intertemporal choice (cf. Frederick
et al., 2002), decisions under risk (cf. Kahneman and Tversky, 1979; Ko¨szegi and
Rabin, 2007), reference-dependence and loss aversion (cf. Kahneman et al., 1990;
Ko¨szegi and Rabin, 2006), and behavioral game theory (cf. Camerer, 2011). A topic
that is most relevant for this thesis addresses the nature of social preferences such
as altruism (Andreoni and Miller, 2002), inequity aversion (Fehr and Schmidt, 1999;
Bolton and Ockenfels, 2000), and reciprocity (Rabin, 1993; Dufwenberg and Kirch-
steiger, 2004; Falk and Fischbacher, 2006) which all have been found to be important
drivers of economic behavior. Insights from this research have been applied to many
different domains such as finance (cf. Barberis and Thaler, 2003), macroeconomics
(cf. Shefrin and Thaler, 1992; Shafir et al., 1997), labor and personnel economics (cf.
Akerlof and Yellen, 1990; Fehr and Ga¨chter, 2000), and law (cf. Jolls et al., 1998).
One widely applied methodology within behavioral economics are laboratory
experiments which allow for a tight control of the decision environment, a fact
that is hard to obtain in natural occurring settings. This is important because
together with the exogenous assignment to treatment and control conditions, it
allows for a precise testing of theoretical predictions and for a clean method to draw
inference about the causal relationship of interest. Because of that, experiments can
be regarded as a major source of knowledge in the social sciences that complements
other methods such as theory or field data (Falk and Heckman, 2009). With regard
to the research question of this thesis, laboratory experiments constitute a well
suited workhorse as they circumvent the problem that in everyday life, heterogeneity
usually emerges endogenously and is often hard to measure. In three out of four
chapters we therefore use laboratory experiments as a common element which allows
us to induce heterogeneity exogenously and in a controlled way.
In Chapter 1, within a theoretical model we analyze the effects of wealth in-
equality on the incentives to contribute to a public good when agents are inequity
averse and may differ with respect to their abilities. Because an individual’s ability
determines the marginal effect of her contributions, heterogeneous abilities typically
lead to different individual contributions. When all agents benefit to the same ex-
tent from the public good, equality in initial wealth may then lead to inequality
ex-post as more able agents provide higher inputs and, in turn, incur higher costs.
In a first step, we compare optimal contribution behavior of purely selfish agents
with those who do not only care about absolute but also about relative payoffs as
modeled by Fehr and Schmidt (1999). In a second step, we analyze the welfare con-
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sequences arising from the redistribution of a fixed amount of initial wealth among
both agents.
Situations like this are highly relevant as, undoubtedly, wealth is often distributed
unequally among members of a society and many people care about that distribution
(cf. Sobel, 2005; Cooper and Kagel, 2009). Furthermore, while benefits from a
common good are typically the same for everyone, people often differ in their ability
to contribute to a common good. For example, members of a team working on a joint
project often have different task-specific capabilities determining the productivity of
their chosen effort.2 Similarly, in the context of environmental protection countries
may have different qualifications in fighting global climate change, e.g. different
opportunities to preserve the rainforest or different technological competencies to
avoid carbon dioxide emissions.
Our analysis shows that if agents are inequity averse, this leads to an increased
incentive to adapt contributions according to the distribution of initial wealth such
that potential inequalities are endogenously offset to some degree. Furthermore, we
find that while treating agents of different abilities equally may have detrimental
effects for the provision of the public good, allocating higher wealth to the more
able agent may motivate the latter to increase her contributions which, in turn,
can increase social efficiency. The reason is that if initial wealth is distributed
unequally, the wealthier agent can reduce this inequality by contributing more than
her counterpart. If agents are inequity averse they have an incentive to do that
as this reduces their psychological costs due to inequity. If the wealthier agent is
also the more able one, this may enhance overall efficiency because increasing her
contributions is more valuable than a similar-sized increase in the contributions of
less able agents. As a consequence, less able agents may even benefit from initial
wealth inequality to their disadvantage because the increased incentive of the more
able agents to contribute can outweigh their lower initial wealth. The novel results
of this study are that not although but because agents care for fairness it might be
optimal to introduce wealth inequality and that the stronger the agents’ inequity
aversion, the stronger is the incentive effect of inequality and the larger should be
the optimal difference in initial wealth.
In line with equity theory (Adams, 1965) and recent empirical evidence (Abeler
et al., 2010), our results suggest that (in)equality does not necessarily imply (in)equity
and vice versa. Applied to a team context within a firm, this means that simple
statements sometimes heard in practice claiming that inequality among the mem-
bers of a group is demotivating when people care for fairness may be misleading.
2In the following, we use the terms of ability and capability interchangeably.
4
The reason is that when people differ in ability, equality in wealth may actually
crowd-out the motivation to contribute, but introducing inequality in favor of the
more able agent may have positive effects on people’s willingness to cooperate.
Besides heterogeneity in capabilities, another reason for why incentives to con-
tribute to a collective good may differ between individuals is that they have differ-
ent valuations or preferences for the common good. For example, parks, swimming
pools, dams, or other public facilities provide very different benefits to individuals,
depending on how far away they live from the site or how often they enjoy the
consumption of the public good. In Chapter 2, we experimentally investigate both
types of heterogeneity, capabilities and preferences, and compare their effects on
contribution behavior in a repeated linear public goods game when the possibility
to punish other group members is possible or not. Importantly, in some treatments
group members differ with regard to the benefit they receive from their own and
their group members’ contributions, either because of having different valuations for
the public good, or because of having different capabilities determining the marginal
effect of contributions. While both types of heterogeneity are closely related and
often referred to as changes in the marginal per capita rate of return (MPCR), they
differ with respect to the externality contributions have on the other group mem-
bers’ payoffs. When individuals have asymmetric preferences, benefits from the
public good differ between group members, but are independent of who makes a
contribution. In contrast, if individuals have asymmetric capabilities, benefits are
the same for everyone but depend on which group member contributes. While in
the first case group members always benefit asymmetrically causing inequalities in
payoffs, in the case of heterogeneous capabilities, equal contributions also lead to
equal payoffs. Because this difference influences the distribution of wealth, given
that people are not purely selfish this creates different incentives to contribute.
In contrast to previous studies, this feature allows us to disentangle the effects
of heterogeneous characteristics and an asymmetric payoff structure. In general,
we find that the nature of group heterogeneity crucially affects cooperation and
coordination within groups. Compared to a control group of homogeneous agents,
asymmetric preferences for the public good have detrimental effects on voluntary
contributions, and different capabilities in providing the public good have a posi-
tive and stabilizing effect on contribution behavior. As such, we provide evidence
that abstracting from heterogeneity in social dilemma situations can be a serious
shortcoming as inequality among group members can have opposing effects on co-
operation. Furthermore, our results imply that it is not the asymmetric nature of
groups per se that facilitates or impedes collective action, but that it is the spe-
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cific type of heterogeneity that determines people’s willingness to cooperate within
groups.
Insights from this research can have important policy implications, for instance
by assisting organizations and policy-makers in developing institutions that effec-
tively alleviate cooperation and coordination failure in social dilemma situations.
For example, in a firm context our results suggest that the formation of teams in
which members have different interests in the success of a joint project, or paying
different team-performance related bonuses to otherwise identical agents may have
detrimental effects on the group output. In contrast, forming groups of heteroge-
neous abilities may have positive effects on cooperation.
In Chapter 3, we shift our focus from differences in people’s characteristics, to
the effects of observing unequal contribution behavior of otherwise identical agents.
As has been shown in the first two chapters, heterogeneous characteristics often in-
duce contributions to differ among group members. Yet, the reasons for such diverse
behavior may sometimes remain sealed to individuals, for instance when people’s
characteristics are not common knowledge but private information. Alternatively,
differences in individuals’ contribution behavior may result from differences in their
preferences for cooperation. The question we address in this chapter is how individ-
uals decide about their own contributions when being confronted with cooperative
and uncooperative agents at the same time.
Many previous studies have shown that a considerable fraction of people con-
dition their contributions on the behavior of others, i.e., they tend to cooperate if
others do so as well, and curtail their contributions if others are not pulling their
weight (cf. Chaudhuri, 2011). While evidence for this behavioral regularity called
conditional cooperation is extensive, almost all studies have analyzed how condi-
tional contributions depend on the average contributions of others. Yet, relatively
little is known about how people react when having information about the exact
composition of others’ individual contributions. In many real-life situations observ-
ing individual rather than aggregate behavior is the more realistic case, for instance
when working in a team within a company or when being member of a football
team. In such a situation, however, it is not clear which, if any, contribution is
most influential in determining behavior. Are people more inclined to follow the
bad example of an uncooperative group member or do they tend to match the good
example of a high contributor?
In our experiment, by varying the information subjects receive about others’
contributions to a public good, we find that observing uniform individual behav-
ior of others elicits higher contribution levels than receiving only the corresponding
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aggregate information. Furthermore, when providing full information about others’
individual contributions, we find that the higher the variation in others’ contribu-
tions, the lower, on average, subjects’ willingness to contribute. This is in line with
the presence of a bad apple effect implying that people are more likely to follow the
bad example of an uncooperative group member rather than the good example of a
high contributor. This may explain why people usually fall short of matching others’
contributions perfectly when only aggregate information is provided. The reason is
that in this case, people face uncertainty about others’ individual behavior. Believ-
ing that a “rotten apple” in the group contributes little may then be a sufficient
reason to justify low own contributions (i.e., less than the average). In fact, the
lack of information about individual behavior may additionally provide individuals
with moral “wiggle room” to self-servingly “form” pessimistic beliefs about others’
contributions, i.e., as an excuse for contributing little.
Our results may have several interesting implications. For example, our results
provide hints on what kind of feedback mechanism is best suited to increase co-
operation in the case of fund-raising or sequential public good provision when the
organization has some discretion about which information to make public. In par-
ticular, policy makers striving to facilitate voluntary public goods provision should
reveal previous individual behavior only if it is relatively uniform and instead give
information about aggregate behavior if it varies a lot. In a team context within
a firm, our results suggest that forming groups of equal performers is generally
preferable because in diverse teams, it is more likely that the negative effect of low
performers outweighs any positive effects of the high performers. This, for example,
highlights why firing shirking workers can have additional positive effects on the
productivity of others.
In the last chapter, we experimentally investigate to what degree people’s will-
ingness to cooperate is affected by the way how a social dilemma situation is repre-
sented.3 This might be relevant because very often seemingly different decision sit-
uations inhere similar strategic circumstances or, likewise, similar decision problems
are represented in more than one way. While according to rational choice theory,
different formulations of a logically equivalent problem should not affect behavior,
evidence from experiments in psychology and economics suggest that many people
are prone to framing effects. Such framing effect is said to be present when different
representations of the same decision situation lead individuals to change behavior,
even though the underlying information and decision options remain essentially the
same (Cookson, 2000).
3In a sense, one could think of this as the effects of heterogeneity in terms of representation.
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In this study, we use framing to investigate the interplay of (frame-induced)
loss aversion and cooperation, i.e., we want to examine whether people are more
or less likely to cooperate when this leads to the achievement of something good
compared to when it leads to the prevention of something bad. For instance, while
cooperation within a team that is striving for the completion of a project can be
seen as an example for achieving something good, the original description of the
prisoner’s dilemma in which two prisoners who have to remain silent to avoid being
imprisoned for long can be seen as an example for preventing something bad. Using
a one-shot prisoner’s dilemma game, by gradually shifting subjects’ payoffs from a
positive into a negative domain, we either induce a gain- or a loss-framing (or a
combination of both), and subsequently study whether behavior is sensitive to such
frame manipulation.
In line with evidence from related studies, we find framing to significantly affect
the frequency of cooperation across treatments. Yet, because subjects in our ex-
periment had to choose actions simultaneously, we are not able to disentangle the
effects of beliefs and actions. As a consequence, we cannot conclusively answer the
question of how loss aversion and the willingness to cooperate interact with each
other. To test this more precisely, it is planned to conduct a follow-up experiment
in which subjects have to choose actions sequentially. For the second mover, this
would rule out the effects of beliefs on behavior by design and thus provide a clean
test of the effects of losses on cooperation. Nevertheless, if anything, the results of
our experiment indicate that the involvement of losses tends to make people less
cooperative.
In general, we think that the question of how the concepts of loss aversion and
social preferences interrelate with each other might be an interesting topic that
could complement the findings of studies investigating the connection between social
preferences and risk taking (cf. Bohnet et al., 2008; Bolton and Ockenfels, 2010).
Evidence from this research may have interesting fields of application such as in
financial services where advisors sell products to advisees that often not only include
high risks but also may entail the danger of incurring losses.
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Chapter 1
Inequality, Inequity Aversion, and
the Provision of Public Goods
The doctrine of equality! There is no more poisonous poison any-
where: for it seems to be preached by justice itself, whereas it really is
the termination of justice. “Equal to the equal, unequal to the unequal”
- that would be the true slogan of justice; and also its corollary: “Never
make equal what is unequal.”
(Friedrich Nietzsche)
1.1 Introduction
While most studies on collective action so far have focussed on situations in which
agents with identical characteristics interact with each other, in social and eco-
nomic life homogeneous-group environments are the exception rather than the rule.
People often differ with respect to important attributes such as preferences, re-
sources, wealth, ability or motivation. In this study we therefore investigate the
effects of the interplay between two sources of heterogeneity: wealth and ability.
Undoubtedly, wealth is often distributed unequally among members of a society or
an organization. Likewise, people often differ in their skills affecting their ability
to contribute to a common good. For example, members of a team that work on
a joint project might have different task-specific abilities determining the produc-
tivity of their chosen effort. In the context of environmental protection, countries
have different qualifications in fighting climate change, for instance different capa-
bilities to resist deforesting the rainforest or different technological competencies to
avoid carbon dioxide emissions. Similarly, in the case of charitable donations and
volunteer work, ability heterogeneity arises when contributors have heterogeneous
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capabilities to provide these public services.
The heterogeneity in abilities typically should lead to a heterogeneity in optimal
contributions. And this, in turn, naturally leads to inequality when the involved
actors benefit to the same extent from the quality of the public good but have dif-
ferent costs. However, there is now a broad number of studies indicating that many
people tend to dislike inequity. Formal models of inequity aversion such as those by
Fehr and Schmidt (1999) or Bolton and Ockenfels (2000) have been quite successful
in explaining several patterns of behavior observed in laboratory experiments and
in the field.1 Inequity aversion should thus affect the willingness to accept hetero-
geneity in payoffs from public good provision, and, in turn, be an important factor
affecting the incentives to contribute.
In this paper we therefore analyze the effect of ex-ante inequality in wealth and
ability on the motivation of inequity averse agents to contribute to a public good or
a team outcome. While a straightforward conjecture would be that inequity aversion
should lead to the optimality of a more egalitarian wealth distribution, we show that
the optimal degree of wealth inequality may actually increase with the importance
of inequity aversion in the agents’ preferences.
In order to address the interaction of wealth and ability heterogeneity, we con-
sider a simple setting in which two agents who are inequity averse simultaneously
decide on their contributions to a public good or a team outcome. The joined output
is increasing in each agent’s contribution but both agents may have different abili-
ties which determine the marginal effect of their contributions. When both agents
benefit to the same extent from the public good, equality in initial wealth may then
lead to inequity as the more able agent provides higher inputs and, in turn, has
higher costs.2 We show that this inequity is endogenously offset to some degree as
the agents adapt their contributions. Treating agents of different abilities equally
may then have detrimental effects for the provision of the public good. But allo-
cating a higher wealth to the more able agent may motivate the latter to increase
her contribution. When the distribution of initial wealth is aligned to the difference
in the agents’ abilities, there will be multiple equilibria in which the agents attain
the same utility even though their initial wealth differs. In these equilibria, both
1For experimental evidence see for example Roth and Kagel (1995), Camerer (2003) and En-
gelmann and Strobel (2004). Using a more general notion of fairness, field evidence is given by
e.g. Blinder and Choi (1990), Agell and Lundborg (1995), Campbell and Kamlani (1997), Be-
wley (1999) and Carpenter and Seki (2006). For a summary of the empirical evidence on social
preferences see for instance Fehr and Schmidt (2002) and Sobel (2005).
2In the following we use the term inequality describing inequality in initial wealth, and the term
inequity describing inequality in wealth after agents have contributed and received their benefits
from the public good.
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agents have an incentive to match their group members’ contribution and, in turn,
the free-rider problem can be substantially reduced when the agents coordinate on
the Pareto-dominant equilibrium. In particular, for intermediate levels of wealth
inequality both agents exert higher efforts relative to the efforts maximizing their
material payoffs.
We further analyze the optimal degree of initial inequality for two simple settings.
In the first setting, we analyze the agents’ individual preferences for redistribution
of a given amount of total initial wealth. Here, we show that the less able agent
may even benefit from initial wealth inequality to her disadvantage. The reason
is that the increased incentives of the more able agent to contribute to the public
good can outweigh the loss in initial wealth. In the second setting, we show that
not only a utilitarian but also an egalitarian social planner will choose an unequal
wealth distribution favoring the more productive agent. Most strikingly, the stronger
the agents’ inequity aversion, the larger should be the difference in initial wealth.
Moreover, we show that an egalitarian wealth distribution can only be optimal when
all agents have the same ability. On the contrary, in the case of heterogeneous agents
such a policy always leads to a stronger underprovision of the public good causing
welfare losses. Finally, we demonstrate that under the optimal distribution of wealth,
total contributions are independent of the group composition, i.e. homogeneous and
heterogeneous groups provide the same amount of the public good and identical
levels of social welfare are attained.
In the existing public good literature, a well established result is that the private
provision of a public good is unaffected by any reallocation of income amongst
contributing agents. This result has first been shown by Warr (1983) and later
been extended by Bergstrom et al. (1986). However, the latter also shows that an
income redistribution which increases inequality by transferring wealth from non-
contributing individuals to contributing individuals can have positive welfare effects
(see also Itaya et al. (1997)). In a similar vein, Andreoni (1990) argues that public
good provision can be enhanced by redistributing wealth from less altruistic to
more altruistic people. We add to this literature by showing that redistribution
can be beneficial even for the case of symmetric preferences and even if the set of
contributors is left unchanged. While the reason for inequality in our model stems
from the heterogeneity in the agents’ characteristics, the agents’ fairness concerns
appear to be an important factor influencing the optimal degree of inequality.
In recent years, there also has been a couple of (predominantly experimental)
studies investigating the effects of wealth heterogeneity on public good provision.
However, empirical results from these studies are not clear-cut. While some papers
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find that inequality leads to lower contributions (e.g. Ostrom et al. (1994), Van Dijk
et al. (2002), Cherry et al. (2005) and Anderson et al. (2008)), other studies report a
neutral or even positive effect of wealth inequality (e.g. Chan et al. (1999), Buckley
and Croson (2006)).3 One reason for the non-conclusive evidence might be that
these studies investigated inequality only in the income dimension. Yet, the claim
of our study is that there is an interplay of inequality in wealth and heterogeneity
in the agents’ characteristics that affect “psychological” inequity costs which might
hamper the cooperation in social dilemmas.4
In this regard, our paper also contributes to the literature on the interplay of
equity and equality in social exchanges (e.g. Homans (1958), Adams (1965), Konow
(2000), Cappelen et al. (2007) or Konow et al. (2009)). Psychological equity the-
ory (Adams (1965)) for instance argues that individuals do not strive to receive
equal benefits or make equal contributions as long as the ratio between benefits and
contributions is similar. Analogously, we show that if agents are sufficiently hetero-
geneous, i.e., if the difference in abilities (and hence their inputs) is large, equity
between agents is only feasible when initial wealth levels are unequal suggesting that
(in)equality does not necessarily imply (in)equity and vice versa.
Applied to a team context within firms, our study provides insights on the ques-
tion whether equal wages are always the best wage policy. While it has often been
argued that unequal reward schemes provoke morale problems among co-workers
leading to lower performances (e.g. Akerlof and Yellen (1990), Bewley (1999)),
some other studies questioned whether equal payment, realized by wage compres-
sion, does eliminate all these problems.5 Winter (2004), for instance, shows that it
might be even optimal to reward identical agents differently as coordination can be
improved which has recently be confirmed in an experiment by Goerg et al. (2010).
In another experiment, Abeler et al. (2010) find that paying equal wages after an
unequal performance may lead to inequity and, in turn, to substantially lower efforts
and a decline in efficiency over time. But while these papers argue for inequality
in ex-post performance rewards, our paper shows that it may even be optimal to
introduce ex-ante inequality in the non-performance contingent wage components.
Furthermore, our paper also adds to the literature on behavioral contract theory
3Chan et al. (1996) find evidence which is in line with the model of Bergstrom et al. (1986) on
an aggregate level but not an individual level. Studies from sociology and development economics
that focus on different types of group heterogeneity also report mixed results (see e.g. Heckathorn
(1993), Vedeld (2000), Poteete and Ostrom (2004), Margreiter et al. (2005)).
4For recent experimental evidence of ability heterogeneity on public good provision see Noussair
and Tan (2011) and Fellner et al. (2011).
5See e.g. Lazear (1989) who argues that “... it is far from obvious that pay equality has these
effects”.
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studying the effects of inequity aversion on incentives.6 However, while in most of
the studies inequity aversion leads to more equal payment structures, our model
shows that inequity aversion may be a reason to introduce ex-ante inequality.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. The model is described in
Section 2. Section 3 presents the equilibrium analysis. In Section 4, we compare
the effort levels chosen by inequity averse and purely selfish agents. Section 5 ana-
lyzes preferences for redistribution and examines the effects of distribution policies
and group composition on the public good provision and social welfare. Section 6
concludes.
1.2 The Model
Two agents i and j can both contribute to a public good or a team outcome. An
agent’s contribution depends on her effort ei and her ability ai. Individual effort
costs are linear in the exerted effort and equal to c · ei, c ∈ R+. The group output
is determined by the sum of both agents’ contribution:7
ai
√
ei + aj
√
ej.
The agents directly benefit from a higher group output. Each agent receives a
share η of the group output indicating her individual valuation of the public good
(marginal per capital return). Furthermore, each agent i is provided with an initial
endowment wi.
8 Let ∆wi = wi − wj be the difference in initial endowments. Both
agents are inequity averse with a Fehr and Schmidt (1999) type utility function. An
agent’s utility is9
Ui = wi − c · ei + η ·
(
ai
√
ei + aj
√
ej
)− v (wi − c · ei − wj + c · ej)
with
v (∆) =
{
−α ·∆ if ∆ < 0
β ·∆ if ∆ > 0
6For a theoretical investigation of this topic see for instance Fershtman et al. (2003), Itoh (2004),
Grund and Sliwka (2005), Huck and Rey-Biel (2006), Demougin et al. (2006), Fehr et al. (2007),
Rey-Biel (2008), Dur and Glazer (2008), Mohnen et al. (2008), Kragl and Schmid (2009), Neilson
and Stowe (2010), Bartling and von Siemens (2010) and Englmaier and Wambach (2010).
7The concavity of the production functions guarantees internal solutions. Note that this frame-
work can be equivalently transformed to a setting with linear production functions and quadratic
costs. The chosen transformation just simplifies the exposition.
8In a team context, η represents e.g. the degree of team identification or the intrinsic benefit
of the work output and wi represents the wage.
9Hence, we allow that the disutility from inequity v (∆) depends on the difference of the agents’
net-wealth (rewards minus costs of effort).
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where α measures the “psychological costs” of disadvantageous inequity and β
that of advantageous inequity. Following Fehr and Schmidt (1999) we assume that
α ≥ β ≥ 0. Additionally, we assume that β ≤ 1
2
.10
1.3 Equilibrium Analysis
Each agent i maximizes
max
ei
wi + η ·
(
ai
√
ei + aj
√
ej
)− c · ei − v (wi − c · ei − wj + c · ej) .
The function is continuous but not continuously differentiable as it has a kink
at ei =
∆wi
c
+ ej where i attains the same utility as j. Off the kink, the second
derivative with respect to ei is −ηai
√
ei
4e2i
< 0. As the right-sided derivative at the kink
is strictly smaller than the left-sided derivative, the function is strictly concave.
We have to consider two possible equilibrium types depending on whether there is
inequity in equilibrium or whether both agents are equally well off. In an inequitable
equilibrium one agent i is better off given the chosen effort levels, i.e. wi − cei >
wj − cej. Suppose that such an equilibrium exists. When agent i is better off, the
following two conditions must hold in equilibrium
∂Ui
∂ei
= −c+ ηai
2
√
ei
+ βc = 0,
∂Uj
∂ej
= −c+ ηaj
2
√
ej
− αc = 0.
The respective equilibrium efforts are therefore
e∗i =
η2a2i
4 (1− β)2 c2 and e
∗
j =
η2a2j
4 (1 + α)2 c2
. (1.1)
Such an equilibrium exists if at these effort levels we indeed have that wi − cei >
wj − cej or
wi − c ·
(
η2a2i
4 (1− β)2 c2
)
> wj − c ·
(
η2a2j
4 (1 + α)2 c2
)
.
Substituting ∆wi ≡ wi − wj, this directly leads to the following result:
10Note that β > 12 connotes a very strong form of inequity aversion implying that ex-post, agents
would be willing to donate parts of their wealth to less wealthy group members up to the point
where wealth levels are completely equalized (compare Rey-Biel (2008)). We discuss implications
of this assumption at the end of Section 3.
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Proposition 1 If the difference in initial wealth ∆wi >
η2
4c
(
a2i
(1−β)2 −
a2j
(1+α)2
)
, there
exists a unique inequitable equilibrium. In this equilibrium, agent i is strictly better
off than agent j; the equilibrium effort levels satisfy:
e∗i =
η2a2i
4 (1− β)2 c2 and e
∗
j =
η2a2j
4 (1 + α)2 c2
.
Note that both agents adapt their efforts as the contribution of the favored agent i
increases in the degree of “compassion” β and that of her disadvantaged counterpart
j decreases in the degree of “envy” α. Still, they here end up in a situation which
is inequitable ex-post. But as the result shows this is only the case when the initial
inequality in wealth is sufficiently large.
We now have to check whether there are also equitable equilibria in which both
agents attain the same payoff. In that case wi − cei = wj − cej and both agents
choose their effort levels at the kink of the respective utility function. An effort
tuple
(
e∗i , e
∗
j
)
can be sustained in such an equitable Nash equilibrium if no agent has
an incentive to deviate. As the function is strictly concave, necessary and sufficient
conditions for the existence of the equilibrium are that for both agents the left hand
side derivative of the utility function must be positive at
(
e∗i , e
∗
j
)
, the right hand
side derivative negative and wi− ce∗i = wj − ce∗j . Hence, in an equitable equilibrium,
the following five conditions must be met:
∂−Ui
∂ei
∣∣∣∣
ei=e∗i
= −c+ ηai
2
√
e∗i
+ βc ≥ 0⇔ e∗i ≤ η
2a2i
4(1−β)2c2 (1.2)
∂+Ui
∂ei
∣∣∣∣
ei=e∗i
= −c+ ηai
2
√
e∗i
− αc ≤ 0⇔ e∗i ≥ η
2a2i
4(1+α)2c2
(1.3)
∂−Uj
∂ej
∣∣∣∣
ej=e∗j
= −c+ ηaj
2
√
e∗j
+ βc ≥ 0⇔ e∗j ≤
η2a2j
4(1−β)2c2 (1.4)
∂+Uj
∂ej
∣∣∣∣
ej=e∗j
= −c+ ηaj
2
√
e∗j
− αc ≤ 0⇔ e∗j ≥
η2a2j
4(1+α)2c2
(1.5)
e∗j = e
∗
i − ∆wic (1.6)
From these conditions the following result can be derived:
Proposition 2 If η
2
4c
(
a2i
(1+α)2
− a2j
(1−β)2
)
≤ ∆wi ≤ η24c
(
a2i
(1−β)2 −
a2j
(1+α)2
)
, there exists a
continuum of equitable equilibria. Specifically, any pair
(
e∗i , e
∗
j
)
of effort levels such
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that
max
{
η2a2i
4(1+α)2c2
;
η2a2j
4(1+α)2c2
+ ∆wi
c
}
≤ e∗i ≤ min
{
η2a2i
4(1−β)2c2 ;
η2a2j
4(1−β)2c2 +
∆wi
c
}
(1.7)
and e∗j = e
∗
i − ∆wic is an equitable equilibrium.
Proof: Inserting the equity condition (1.6) in conditions (1.4) and (1.5), we can
conclude that an effort level e∗i can be sustained if and only if
max
{
η2a2i
4(1+α)2c2
;
η2a2j
4(1+α)2c2
+ ∆wi
c
}
≤ e∗i ≤ min
{
η2a2i
4(1−β)2c2 ;
η2a2j
4(1−β)2c2 +
∆wi
c
}
.
Note that
η2a2i
4(1+α)2c2
<
η2a2i
4(1−β)2c2 and
η2a2j
4(1+α)2c2
+ ∆wi
c
<
η2a2j
4(1−β)2c2 +
∆wi
c
. Hence, the set
is non-empty for certain values of ∆wi if
η2a2i
4(1− β)2c2 ≥
η2a2j
4(1 + α)2c2
+
∆wi
c
and
η2a2j
4(1− β)2c2 +
∆wi
c
≥ η
2a2i
4(1 + α)2c2
which is the case when
η2a2i
4(1 + α)2c
− η
2a2j
4(1− β)2c ≤ ∆wi ≤
η2a2i
4(1− β)2c −
η2a2j
4(1 + α)2c
. (1.8)
This result has several interesting implications. First, note that there are always
multiple equitable equilibria. The reason is that inequity averse agents have some
interest to adapt their own effort according to the group member’s effort in order
to avoid the disutility from inequity. This leads to a coordination problem as the
reaction functions are upward sloping.
Second, the set of equitable equilibria defined by (1.7) is the larger, the higher
the agents’ degree of inequity aversion: The more the agents care for equity, the
larger is their willingness to adapt their efforts to reduce inequity which may either
be triggered by inequality in initial wealth or the group member’s effort level. The
lower boundary of the equilibrium set is decreasing in α as more “envious” agents
are willing to reduce their efforts to avoid being worse off than their group member.
Analogously, the upper boundary is increasing in β as more “compassionate” agents
are more willing to raise their efforts to reduce a group member’s disadvantage.
Likewise, the set defined by (1.8) is also increasing in the agents’ inequity aversion
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implying that the stronger the agents’ aversion against inequity, the larger may be
the maximal initial wealth inequality the agents are willing to offset by adapting
their contributions ending up in an equitable equilibrium.
Finally, note that the lower boundary for ∆wi as defined by condition (1.8)
exceeds zero (or the upper boundary is smaller than zero) when the abilities differ
strongly and inequity aversion is not too strong. In these cases, equitable equilibria
never exist when ∆wi = 0 and, hence, equity cannot be attained when wealth is
distributed equally. The reason is that due to the higher marginal productivity of
effort, the more productive agent will have a higher incentive to exert more effort
than her less productive fellow agent and, in turn, bears higher costs. But as both
agents benefit equally from the public good the more able agent is worse off when
both have the same initial wealth.11
Figure 1 shows the sustainable equilibrium effort levels of both agents i and j
as a correspondence of ∆wi.
12 There are two cut-off values for ∆wi. For small
values of ∆wi (= −∆wj) below η24c
(
a2i
(1+α)2
− a2j
(1−β)2
)
there is a unique inequitable
equilibrium with e∗i =
η2a2i
4(1+α)2c2
and e∗j =
η2a2j
4(1−β)2c2 . For large values of ∆wi above
η2
4c
(
a2i
(1−β)2 −
a2j
(1+α)2
)
there is a unique inequitable equilibrium with e∗i =
η2a2i
4(1−β)2c2 and
e∗j =
η2a2j
4(1+α)2c2
. For intermediate values of ∆wi equitable equilibria exist.
Note that as both agents attain identical payoffs in an equitable equilibrium,
they prefer the same one. Consequently, it is important to compare the different
feasible equitable equilibria with respect to the agents’ utility which leads to the
following result:
Corollary 1 As long as β ≤ 1
2
the equitable equilibrium in which the agents’ utility
is highest is always Pareto optimal within the set of Nash equilibria.
Proof: See the appendix.
To understand this result note that there is a free-rider problem which is par-
ticularly strong when agents are selfish. Inequity aversion helps to overcome this
free-rider problem as it allows agents to coordinate on higher effort levels which
come closer to the first best. As long as β does not exceed 1
2
the highest feasible
equilibrium is still lower than the first-best and therefore is preferred by the agents.13
With a β larger than 1
2
, however, inequity aversion becomes so strong that an agent
11Note that this is always the case when the agents are purely selfish (i.e. α = β = 0).
12The figure shows a setting in which ai = 12, aj = 10, α = 0.4, β = 0.2, η = 0.2, and c = 1.
13The agents’ first-best efforts can be derived by maximizing wi + wj − c · ei − c · ej + 2η ·(
ai
√
ei + aj
√
ej
)
and are given by eFBi =
η2a2i
c2 and e
FB
j =
η2a2j
c2 .
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Figure 1.1: Effort choice of agent i (left) and agent j (right) depending on ∆wi.
even would have an incentive to match an inefficiently high effort level chosen by
her group member even though both would be better off with a lower effort.
Hence, both agents benefit from playing the equitable equilibrium with the high-
est sustainable effort level when they are not extremely “compassionate”. This effort
level is equal to min
{
η2a2i
4(1−β)2c2 ;
η2a2j
4(1−β)2c2 +
∆wi
c
}
and, hence, strictly increasing in the
degree of advantageous inequity aversion β.
1.4 Do Inequity Averse Agents Contribute More?
We now compare the attained effort levels with those chosen by purely selfish agents
to study the effects of inequity aversion on the motivation to contribute to the public
good. From Propositions 1 and 2 as well as Corollary 1 (assuming that the agents
play the Pareto best equitable equilibrium)14 we know that the equilibrium effort
levels of inequity averse agents
(
e∗i , e
∗
j
)
are given by
(
η2a2i
4(1+α)2c2
,
η2a2j
4(1−β)2c2
)
if ∆wi <
η2
4c
(
a2i
(1+α)2
− a2j
(1−β)2
)(
η2a2j
4(1−β)2c2 +
∆wi
c
,
η2a2j
4(1−β)2c2
)
if ∆wi ∈
[
η2
4c
(
a2i
(1+α)2
− a2j
(1−β)2
)
, η
2
4c
(
a2i−a2j
(1−β)2
)](
η2a2i
4(1−β)2c2 ,
η2a2i
4(1−β)2c2 − ∆wic
)
if ∆wi ∈
[
η2
4c
(
a2i−a2j
(1−β)2
)
, η
2
4c
(
a2i
(1−β)2−
a2j
(1+α)2
)](
η2a2i
4(1−β)2c2 ,
η2a2j
4(1+α)2c2
)
if ∆wi >
η2
4c
(
a2i
(1−β)2−
a2j
(1+α)2
) (1.9)
as depicted by the solid upper boundary of the graphs in Figure 1. Note that
both functions are continuous and weakly monotonic.
Suppose, w.l.o.g., that i is the more able agent, i.e., ai ≥ aj. Purely selfish
14Cooper et al. (1992), Blume and Ortmann (2007) for instance find experimentally that simple
ex-ante cheap talk communication indeed very frequently leads to the choice of the Pareto efficient
Nash equilibrium in coordination games. See Demichelis and Weibull (2008) for a theoretical
argument based on lexicographic preferences for honesty.
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agents’ effort choices are not affected by initial wealth inequality as they consider
only their marginal returns when choosing their efforts. Hence, efforts are given by15
eselfishi =
η2a2i
4c2
and eselfishj =
η2a2j
4c2
. (1.10)
By comparing these effort levels of selfish agents with those of inequity averse
agents as given by (1.9) we obtain the following result:
Proposition 3 If
η2a2i
4c
− η2a2j
4(1−β)2c < ∆wi <
η2a2i
4(1−β)2c −
η2a2j
4c
, both agents contribute
more when they are inequity averse (i.e. e∗i > e
selfish
i and e
∗
j > e
selfish
j ). If ∆wi ≥
η2a2i
4(1−β)2c −
η2a2j
4c
, inequity aversion motivates agent i to exert higher efforts but de-
motivates agent j (i.e. e∗i > e
selfish
i and e
∗
j < e
selfish
j ). The opposite holds if ∆wi ≤
η2a2i
4c
− η2a2j
4(1−β)2c .
Proof: By comparing (1.9) with (1.10) it is straightforward to see that e∗i > e
selfish
i
if ∆wi ≥ η24c
(
a2i−a2j
(1−β)2
)
and e∗i < e
selfish
i if ∆wi ≤ η
2
4c
(
a2i
(1+α)2
− a2j
(1−β)2
)
. We only have
to check the case in which ∆wi ∈
(
η2
4c
(
a2i
(1+α)2
− a2j
(1−β)2
)
, η
2
4c
(
a2i−a2j
(1−β)2
))
. In this case
e∗i > e
selfish
i if
η2a2j
4(1−β)2c2 +
∆wi
c
>
η2a2i
4c2
⇔ ∆wi > η
2a2i
4c
− η2a2j
4(1−β)2c .
Hence, we can conclude that e∗i > e
selfish
i if ∆wi exceeds this cut-off.
16 Analogously,
e∗j > e
selfish
j if ∆wj = −∆wi >
η2a2j
4c
− η2a2i
4(1−β)2c which gives us the upper boundary.
It is straightforward to check that the interval in which both e∗i > e
selfish
i and
e∗j > e
selfish
j is non-empty.
Hence, the initial wealth differential ∆wi is crucial to determine how inequity
averse agents adapt their effort choices relative to the efforts maximizing their ma-
terial payoffs. For intermediate levels of initial wealth inequality, inequity aversion
indeed helps to reduce the free-rider problem as both agents contribute more when
coordinating on the Pareto-superior equilibrium.
But if initial wealth inequality becomes stronger, inequity aversion leads to an
asymmetric reaction as the favored agent chooses a higher effort than the level
maximizing her material payoff and the disadvantaged contributes less than would
be optimal from a payoff maximizing perspective.
15To see that, just replace α = β = 0 in the equilibrium efforts given by (1.1).
16Note that this cut-off is indeed always in the interior of the relevant interval.
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But it is important to note that the latter demotivating effect may arise for the
more able agent even when she is richer than her less able colleague: The lower
boundary for ∆wi in Proposition 3 is larger than zero if
η2a2i
4c
− η2a2j
4(1−β)2c > 0⇔ ai >
aj
1− β .
Hence, when ai is much larger than aj or when β is sufficiently small, the more able
agent reduces her effort below eselfishi unless ∆wi exceeds a strictly positive cut-off
value. Or, in other words, she has to be paid sufficiently more than her colleague
or otherwise will reduce her effort below the selfishly optimal level. To understand
the reason for this effect, note again that the payoff maximizing effort is always
larger for the more able agent as her marginal returns to effort are higher. As both
equally benefit from the public good, she is worse off than her less able colleague
when both have the same initial wealth. But when being inequity averse she suffers
from this disadvantage which is the higher the larger ai relative to aj. If β is high,
the more able agent will still choose an equilibrium effort level above eselfishi as also
her less able but “compassionate” counterpart puts in a sufficiently high effort and
they can coordinate to a superior equilibrium. But when β is small, she can only
reduce inequity by lowering her effort. Hence, not awarding the more able agent
more money up front leads to an unfair distribution of payoffs and, in turn, to lower
efforts.
1.5 Social Welfare, Redistribution, and Group Com-
position
We proceed by analyzing redistribution preferences of a) the agents and b) a social
planner who can allocate a fixed budget. We further investigate the welfare con-
sequences of a policy implementing an egalitarian wealth distribution irrespective
of the distribution of the agents’ abilities. Finally, we examine the effect of group
composition under the optimal distribution of the initial wealth.
1.5.1 Individual Preferences for Redistribution
We first study the agents’ ex-ante preferences on the initial wealth differential ∆wi
when they take into account their equilibrium effort choices. These considerations
will be a useful starting point for welfare analysis. To do that, it is instructive to
consider a situation in which a certain budget W = wi + wj can be distributed
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between the two agents. By inserting the equilibrium effort choices (1.9) into the
agents’ utility functions we can describe their utility as a function of the initial
wealth differential ∆wi. Analyzing the shape of the indirect utility functions we
obtain the following result:
Proposition 4 The agents’ utility function is continuous in ∆wi. If ∆wi <
η2
4c
(
a2i−a2j
(1−β)2
)
or ∆wi >
η2
4c
(
a2i
(1−β)2−
a2j
(1+α)2
)
an agent i’s utility is strictly increasing in ∆wi. But
between these two cut-off values it is strictly decreasing. Both agents’ utility func-
tions attain a local maximum at ∆w∗i =
η2
4c
(
a2i−a2j
(1−β)2
)
.
Proof: See the appendix.
This result is illustrated in Figure 2. The solid line shows agent i’s utility and
the dashed line agent j’s utility both as a function of ∆wi.
17 For extreme val-
ues of ∆wi each agent benefits from a redistribution in her favor and there is a
straightforward conflict of interest between both agents. But in the interval between
η2
4c
(
a2j
(1−β)2−
a2i
(1+α)2
)
and η
2
4c
(
a2i
(1−β)2−
a2j
(1+α)2
)
both agents’ interests are fully aligned.
The reason is that within this interval only equitable equilibria exist, and hence,
any ex-ante inequality in wealth will be offset by adapted effort levels. Moreover, all
values of ∆wi within this interval are Pareto-dominated by a initial wealth differen-
tial of ∆w∗i =
η2
4c
(
a2i−a2j
(1−β)2
)
as at this point, agents can coordinate on an equilibrium
leading to the highest contributions.
Proposition 4 has several interesting implications. Consider the situation of an
individual agent who can (re-)distribute a given wealth allocation. Interestingly,
an individual may benefit from ex-ante redistribution at her own expense as the
following result shows:
Corollary 2 If both agents receive the same initial wealth (i.e. ∆wi = 0) the less
able agent j can be made better off by reducing her own initial wealth by η
2
8c
(
a2i−a2j
(1−β)2
)
and transferring this money to the more able colleague i if
α > 1−β
3−4β
√
(2 (6β2 − 7β + 2)) + 2(1−β)2
(3−4β) − 1.
If α is smaller than this cut-off, such a transfer is still beneficial for agent j when
her ability is not to small, i.e. if
aj
ai
> min
{
1−β
1+α
,
√
1
(1−2β)
(
4(1−β)2
(1+α)
+ 1− 4 (1− β)− 2β(1−β)2
(1+α)2
)}
.
17The figure shows a setting in which ai = 12, aj = 10, α = 0.4, β = 0.2, η = 0.2, and c = 1.
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Figure 1.2: Agent i’s and agent j’s utilities in equilibrium depending on ∆wi.
Proof: See the appendix.
Hence, a less able agent can be better off ex-post when sacrificing parts of her
initial wealth which are then transferred to a more able individual. She then ben-
efits from this colleague’s higher willingness to contribute to the public good and
this helps to reduce the free-rider problem. Interestingly, this is always the case
irrespective of the difference in abilities if α is sufficiently large. Moreover, note
that the cut-off value for α is equal to 1
3
when β = 0 and strictly decreasing in
β. Hence, this condition holds for moderate values of α even when the agents only
suffer from disadvantageous inequity. The reason is that a more able agent resents
being worse off than her less able colleague when exerting a higher effort due to her
higher productivity. But she is willing to exert higher efforts when she earns more.
Therefore, a less able agent may benefit when her colleague’s income is increased
because, in turn, this colleague is willing to contribute more.
If α is rather small, the result still holds if the less able agent’s productivity is not
too small relative to her more able colleague’s productivity. If, however, her ability
is much smaller the transfer necessary to implement a performance maximizing
equitable equilibrium is too large such that agent j prefers to stick with the case
in which both receive the same initial wealth although this leads to a lower group
output.
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1.5.2 Social Welfare
We now study a situation in which an external authority can decide on the distri-
bution of wealth. To do so, we consider, a social planner who has a social welfare
function which is either egalitarian (i.e. who wants to maximize the utility of the
least well-off) or utilitarian (i.e. wants to maximize the sum of both agents’ util-
ity). It directly follows from Proposition 4 that such a social planner always has a
dominant choice:
Corollary 3 A social planner who is either utilitarian or egalitarian will set ∆w∗i =
η2
4c
(
a2i−a2j
(1−β)2
)
.
Proof: It is straightforward to see that within the set of initial wealth differentials
inducing equitable equilibria both egalitarian and utilitarian planners will always
choose ∆w∗i =
η2
4c
(
a2i−a2j
(1−β)2
)
as at this spread, both the sum and the minimum of
the agents’ utilities are maximized. Moreover, for an egalitarian social planner
any wealth differential which is not inducing an equitable equilibrium is always
dominated by this choice as the utility of the least well off agent is always lower in
an inequitable equilibrium. To see this formally note that when, w.l.o.g., j is favored
∂ui
∂∆wi
= 1
2
+ α > 0 for all ∆wi inducing an inequitable equilibrium (see (1.12) in the
proof of Proposition 4) and as the utility function is continuous, i’s utility is always
larger in an equitable equilibrium.
A utilitarian social planner will neither choose a wealth distribution inducing
an inequitable equilibrium, as in an inequitable equilibrium which, w.l.o.g., favors
agent j, the marginal gain from transferring money to agent i ∂ui
∂∆wi
= 1
2
+α is always
larger than j’s marginal loss which is equal to 1
2
− β (see again (1.12)).
Hence, even an egalitarian social planner who only considers the utility of the
least well off individual should allow for inequality in initial wealth. The reason is
that it is precisely this inequality in initial wealth that induces an equilibrium in
which equity is attained ex-post and in which the more able agent is willing to con-
tribute more. This observation bears some resemblance to the result by Andreoni
(1990) who argues that redistribution of income will increase the total contribution
if it benefits the more altruistic individuals.18 It directly follows that the imple-
mentation of an egalitarian wealth distribution policy has detrimental effects if the
group considered is not entirely homogeneous in terms of abilities.
18Similarly, with respect to social welfare, Thurow (1971) argues that some redistribution of
income is necessary in order to achieve a Pareto optimum.
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1.5.3 The Optimal Group Composition
So far, we only considered how wealth should be distributed treating the composition
of agents within a group as exogenously given. However,it is also interesting to study
the case in which the formation of groups can be determined as well. This might
be the case either if a principal or social planner has the power to dictate group
composition, or if agents have the opportunity to self-select into different groups or
incentive systems (see e.g. Hamilton et al. (2003), Kocher et al. (2006), Dohmen
and Falk (2011)). A straightforward conjecture is that group composition matters
for the willingness to contribute if the agents are inequity averse towards their fellow
group members. To investigate this, we consider a simple situation in which there
are four agents, two of high ability and two of low ability, that can be assigned into
two groups of two.19 By comparing total contributions, we can derive the following
result:
Proposition 5 If all agents have the same initial wealth, total contributions are al-
ways higher with homogeneous than with heterogeneous groups. But when wealth can
be adapted optimally, total contributions are independent of the group composition.
Proof: Let aH > aL be the ability of the high and low productive agent and let
wH and wL denote the initial wealth levels of the two agents, respectively. Given
the same initial wealth (∆w = wH − wL = 0) the total contribution with two
homogeneous groups is equal to
2η2a2H
4(1−β)2c2 +
2η2a2L
4(1−β)2c2 =
η2(a2H+a2L)
2(1−β)2c2 . (1.11)
With heterogeneous groups it is given by
η2a2H
2(1+α)2c2
+
η2a2L
2(1−β)2c2 if ∆w <
η2
4c
(
a2H
(1+α)2
− a2L
(1−β)2
)
η2(a2L+a2L)
2(1−β)2c2 if ∆w ∈
[
η2
4c
(
a2H
(1+α)2
− a2L
(1−β)2
)
, η
2
4c
(
a2H−a2L
(1−β)2
)] .
In both cases, the expression is strictly smaller than (1.11). If, however, the distri-
bution of the initial wealth can be optimally adapted, i.e. ∆w∗ = η
2
4c
(
a2H−a2L
(1−β)2
)
, the
19Note that in this regard, heterogeneity refers to the difference in agents’ abilities. For studies
analyzing optimal team composition with heterogeneity in agents’ preferences see for instance
Fershtman et al. (2006) and Brunner and Sandner (2012). Bartling (2012) analyzes how agents’
(social) preferences can be endogenously affected by the internal design of organizations.
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total contribution of two heterogeneous groups is
2
(
η2a2H
4(1−β)2c2 +
η2a2H
4(1−β)2c2 − ∆w
∗
c
)
=
2η2a2H
4(1−β)2c2 +
2η2a2H
4(1−β)2c2 − 2η
2
4c2
(
a2H−a2L
(1−β)2
)
=
2η2(a2H+a2L)
4(1−β)2c2 .
But this is equal to the total contribution of the homogeneous groups which is again
given by (1.11) as ∆w∗ = 0 is optimal in this case.
Hence, when the wealth level is fixed and equally distributed it is beneficial to
have homogeneous groups. The reason is straightforward from the analysis above:
Heterogeneity in abilities leads to a de-motivation of the more qualified agent when
wealth is equally distributed. By matching agents into homogeneous teams, this
de-motivational effect can be avoided and group homogeneity helps the agents to
coordinate on more favorable equilibria.
It is, however, interesting to note that group composition is irrelevant for total
contributions when the wealth level can be optimally adapted. In this case, the
disadvantage of the more able agent can be entirely offset and, in turn, motivation
to contribute is restored to the levels attainable in homogeneous groups. Besides
of that, there might be other channels through which performance can be affected
by group composition. For example, as argued by Hamilton et al. (2003), ”worker
heterogeneity could shape team productivity by facilitating mutual learning or by
influencing the group production norm.” Using a large dataset, the authors indeed
find that teams with a greater spread in ability are more productive than teams of
homogeneous agents.
1.6 Conclusion
This paper contributes to the literature investigating the effects of group heterogene-
ity on collective action. In particular, we analyzed the effects of wealth inequality
on the incentives to contribute to a public good when agents are inequity averse.
We have shown that it is optimal to introduce ex-ante inequality in wealth if agents
differ in their abilities. The reason is that inequality in favor of a more able agent
can motivate this agent to exert higher efforts. In particular, the stronger the agents’
inequity aversion, the stronger is also this incentive effect of inequality and the larger
should be the difference in initial wealth. Furthermore, we have shown that com-
pared to the case when agents are purely self-interested, contributions are higher
when agents are inequity averse as inequity aversion helps to reduce the free-rider
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problem and agents can coordinate on higher efforts.
Our results have several interesting implications. First of all, they cast doubt on
simple statements sometimes heard in practice claiming that inequality among the
members of a group is demotivating when people care for fairness. While this is
indeed true for very large wealth differentials in our model, the opposite can also
be the case, when wealth differentials are too small. Allocating agents of different
abilities the same initial wealth can lead to highly inequitable situations. The reason
is that in a public good setting, all agents equally benefit from the group output, but
more able agents exert higher efforts as their marginal returns to effort are higher
and, in turn, they incur higher costs. When agents are inequity averse this can
demotivate the more able agents which is bad for the overall performance as their
contributions are more valuable.
The results also may cast some light on the discussion about distributional poli-
tics (Alesina and Angeletos (2005), Durante and Putterman (2009)) and the effects
on citizens’ willingness to voluntary donate to a common good. Some previous
studies (e.g. Warr (1983) and Bergstrom et al. (1986)) have argued that the total
provision of a public good is independent of the distribution of wealth. In con-
trast, our results indicate that equality in wealth may crowd-out the motivation to
contribute. But introducing inequality may have positive effects on the citizens’
willingness to work for the common good. However, our model also shows that this
is the case only if the higher wealth is in the hands of those who can provide the
most valuable contributions.
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1.7 Appendix to Chapter 1
Proof of Corollary 1:
The value of emaxi directly follows from the upper boundary given by (1.7). Let
vEi (ei) = wi − cei + η
(
ai
√
ei + aj
√
ei − ∆wic
)
be agent i’s utility which is equal to agent j’s utility in any equitable equilibrium.
To compare the equilibria in the set defined by (1.7) we have to check which value
of ei maximizes this utility. Note that
∂vEi (ei)
∂ei
= −c+ η
 ai
2
√
ei
+
aj
2
√
ei − ∆wic
 and
∂2vEi (ei)
∂e2i
= η
(
−ai
4
e
− 3
2
i −
aj
4
(
ei − ∆wi
c
)− 3
2
)
< 0.
As vEi (ei) is strictly concave,
∂vEi (ei)
∂ei
∣∣∣
ei=emaxi
≥ 0 is a necessary and sufficient condi-
tion for emaxi to be Pareto optimal. If ∆wi <
η2
4c
(
a2i
(1−β)2 −
a2j
(1−β)2
)
, emaxi is equal to
η2a2j
4(1−β)2c2 +
∆wi
c
and the condition is equivalent to
−c+ η
ai 1
2
√
η2a2
j
4(1−β)2c2 +
∆wi
c
+ aj
1
2
√
η2a2
j
4(1−β)2c2 +
∆wi
c
−∆wi
c
 ≥ 0⇔
∆wi ≤ η
2
4c
(
a2i
β2
− a
2
j
(1− β)2
)
.
But η
2
4c
(
a2i
β2
− a2j
(1−β)2
)
≥ η2
4c
(
a2i
(1−β)2 −
a2j
(1−β)2
)
as long as β ≤ 1
2
. Hence, both agent’s
utility is maximal at emaxi in this case. If, however, ∆wi ≥ η
2
4c
(
a2i
(1−β)2 −
a2j
(1−β)2
)
, emaxi
is equal to
η2a2i
4(1−β)2c2 and the condition is equivalent to
−c+ η
ai 1
2
√
η2a2
i
4(1−β)2c2
+ aj
1
2
√
η2a2
i
4(1−β)2c2−
∆wi
c
 ≥ 0⇔
∆wi ≥ η
2
4c
(
a2i
(1− β)2 −
a2j
β2
)
But η
2
4c
(
a2i
(1−β)2 −
a2j
β2
)
≤ η2
4c
(
a2i
(1−β)2 −
a2j
(1−β)2
)
is again equivalent to β ≤ 1
2
.
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Proof of Proposition 4:
By substituting the equilibrium efforts (1.9) into agent i’s utility function we
obtain:
ui =

W+∆wi
2
+ η
(
ai
√
η2a2i
4(1+α)2c2
+ aj
√
η2a2j
4(1−β)2c2
)
− η2a2i
4(1+α)2c
+ α
(
∆wi − η
2a2i
4(1+α)2c
+
η2a2j
4(1−β)2c
)
if ∆wi <
η2
4c
(
a2i
(1+α)2
− a2j
(1−β)2
)
W+∆wi
2
+ η
(
ai
√
η2a2j
4(1−β)2c2 +
∆wi
c
+ aj
√
η2a2j
4(1−β)2c2
)
−
(
η2a2j
4(1−β)2c + ∆wi
)
if ∆wi ∈
[
η2
4c
(
a2i
(1+α)2
− a2j
(1−β)2
)
, η
2
4c
(
a2i−a2j
(1−β)2
)]
W+∆wi
2
+ η
(
ai
√
η2a2i
4(1−β)2c2 + aj
√
η2a2i
4(1−β)2c2 − ∆wic
)
− η2a2i
4(1−β)2c
if ∆wi ∈
[
η2
4c
(
a2i−a2j
(1−β)2
)
, η
2
4c
(
a2i
(1−β)2−
a2j
(1+α)2
)]
W+∆wi
2
+ η
(
ai
√
η2a2i
4(1−β)2c2 + aj
√
η2a2j
4(1+α)2c2
)
− η2a2i
4(1−β)2c − β
(
∆wi − η
2a2i
4(1−β)2c +
η2a2j
4(1+α)2c
)
if ∆wi >
η2
4c
(
a2i
(1−β)2−
a2j
(1+α)2
)
The first derivative of this function is
∂ui
∂∆wi
=

1
2
+ α if ∆wi <
η2
4c
(
a2i
(1+α)2
− a2j
(1−β)2
)
−1
2
+ η·ai
2c
√
η2a2
j
4(1−β)2c2 +
∆wi
c
if ∆wi ∈
[
η2
4c
(
a2i
(1+α)2
− a2j
(1−β)2
)
, η
2
4c
(
a2i−a2j
(1−β)2
)]
1
2
− η·aj
2c
√
η2a2
i
4(1−β)2c2−
∆wi
c
if ∆wi ∈
[
η2
4c
(
a2i−a2j
(1−β)2
)
, η
2
4c
(
a2i
(1−β)2−
a2j
(1+α)2
)]
1
2
− β if ∆wi > η24c
(
a2i
(1−β)2−
a2j
(1+α)2
)
(1.12)
Note that the slope in the second interval is strictly positive if
−1
2
+
η · ai
2c
√
η2a2j
4(1−β)2c2 +
∆wi
c
> 0⇔
η2
4c
(
4a2i −
a2j
(1− β)2
)
> ∆wi
which is always true for any ∆wi ∈
[
η2
4c
(
a2i
(1+α)2
− a2j
(1−β)2
)
, η
2
4c
(
a2i−a2j
(1−β)2
)]
and β ≤ 1
2
.
Furthermore, it is always positive at ∆wi =
η2
4c
(
a2i−a2j
(1−β)2
)
for any β ≤ 1
2
and equal to
zero if and only if β = 1
2
.
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Similarly, the slope in third interval is strictly negative if
1
2
+ η · aj
−1
c
2
√
η2a2i
4(1−β)2c2 − ∆wic
< 0⇔
η2
4c
(
a2i
(1− β)2 − 4a
2
j
)
< ∆wi
which is always true as well for any ∆wi ∈
[
η2
4c
(
a2i−a2j
(1−β)2
)
, η
2
4c
(
a2i
(1−β)2−
a2j
(1+α)2
)]
and
β ≤ 1
2
. Furthermore, it is always negative at ∆wi =
η2
4c
(
a2i−a2j
(1−β)2
)
for any β ≤ 1
2
and
equal to zero if and only if β = 1
2
.
Proof of Corollary 2:
The utility of agent j at ∆wi = 0 is always smaller as compared to ∆wi =
η2
4c
(
a2i−a2j
(1−β)2
)
if agent j’s utility function is increasing at ∆wi = 0 which is the case
when
0 >
η2
4c
(
a2i
(1 + α)2
− a
2
j
(1− β)2
)
⇔ aj
ai
>
1− β
1 + α
.
If this is not the case we have to compare the utility of the less able agent j at
the local maximum of both agents’ utility function
W
2
− η
2
(
a2i + a
2
j
)
8(1− β)2c +
η2
(
a2i + a
2
j
)
2 (1− β) c
with her utility at ∆wi = 0, which for
aj
ai
< 1−β
1+α
is given by
W
2
+
η2a2j
2 (1− β) c +
η2a2i
2 (1 + α) c
− η
2a2j
4 (1− β)2 c + β
(
η2a2j
4 (1− β)2 c −
η2a2i
4 (1 + α)2 c
)
.
Hence, agent j is better off with an unequal income when
a2j
a2i
>
1
(1− 2β)
(
4 (1− β)2
(1 + α)
+ 1− 4 (1− β)− 2β (1− β)
2
(1 + α)2
)
.
Note that if
(
4(1−β)2
(1+α)
+ 1− 4 (1− β)− 2β(1−β)2
(1+α)2
)
< 0 this holds for all values of
aj. As 4β − 3 < 0 this condition is equivalent to(
(1 + α)− 2 (1− β)
2
(3− 4β)
)2
>
2 (1− β)2
(3− 4β)2
(
6β2 − 7β + 2) .
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Note that 6β2 − 7β + 2 > 0 as this function is = 0 at β = 1
2
and decreasing for
0 < β < 1
2
. Rearranging the equation gives
α >
1− β
3− 4β
√
2 (6β2 − 7β + 2) + 2 (1− β)
2
(3− 4β) − 1
which proves the first claim. If, however,
(
4(1−β)2
(1+α)
+ 1− 4 (1− β)− 2β(1−β)2
(1+α)2
)
> 0,
the condition is equivalent to
aj
ai
>
√√√√ 1
(1− 2β)
(
4 (1− β)2
(1 + α)
+ 1− 4 (1− β)− 2β (1− β)
2
(1 + α)2
)
which establishes the second claim.
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Chapter 2
Heterogeneity and Cooperation in
Privileged Groups: The Role of
Capability and Valuation on
Public Goods Provision
2.1 Introduction
Most studies on collective action have focused on situations where agents with iden-
tical characteristics interact with each other. When considering the social and eco-
nomic life, however, people generally differ with respect to a variety of character-
istics, such as preferences, resources, qualifications, and attitudes. As such, the
existence and formation of homogeneous group environments can be regarded as an
exception, rather than the rule. Yet, the when, how, and to which degree collective
action is affected by inequality among group members is still a question that is dis-
cussed controversially.1 In this paper, we therefore experimentally investigate the
effects of two different sources of heterogeneity, valuations and capabilities, on the
willingness to cooperate in social dilemmas.
While it is often legitimate to abstract from heterogeneity to study the underlying
logic of collective action problems, we illustrate that this abstraction can sometimes
be problematic as it neglects important characteristics of cooperation. Our results
indicate that heterogeneity can affect the principle of reciprocity in non-trivial ways
by fundamentally altering individuals’ willingness to cooperate within groups. More
importantly, however, we find that it is not the asymmetric nature of groups per
1While some studies argue for a positive effect of heterogeneity (e.g. by increasing the likelihood
of attaining motivated contributors that initiate collective action (Olson, 1965; Hardin, 1982; Oliver
et al., 1985)), others find negative effects on cooperation levels, arguing that diversity makes the
emergence and enforcement of social norms more difficult (Bardhan and Dayton-Johnson, 2002;
Reuben and Riedl, 2013).
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se that facilitates or impedes collective action, but that it is the specific type of
heterogeneity that determines the degree of cooperative behavior and the level of
public good provision. In particular, our results imply that when heterogeneity
is associated with group members benefiting differently from the collective action,
then this has negative effects on contribution behavior. In contrast, we find that
if heterogeneity does not destroy the symmetric nature of public good benefits,
then inequality among group members can have positive effects on cooperation and
coordination.
Undoubtedly, members of a society or an organization often differ with respect
to their incentives to contribute to a collective good. On the one hand, this might
be the case if they have different valuations / preferences2 for the public good. For
example, parks, swimming pools, dams, or other public facilities provide very differ-
ent benefits to individuals, depending on how far away they live from the site or how
often they enjoy the consumption of the public good. Similarly, on an international
level, countries commonly are differently affected by global warming, the exploita-
tion of natural resources such as fish populations, or conventions about international
defense alliances. On the other hand, incentives to contribute may differ because
individuals have different capabilities in providing the public good.3 For exam-
ple, members of a team working on a joint project often have different task-specific
capabilities determining the productivity of their chosen effort. In the context of en-
vironmental protection, countries may have different qualifications in fighting global
climate change, e.g. different opportunities to preserve the rainforest or different
technological competencies to avoid carbon dioxide emissions. Likewise, in the case
of charitable donations and volunteer work, capability heterogeneity arises when in-
dividual donors have asymmetric information about fundraising organizations with
varying levels of qualifications (Vesterlund, 2003).
While both types of heterogeneity (preferences and capabilities) are closely re-
lated and often referred to as changes in the marginal per capita rate of return
(MPCR), they differ with respect to one important characteristic, namely the exter-
nality contributions have on the other group members’ payoffs. When individuals
have asymmetric preferences, benefits from the public good differ between group
members, but are independent of who makes a contribution. In contrast, if individ-
uals have asymmetric capabilities, benefits are the same for everyone but depend
on which group member contributes. While in the first case group members always
benefit asymmetrically causing inequalities in payoffs, in the case of heterogeneous
2In the following, we use both terms interchangeably.
3See e.g. Sugden (1984) who argued that “... equal efforts [to the public good] on the part of
different individuals need not be equally productive.”
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capabilities, equal contributions also lead to equal payoffs. This difference influences
the distribution of wealth and, given that people are not purely selfish, creates differ-
ent incentives to contribute which, in turn, can also affect allocation. By comparing
these two sources of heterogeneity, we are able to disentangle the effects of hetero-
geneous characteristics and an asymmetric payoff structure.
In particular, we investigate these types of heterogeneity within privileged groups
which according to Olson (1965) are groups in which at least one group member
“has an incentive to see that the collective good is provided, even if he has to
bear the full burden of providing it himself”.4 While the main argument of our
paper is not exclusive to privileged groups but also applies to heterogeneous non-
privileged groups, there are several reasons why these groups are of special interest.
First, many groups facing the problem of providing public goods can be regarded
as being privileged, e.g. in the case of commons-based peer productions such as
Linux (Benkler, 2002), attempts to stop overexploitation of natural resources, or
the fight against international terrorism.5 Second, especially in privileged groups
peoples’ willingness to (conditionally) cooperate is affected in important ways. The
reason is that contributions by others are not necessarily reciprocated if they do not
entail an individual sacrifice, making it hard to unequivocally identify them as nice
acts (Glo¨ckner et al., 2011). Third, although the free-rider problem is mitigated in
privileged groups as at least some amount of the public good is voluntarily provided,
there will still be underprovision as long as some members find it optimal not to
contribute. Finally, privileged groups are especially suited for studying heterogeneity
as they are asymmetric in their nature per se.
Because in collective action problems private and social marginal benefits diverge,
relying on voluntary provisions typically leads to an inefficient underprovision of the
public good (Samuelson, 1954; Olson, 1965; Hardin, 1968). Different institutional
solutions have been proposed to overcome this problem (see Chen, 2008, for a sur-
vey). In the experimental literature, the most commonly used institution to improve
collective action is decentralized peer punishment. However, while punishment has
4A different environment in which positive public goods contributions can be sustained in equi-
librium are so called step-level or threshold public good games (see e.g. Van de Kragt et al., 1983;
Suleiman and Rapoport, 1992; Marks and Croson, 1998; Cadsby and Maynes, 1999; Croson and
Marks, 2000; Spencer et al., 2009). Introducing provision points eliminates dominance from the
free-riding strategy and creates multiple equilibria by embedding a coordination game into the
social dilemma. This can lead to an efficient supply of the public good when agents manage to
coordinate, so that the provision point is exactly met.
5For example, the implementation of fishing quotas might be seen as individually optimal or
not, depending on how much a country’s economy depend on fishing. Likewise, in the case of the
fight against international terrorism, depending on the likelihood of being a target, countries may
perceive the benefits of contributing as being larger or lower than the costs (compare Reuben and
Riedl, 2009).
33
shown to be very effective in promoting public good contributions in homogeneous
settings (Ga¨chter and Herrmann, 2009; Chaudhuri, 2011), evidence from heteroge-
neous groups is rather sparse and inconclusive.6 In such environments, it is not clear
whether punishment and related mechanisms work similarly effective. As argued by
Reuben and Riedl (2013), one reason for this is that in asymmetric settings, different
fairness concepts can imply different contribution norms which, in turn, can have
detrimental effects on voluntary contributions and enforcement of cooperation. In
contrast, in homogeneous environments, different fairness norms such as efficiency,
equality, and equity all lead to one “coinciding focal norm” facilitating cooperation
and coordination and its enforcement. To study these effects in our context, we
compare our experimental treatments under two complementary situations: one in
which punishing other group members is possible and one in which informal sanc-
tions are absent.
Closest related to our work is a study by Reuben and Riedl (2009). In their
experiment, they also compare privileged groups of heterogeneous valuations to nor-
mal groups when punishment is possible or not. They find that without punishment
privileged groups contribute more, but once punishment is possible they lose their
privileged status contributing less than normal groups. They conclude that the
asymmetric nature of groups makes the enforcement of cooperation through infor-
mal sanctions harder to accomplish. In contrast to them, we additionally study
privileged groups of heterogeneous capabilities. This enables us to demonstrate that
it is not the asymmetric nature of groups per se that facilitates or impedes collec-
tive action, but that it is the specific type of heterogeneity that determines peoples’
willingness to cooperate within groups. In particular, our results imply that hetero-
geneity only has detrimental effects on voluntary contributions if it is accompanied
by an asymmetric payoff structure, highlighting the importance of payoff equality
on cooperation and coordination within groups.
So far, most previous studies that investigate the effects of heterogeneity on
public good provision also have made the payoff structure asymmetric by analyzing
6To our knowledge, the only experimental studies that analyze the interaction of heterogeneity
and punishment are Burns and Visser (2006), Reuben and Riedl (2009; 2013), and Noussair and
Tan (2011). While the first study finds positive effects of punishment on cooperation, the latter find
that punishment is relatively ineffective in increasing contributions in heterogeneous environments.
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inequality in endowments7 or preferences8. The crucial point of studying capability
differences is that it allows us to investigate the effects of heterogeneity on public
goods provision without destroying the symmetry of the payoff structure. In the
experimental literature, we are only aware of two studies (Noussair and Tan, 2011;
Fellner et al., 2011) that implement capability heterogeneity in a similar manner as
in our study. However, none of them investigate privileged groups and none of them
analyze the mere effect of capability heterogeneity as they do not compare behavior
to groups of homogeneous capability. Furthermore, we are not aware of any study
that directly compares differences in capabilities and preferences. Shedding light on
the differences between these two related types of heterogeneity is the major goal of
this study.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, the experi-
mental design and the behavioral predictions are described. Section 3 presents the
results of the experiment. Section 4 concludes.
2.2 The Experiment
2.2.1 Experimental Design
The underlying decision situation behind our experiment is a standard linear public
goods game. Subjects are randomly assigned to one of three experimental treat-
ments, which differ with respect to the group members’ characteristics (see below).
In each treatment, participants are matched into groups of three, playing the public
goods game for twenty consecutive periods with a surprise restart after ten periods
7Experiments investigating the effects of wealth heterogeneity in social dilemmas report mixed
results. While most studies find that endowment inequality leads to lower contributions (Ostrom
et al., 1994; Zelmer, 2003; Cherry et al., 2005; Anderson et al., 2008), a few studies report neutral
or even positive effects (Chan et al., 1996; 1999). Buckley and Croson (2006) find that individuals
with low incomes contribute the same absolute amount and a higher percentage of their income to
a common good than individuals with a high income. Levati et al. (2007) report a negative effect
of endowment heterogeneity on leading by example situations, especially in the case of incomplete
information. Cardenas (2003) finds a negative effect of inequality in real-life wealth on cooperation
levels when group members can communicate with each other.
8Several studies investigate the effects of different material incentives to contribute. Without
altering the Nash prediction of full free-riding, Isaac et al. (1984) and Isaac and Walker (1988)
find that higher marginal benefits from the public good also lead to higher contributions (see also
Ledyard (1995) and Zelmer (2003) for an overview). While these studies implement heterogeneity
only between groups, other studies analyze the effects of within-group inequality by manipulat-
ing the opportunity costs of contributing (Fisher et al., 1995; Palfrey and Prisbrey, 1996; 1997).
Relatedly, Goeree et al. (2002) investigate the effects of different internal and external returns on
public good provision. Similar to our experiment, a few articles study the case of full cooperation
being the dominant strategy. They find that even then, underprovision of the public good occurs
(Saijo and Nakamura, 1995; Reuben and Riedl, 2009; Glo¨ckner et al., 2011).
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(compare Andreoni, 1988; Croson, 1996). Group composition is kept constant across
all twenty periods (partner-matching design). At the beginning of each period, all
group members i ∈ {1, 2, 3} receive an endowment of twenty tokens.9 During the
first ten periods of the experiment, the game only consists of a contribution stage
in which participants simultaneously decide how many tokens of their endowment
they want to contribute to the public good and how many tokens they want to
keep for themselves. In the last ten periods, the contribution stage is followed by a
decentralized punishment stage.10
Importantly, in addition to one benchmark treatment in which all subjects have
completely identical characteristics, in the other two treatments group members dif-
fer with regard to the benefit they receive from their own and their group members’
contributions. In one treatment, they differ with respect to their valuation of the
public good δi, and in the other treatment, they differ with respect to their capa-
bility ai determining the marginal effect of their contributions. As such, a subject’s
effective contribution to the public good depends on two factors: (1) the individ-
ual’s nominal contribution ci ∈ [0, 20], and (2) the individual’s capability ai. Hence,
every token contributed to the public good by subject j increases the earnings of
each group member by δi · aj tokens. Any token not contributed to the public good
increases the own payoff by one token(leaving the other group member’s payoff un-
changed). Without punishment, subjects’ monetary payoff at the end of each period
is given by
pii = 20− ci + δi ·
N∑
j=1
aj · cj (2.1)
where the amount of public good provision is given by the sum of effective con-
tributions. If subjects are only interested in maximizing their monetary payoffs, if
δi·ai < 1, then in the stage game, the dominant strategy for subject i is to completely
free-ride and contribute nothing to the public good. If, however, δi ·ai > 1, then full
contribution becomes the dominant strategy. Furthermore, social efficiency is max-
9In each period, subjects receive an additional lump sum payment of five tokens. These tokens,
however, do not alter contribution possibilities to the public good. This was done because of some
additional treatments unrelated to the research question in this paper. As the lump-sum payment
does not alter any of our predictions and results, we discard it from our analyses.
10In this study, we abstain from controlling for order effects. However, as has been shown
previously (see e.g. Fehr and Ga¨chter, 2000), the sequence of play, i.e. whether the punishment
condition is played first or last, does not affect the effectiveness of punishment. Therefore, in the
results section, we assume that contribution differences between conditions are mainly driven by
the introduction of punishment, rather than other explanations such as learning. Furthermore,
as our results from the punishment condition are very similar to Reuben and Riedl (2009) who
analyze the effects of punishment in a between-subject design, we provide evidence that they are
robust to this variation in the experimental design.
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imized if everyone contributes their entire endowment to the public good. Hence,
we have a typical social dilemma situation in which, except for privileged players,
individual and group interests are at odds.
In the punishment stage, each participant i simultaneously decides how many
punishment points pij ∈ [0, 10] she wants to assign to each other group member j.
Each punishment point assigned reduces the earnings of the punished group member
by three tokens and costs the punisher one token. At the end of each period, group
members are informed about the total number of punishment points received by
other group members and their earnings from this period.11 With punishment, in
each period, earnings are given by
pii = 20− ci + δi ·
N∑
j=1
aj · cj − 3
∑
j 6=i
pji −
∑
j 6=i
pij (2.2)
The parameterization of our experiment is very similar to other public good
experiments. In our baseline treatment (Base), all group members receive the
same endowment yi = 20, benefit to the same extent from the public good δi = 0.5,
and have the same capability of providing the public good ai = 1.
12 In the valuation
treatment (Val), the only difference is that at the beginning of the experiment,
in each group one randomly selected member is assigned a valuation of δH = 1.5
leaving her capability of aH = 1 unchanged. In the capability treatment (Cap),
the randomly selected member receives an capability of aH = 3 keeping constant
her valuation of δH = 0.5. The two non-selected group members have the same
characteristics as subjects in the baseline treatment (δL = 0.5; aL = 1). In both
treatments we refer to the randomly selected members as h-types and to the other
members as l-types. The assignment of types is kept constant throughout all 20
periods. All of this information is common knowledge to all participants in the
experiment. Additionally, at the end of each period subjects receive exact feedback
about each group members’ contribution and payoff. For a summary of the three
treatments, see Table 2.1.
The difference between Val and Cap arises from the different externalities con-
tributions have on the group members’ payoffs, i.e. l- and h-players in Val and
Cap benefit differently from contributions made by h- and l-players, respectively.
In Table 2.1, Column 5 shows public good benefits subjects receive from contribu-
11Subjects do not receive any information about individual punishment behavior of the other
group members. Additionally, subjects are informed that they are protected against severe losses
as they cannot be punished by other group members below zero (compare Fehr and Ga¨chter, 2002).
12Note then when ai = 1, the game boils down to the standard case without an explicit modeling
of capability.
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Table 2.1: Experimental Treatments
Treatment Type
Valuation Capability
∂piPGi
∂cL
=
∂piPGi
∂cH
=
# Groups
δi ai δi · aL δi · aH
Base 3 x l-player 0.5 1 0.5 - 15
Val
2 x l-player 0.5 1 0.5 0.5
16
1 x h-player 1.5 1 1.5 1.5
Cap
2 x l-player 0.5 1 0.5 1.5
15
1 x h-player 0.5 3 0.5 1.5
Note: The endowment for all player types in all treatments is 20 tokens per period.
tions of l-types, and Column 6 displays public good benefits subjects receive from
contributions of h-types. In Val, only h-players directly benefit from the “gift” of
having a higher evaluation, irrespective of which type contributes. L-players only
indirectly benefit from the increased material incentives of the h-player but not from
her higher valuation per se. In contrast, in Cap, all group members benefit equally
from the “gift” of one player having a higher capability. Both types of player re-
ceive 1.5 points from the public good when h-types contribute, and 0.5 points when
l-types contribute. Hence, l-players not only benefit from the increased material
incentives of the h-player but also from the fact that her contributions are more
valuable. In the next section, we investigate how this difference between both types
of privileged groups affects behavior.
In summary, the only difference across treatments is the absence or presence of
an h-player and, in the latter case, whether the h-player has a higher valuation
or a higher capability than the l-players. Thus, by comparing our three treatment
conditions, we can investigate the effect of different types of h-players on contribution
behavior depending on whether the possibility to punish is available or not.
2.2.2 Behavioral Predictions
Without the possibility to punish, under the assumption that individuals are fully
rational, focusing only on the maximization of their own monetary payoff, nobody
is predicted to contribute a positive amount to the public good in Base. The same
prediction can be made for l-types in Val and Cap. However, in these treatments,
it is strictly dominant for h-types to contribute their entire endowment as their
individual return of contributing strictly outweighs the corresponding costs, and
therefore, also increases their own material payoff. In contrast to normal groups in
Base, groups in these two treatments can be characterized as being privileged in
38
the sense of Olson (1965), as one member in each group has an individual material
incentive to provide the public good. Importantly, monetary incentives for h-players
in Val and Cap are completely identical, as their marginal benefit from contributing
one token to the public good is given by δV ALH ·aV ALH = 1.5·1 = 1.5 and δCAPH ·aCAPH =
0.5 · 3 = 1.5, respectively. Certainly, they differ with respect to the externality they
have on other group members and other group members have on them. Yet, these
external effects only matter if people also care about the well-being of others (see
below). Introducing punishment does not change the standard predictions made
previously. Since punishment is costly, selfish individuals are predicted to not assign
any punishment points in the second stage. By the logic of backward induction, this
is anticipated by group members in the first stage and, thus, they do not change
their contribution behavior, as punishment is not credible.
However, there are now a broad number of studies indicating that many people
are not solely motivated by monetary incentives, but also exhibit some form of other-
regarding preferences. For example, even when nobody is predicted to contribute
anything, evidence from previous public good experiments suggest that there is
some positive amount of voluntary cooperation (Dawes and Thaler, 1988; Ledyard,
1995; Chaudhuri, 2011). A variety of models of other-regarding-preferences (Rabin,
1993; Fehr and Schmidt, 1999; Bolton and Ockenfels, 2000; Charness and Rabin,
2002; Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger, 2004; Falk and Fischbacher, 2006) have been
established that are quite successful in explaining such patterns of behavior observed
in the laboratory and in the field.13 In the following, we discuss the implications
such other-regarding preferences have on contribution behavior in our experimental
setting.
First of all note that when the endowment and the valuation of the public good
is the same for all group members, differences in contributions translate one-to-one
into differences in final payoffs, i.e. irrespective of the subjects’ capabilities, equal
contributions lead to equal payoffs and unequal contributions lead to unequal pay-
offs. In Base, given that people are motivated by inequity aversion or reciprocity,
the public goods problem turns into a coordination problem with multiple Pareto
ranked equilibria (Rabin, 1993; 1998; Fehr and Schmidt, 1999; Ga¨chter and Fehr,
1999). Given the right beliefs about other peoples’ contribution, individuals act as
conditional cooperators (Fischbacher et al., 2001) and any amount of cooperation
can be sustained in equilibrium. Yet, as argued by Fehr and Schmidt (1999), co-
ordination on high contribution levels is more likely when the possibility to punish
13For a summary of the empirical evidence on social preferences, see Sobel (2005) and Fehr and
Schmidt (2006).
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free-riders is available. The reason is that reducing income differences by punishing
low contributing group members becomes a credible motivation when people also
care about relative incomes.
In Cap, basically the same logic applies. Yet, in contrast to Base, if both
types of players follow their payoff-maximizing strategy, they end up with very
unequal payoffs. The reason is that all group members benefit equally from the
public good but only h-players have to bear the costs of providing it. If subjects are
inequity averse, they have an incentive to match their group members’ contributions.
While l-players would like to increase their contributions to reduce their disutility
from being better off, h-players would like to decrease their contributions to reduce
their disutility from earning less than their group members. Ex-ante, however, it
is not straightforward on which equilibrium subjects may coordinate on (see Ko¨lle
et al., 2011, for an theoretical analysis of capability heterogeneity on public goods
provision). Fehr and Schmidt (1999) argue that full contribution can be a focal point
serving as a coordination device. Applying their utility function to this context,
however, reveals that the condition for h-players to decrease their contributions is
much easier to fulfill than the condition for l-players to increase their contributions,
making equilibria with low cooperation levels more likely.14 However, when subjects
are given the possibility to punish each other, like inBase, coordination on equilibria
with high cooperation levels may work as well, as using punishment to reduce income
differences is a credible motivation.
When people have asymmetric valuations for the public good, predictions are
different. While contributions made by h-players increase their own payoff with-
out changing income differences within a group, contributions made by l-players
decrease their own income and additionally increase unfavorable income inequality
compared to the h-player. Therefore, inequity aversion does not change the pre-
dictions made by the standard model of purely selfish agents. H-players have no
incentive to deviate from full contributions, and l-players have no incentive to deviate
from free-riding. Furthermore, introducing punishment is not predicted to increase
contributions in this kind of groups. Contrary to the other two treatments, the
motivational effect of punishment has less bite here. The reason is that even when
getting punished, l-types might be reluctant to increase contributions as h-types
14Given the parameterization of this experiment, for sustaining an equilibrium in which all
players contribute positive amounts, both l-players must suffer sufficiently strong from being better
off (β ≥ 0.5). In contrast, h-players have an incentive to deviate and free-ride when their disutility
from being worse off is sufficiently strong (α > 0.5). Note that because disadvantageous inequity
aversion is usually much more pronounced than advantageous inequity aversion (see Blanco et al.
(2011) for an empirical study eliciting the distribution of α and β parameters), the first condition
is more demanding than the latter making deviations of h-players more likely.
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would benefit disproportionately from that leading to an increase in inequality.15
Intention-based theories of social preferences may also lead to different predic-
tions between treatments. While in normal groups, low and high contributions may
have an unambiguous interpretation of being kind or unkind, in privileged groups,
this judgment is more difficult. In these groups, contributions of h-players cannot
unequivocally be identified as being a nice act, as they also maximize their individ-
ual payoffs. As a consequence, l-types might be unsure whether to reciprocate these
contributions or not which, in turn, might hamper cooperation (Glo¨ckner et al.,
2011). While this is true in both types of privileged groups, contributions of h-
players might also be evaluated more kindly in Cap than in Val. The reason is
that due to the different externalities, by contributing h-types in Cap have to fear
the risk of being worse off which is not the case for their counterparts in Val. Like-
wise, when comparing free-riding by l-players between Val and Cap, in the latter
such behavior might be judged being more unkind as, compared to the h-types, this
also gives them a monetary advantage in relative terms.16
In summary, standard preferences do not predict any differences in voluntary
contributions between both types of privileged groups. While models of other-
regarding preferences can explain such differences, ex-ante it is not clear in which
treatment underprovision of the public good will be more pronounced. When the
opportunity to punish is introduced, however, we expect that it has a much weaker
effect on increasing cooperation in Val than in the other two treatments.
2.2.3 Experimental Procedure
The experiment was conducted in 2011 at the Cologne Laboratory for Economic
Research (Germany). Subjects were students from the University of Cologne and
were recruited using the online recruiting software ORSEE (Greiner, 2004). Exper-
imental sessions were computerized using the software z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007).
In total, 138 subjects participated in the experiment, 45 in Base and Cap, and
48 in Val, leading to 15, 15, and 16 independent observations, respectively. About
half of the subjects were female and about half studied economics. Upon arriving
15Of course, if contributing would prevent l-types of getting punished, this would pay off. How-
ever, h-types may not punish l-types in the first place, because this would further increase inequal-
ity. Furthermore, another strategy for l-types to avoid inequality is to punish h-types as a response
to expected punishment.
16Another motivation for contributing to the public good are efficiency concerns (see e.g. Engel-
mann and Strobel, 2004). In this case, we would expect less underprovision in privileged groups
than in normal groups. When comparing privileged groups, we observe that the maximum social
efficiency achievable is the same in Val and Cap. While contributions made by h-types are more
efficient in Cap, contributions made by l-types are more efficient in Val. Ex-ante, however, it is
difficult to predict which, if any, of the two effects dominates.
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in the laboratory, each subject drew a card which randomly assigned them a seat
in the lab. Subjects were also randomly assigned to a treatment, a type (l or h),
and a group. At the beginning of the experiment, subjects read the instructions
explaining the public goods problem, the incentives, and the rules of the game. To
ensure their understanding of the experiment, participants had to answer several
control questions about the comparative statics of the game. Only after all partic-
ipants answered all questions correctly, the experiment started. At the end of the
experiment, subjects had to fill out a short questionnaire, after which they were
confidentially paid out their earnings in cash. A typical experimental session took
about 1.5 hours and subjects earned, on average, 17.02 Euros (approx. 22.81 USD).
2.3 Results
We start our analysis by investigating contribution behavior in the first ten periods
without punishment. After that, we analyze how contributions change when sub-
jects are given the possibility to punish other group members. In both cases, we
first analyze behavior on an aggregated group level and then zoom into individual
behavior of l- and h-types. We then study punishment behavior and how subjects
react to received punishment.
2.3.1 Voluntary Contributions without Punishment
Figure 2.1 illustrates average contributions for all three treatments in periods 1-10
at an aggregated group level (Column 1), as well as separated by l- and h-types
(Columns 2-4). Comparably to similar public good experiments, in Base we find
the commonly observed pattern of positive but decreasing contributions over time.
While in the first round, participants contribute around 60% of the social optimum,
contributions nearly drop to full free-riding in the last period. A Spearman’s rank-
order correlation of contributions on periods corroborates this negative time trend
(ρ = −0.531, p = 0.007).17
Very similar contribution dynamics can be observed in Val. Contributions start
at high but decrease to very low levels in the final period (ρ = −0.513, p < 0.001).
As a result, average contributions are basically identical in both treatments (Base:
9.54 and Val: 9.56 tokens, see Table 2.2). In fact, a non-parametric Mann-Whitney
17Throughout this paper, when using Spearman’s rank-order correlation we calculate a correla-
tion coefficient for each independent observation (group) and report the average. For the p-value
we apply a Binomial test with the null hypothesis that a positive and a negative trend are equally
likely.
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Figure 2.1: Average contributions over time without punishment
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U test18 cannot reject the hypothesis that distributions are drawn from the same
population (p = 0.812). The reason is that in Val, increased contributions of
h-types are accompanied by decreased contributions of l-types (see Column 3 in
Figure 2.1). Compared to Base, both effects are statistically significant (MWU,
l-types, p < 0.044; h-types, p < 0.002). While both types start at different lev-
els, they exhibit a similar decline in cooperation over time until a small endgame
effect sets in. On average, h-types contribute 15.93 tokens and l-types contribute
6.38 tokens (Wilcoxon signed-rank test, p < 0.001). Strikingly, h-types do not stick
to their dominant strategy of full contribution although contributing their entire
endowment would not only maximize their material payoff, but would also max-
imize social efficiency, leaving relative incomes unchanged (Sign test, p < 0.001
one-sided).19 Altogether, we find that privileged groups whose asymmetry stems
from differences in the preferences for the common good do not contribute more
18If not otherwise indicated, we use a non-parametric Mann-Whitney U test (henceforth MWU)
for comparisons between treatments and a non-parametric Wilcoxon signed-rank test (henceforth
WSR) for within-treatment comparisons. We always apply two-sided test statistics and use group
averages based on data from all relevant periods (either 1-10 or 11-20) as the unit of observation.
19By applying a one-sided test, we account for the fact that deviations from full contribution
can only either be zero or negative.
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Table 2.2: Descriptive Statistics
Contributions
Without Punishment With Punishment
l-player h-player total l-player h-player total
Base
9.54 - 9.54 16.53 - 16.53
(4.56) - (4.56) (3.68) - (3.68)
Val
6.38 15.93 9.56 10.27 17.96 12.83
(5.24) (4.32) (4.11) (6.85) (5.40) (5.53)
Cap
12.64 16.19 13.82 18.41 19.83 18.88
(6.01) (4.16) (5.03) (3.02) (0.41) (2.02)
Note: Average contributions depending on treatment, subjects’ type and
whether the opportunity to punish other group member is available or not. Stan-
dard deviations using group averages as the unit of observation are in parentheses.
than normal groups.20
In contrast, privileged groups of heterogeneous capabilities do much better in
sustaining cooperation. While contributions in the first period are at a similar same
level than in the other two treatments, they maintain a high level until the final
period, when a typical endgame effect sets in. Hence, having one subject with a
high capability in the group has a positive and stabilizing effect on voluntary contri-
butions. A Spearman’s rank-order correlation of contributions on periods does not
indicate a decline of cooperation over time (ρ = −0.066, p = 1.000). In total, sub-
jects inCap contribute, on average, 13.82 tokens compared to 9.56 inVal. Although
standard theory predicts that contributions should be the same in both treatments,
a Mann-Whitney test clearly rejects equality of distributions (p = 0.034). The dif-
ference in contributions is thereby mainly driven by l- rather than by h-types. While
the latter contribute about the same amount in both treatments (Val: 15.93, Cap:
16.19; MWU, p = 0.984), l-types in Cap contribute about twice as much as in Val
(12.64 vs. 6.38; MWU, p = 0.007). This already indicates that in Cap, l-types
have a much higher willingness to reciprocate contributions made by h-types. The
reason is that in Cap, by increasing contributions to the levels provided by h-types,
l-types can decrease payoff inequality within the group. Moreover, this also pre-
vents fairness concerned h-types to decrease contributions as a consequence of being
worse off. In this case, increasing contributions also materially pays off for l-types,
as contributions of h-types are more valuable. In contrast, in Val such a behavior
would increase inequality to the l-types’ disadvantage which, in turn, decreases their
20While Reuben and Riedl (2009) find the same result only for the case in which informal
sanctions are available, in our study this effect is also present in situations in which punishing
other group members is not possible.
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Table 2.3: OLS Regressions: Contributions to the public good
Dependent variable: ci, t Base Val Cap
Contributions by i l-types h-types l-types h-types
(Avg.) lagged contrib. l-types 0.700∗∗∗ 0.640∗∗∗ 0.339∗ 0.511∗∗∗ 0.478∗∗∗
c¯ low−i, t−1 (6.36) (5.51) (2.12) (4.81) (4.12)
Lagged contrib. h-types 0.068 0.244∗∗
c¯high−i, t−1 (1.31) (2.64)
Period -0.538∗∗∗ -0.106 -0.196 -0.664∗∗∗ 0.175
t (-3.61) (-0.98) (-1.01) (-4.42) (1.08)
Constant 5.159∗∗∗ 1.202 14.561∗∗∗ 5.862∗∗∗ 8.798∗∗∗
(3.02) (0.71) (5.91) (3.51) (3.92)
# Observations 405 288 144 270 135
Adj. R2 0.448 0.449 0.102 0.381 0.281
Note: t statistics in parentheses; ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01; Robust Std. Err. (clustered on groups)
willingness to contribute.
Further support for the different incentives in reciprocating the other types’
contributions comes from an OLS regression.21 Results are reported in Table 2.3.
Columns 2-6 illustrate the results from separate regressions for each treatment and,
in Val and Cap, additionally separated for l- and h-types. The dependent variable
is the level of public good provision, ci, made by subject i. As independent variables,
we use the lagged contributions of the other group members from the previous period
to analyze subjects’ willingness to (conditionally) cooperate. To provide a clearer
understanding of the dependence of contributions between types, for l-types we
distinguish between contributions made by h- or other l-types in the group. In
addition, we control for different time trends, intercepts, and the dependency of
observations within groups.
In normal groups (Column 2) we find a strong and significant positive relation-
ship between own contributions and the other group members’ contributions from
the preceding period. Thus, subjects seem to condition their contributions on the
other group members’ behavior, i.e. the higher (lower) the other group members’
contributions in the previous period, the higher (lower) are subject i′s contributions
in the subsequent period. In Val, we observe an asymmetry in the willingness to
reciprocate between types. Results indicate that l-players (Column 3) do condition
their contributions on the behavior of the other l-player, but contributions by h-
players do not significantly affect their decisions (F-test, p < 0.001), i.e. l-players,
at least to some extent, are willing to match the other l-player’s contribution, but are
21Applying Tobit regression instead of OLS leads to the same results and conclusions.
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reluctant to increase their contributions up to the level of the h-player as this would
increase inequality to their disadvantage. At the same time, however, h-players
(Column 4) do take into account the contribution behavior of l-players, indicating
that they act as conditional cooperators, thereby “punishing” l-types by recipro-
cating their decreasing contributions over time. This behavior basically constitutes
a one-to-one punishment strategy, which lowers all group members’ payoffs by the
same amount, leaving relative incomes unchanged.22 These results are in line with
l-players following a norm of equal payoffs, and h-players players following a norm
of equal contributions. This asymmetry in behavior may also be a reason for the
steady decline of cooperation over time in this treatment.23 In contrast, in Cap we
find contribution behavior to be much closer and more symmetrically interrelated.
H-players reciprocate contributions by l-players, and l-players reciprocate contribu-
tions by h- and other l-players (Columns 5 and 6). All these effects are positive and
statistically significant. This implies that despite the fact of heterogeneous capabil-
ities, the symmetric payoff structure maintains the l- and h-players’ incentives to
match each other’s contributions. In this case, the norms of equal contributions and
equal payoffs coincide, which seems to foster cooperation.
In summary, we find that the nature of asymmetry within a group crucially af-
fects peoples’ willingness to cooperate. While ex-ante it was not clear which (if any)
type of privileged group performs better, our results indicate that groups of asym-
metric capabilities are much better in coordinating on high cooperation levels than
groups of asymmetric preferences. The main reason are the different externalities
contributions have on the other group members, causing the payoff structure to be
symmetric in Cap, but asymmetric in Val. To demonstrate the magnitude of the
effect this has on the distribution of outcomes, we calculate the standard deviation
of earnings per period within each group as a simple measure of inequality. As ex-
pected, we find inequality within groups to be much more pronounced in Val than
in Cap. Average payoffs per period for l- and h-types are 27.97 and 47.09, respec-
tively, in Val, and 44.28 and 40.73, respectively, in Cap. The average standard
deviation of earnings sums to 11.40 in Val, and 4.34 in Cap (MWU, p = 0.016).
Furthermore, not only in terms of equality but also in terms of efficiency, groups in
Cap perform better than in Val. In the former they reach 86%, and in the latter
22This result is consistent with previous studies which explicitly implement a one-to-one pun-
ishment technology (Egas and Riedl, 2008; Nikiforakis and Normann, 2008; Sutter et al., 2010).
They find that even when punishment does not affect relative incomes, subjects punish each other
although this is not very effective in increasing contributions.
23See Fischbacher and Ga¨chter (2010) for a more comprehensive analysis of contribution dynam-
ics in repeated public goods games.
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they reach 69% of the social optimum (MWU, p = 0.002).24
2.3.2 Voluntary Contributions with Punishment
As argued above, heterogeneity can lead to an increased ambiguity or disagreement
about the contribution norm which, in turn, can substantially affect the enforcement
of cooperation through informal sanctions. In the following, we therefore analyze
to which degree the results found so far hold or change when subjects are given the
possibility to punish each other.
Figure 2.2 summarizes the results illustrating average contributions over time for
all treatments and types when punishment is possible (periods 11-20). We observe
that introducing the opportunity to punish increases average contributions in all
three treatments. However, the quantitative effect of punishment on contributions
strongly differs between treatments. Compared to the first ten periods without
punishment, average contributions go up by 6.99 (WSR, p < 0.001), 3.27 (WSR,
p = 0.030), and 5.06 (WSR, p < 0.001) tokens, in Base, Val, and Cap, respectively.
Apparently, especially in the treatments in which all subjects benefit equally from
the public good, punishment is effective in increasing contributions. Jointly testing
the change in contributions in Base and Cap compared to Val reveals that in
the latter, punishment is less effective in fostering cooperation (MWU, p = 0.054).
One reason for this result is that in Val, the introduction of punishment causes
opposing reactions. In 5 out of 16 groups (31%), average contributions are actually
lower under the punishment condition, leading to an increased standard deviation of
contributions across groups (4.11 vs. 5.53, see Table 2.2). In contrast, in Base and
Cap punishment has a clear and consistent positive effect on cooperation, leading to
increased contributions in all groups. Furthermore, implementing punishment also
leads to a decreased dispersion across groups within treatments, as the standard
deviation of average contributions decreases from 4.56 to 3.68 in Base, and 5.03 to
2.02 in Cap.
When having a closer look at the contribution dynamics over time, in Base
and Cap we observe a significant upward trend in contributions over time (Base:
ρ = 0.348, p = 0.035; Cap: ρ = 0.515, p < 0.001). In contrast, contribution dynam-
ics in Val are rather flat (ρ = 0.026, p = 0.210), implying that peer-punishment is
largely ineffective in fostering cooperation over time. When treating average contri-
butions from period 11 to 20 as independent observations, we find a clear ranking
of cooperation levels. Average contributions in the last ten periods are 16.53, 12.83,
24In Base, subjects earn on average 24.77 tokens per period, corresponding to 83% of the social
optimum and to an inequality measure of 3.95.
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Figure 2.2: Average contributions over time with punishment
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and 18.88 in Base, Val, and Cap, respectively. As in the no punishment condi-
tion, average contributions in Cap are highest. Remarkably, contributions in Val
now fall short even below the levels provided in Base. All these differences are
statistically significant (Base vs. Cap: MWU, p = 0.024; Val vs. Cap: MWU,
p = 0.002; Base vs. Val: MWU, p = 0.053).25 Thus, when introducing the possi-
bility to punish, privileged groups in Val lose their privileged status completely and
perform even worse than normal groups. However, as can be seen from the results
in Cap, it is not the asymmetric nature of groups per se that hampers cooperation.
It is rather the specific type of heterogeneity that undermines peoples’ willingness
to cooperate and prevent contribution levels coming close to social efficiency.
When zooming into the behavior of l- and h-types, similar to the first ten periods,
we observe that contributions are much more closely interrelated in Cap than in Val
(Columns 3 and 4 in Figure 2.2). The difference in contributions between both types
amounts to 1.42 and 7.70 tokens (MWU, p = 0.009), respectively. Comparing both
25When treating group behavior over all twenty periods as independent observations, average
contributions are given by: Base: 13.03; Val: 11.20; and Cap: 16.35. Pairwise comparisons
reveal that the distribution of contributions in Cap is significantly different from Base (MWU,
p = 0.015) and Val (MWU, p = 0.002), but a comparison between Base and Val does not show
any significant differences (MWU, p = 0.179).
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player types’ contributions between treatments, we again find the main difference
between both kinds of privileged groups originating from disparities in the behavior
of l-types. Contribution levels in Val and Cap are 10.27 and 18.41 (MWU, p =
0.002), respectively, for l-types, and 17.96 and 19.83 (MWU, p = 0.382), respectively,
for h-types. Hence, while l-types in Cap contribute nearly twice as much as in Val,
the difference in the h-types’ behavior is less pronounced. Nevertheless, in Cap, h-
types in all groups contribute their entire endowment from the second punishment
period onwards, which is never the case in Val.
In summary, as in the first ten periods we find the specific type of heterogeneity
crucially affecting cooperation levels within groups. As predicted, in the case of
asymmetric preferences informal sanctions are less effective in enforcing cooperation
and coordination within groups. The reason is that the asymmetric payoff structure
prevents punishment to foster individuals’ willingness to cooperate. In contrast,
when the payoff structure is symmetric, punishment successfully deters group mem-
bers from free-riding. As a consequence, while privileged groups of asymmetric
capabilities are very close to full cooperation, in Val they contribute even less than
normal groups. In addition, the introduction of punishment also has different effects
on the distribution and total amount of wealth across treatments. While compared
to the first ten periods, in Base, average payoffs slightly decrease by 1.39 to 23.38
tokens, in Val and Cap, earnings increase by 2.71 and 3.27 to 37.05 and 46.37
tokens, respectively. However, in Val, these efficiency gains come at costs of a
significant increase in payoff inequality. The average standard deviation of earn-
ings within groups increases from 11.40 to 18.64 (WSR, p = 0.034). In contrast,
in Base and Cap this dispersion significantly decreases when punishment is intro-
duced (Base: 3.94 vs. 2.54, WSR, p < 0.02; Cap: 4.34 vs. 1.65, WSR, p < 0.001).
This implies that in these treatments, punishment indeed has a disciplining effect
on relative contributions and payoffs. In terms of social efficiency, groups in Base,
Val, and Cap now reach, on average, 78%, 74%, and 93%, respectively, of the social
optimum. As without punishment, the difference between both privileged groups is
highly significant (MWU, p < 0.002).
2.3.3 Punishment Behavior
To understand the driving forces that cause the strong differences in contribution
behavior, we now analyze to which extent they depend on the way group members
punish each other and how they adapt contributions after being punished.
The average amount of punishment points spent is similar across treatments
(Base: 1.25; Val: 0.55; Cap: 0.73). Although subjects in normal groups punish a
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little bit more than in privileged groups, these differences are not statistically signif-
icant (Kruskal-Wallis test, p = 0.330). Also when pairwise comparing allocated and
received punishment within and between treatments and types, we do not find any
statistical significant differences. However, more important than comparing absolute
levels of punishment is to analyze how subjects punish group members conditional
on their contributions, and how group members react to received punishment.
To investigate the possible determinants of allocating punishment, we apply To-
bit regressions, using the amount of punishment points subject i dealt out to subject
j, pij, as the dependent variable.
26 As explanatory variables, we use the deviation
of j’s contribution from the other two group members’ contribution, i and k. This
allows us to illustrate the dependence of punishment on relative contributions more
clearly than by only using average contributions. Given the opposing monetary in-
centives of l- and h-types in privileged groups, deviations from the average group
contribution may also not be a very meaningful reference point subjects base their
sanctioning decisions on. As negative deviations are usually punished more heav-
ily than positive deviations (Fehr and Ga¨chter, 2002), we allow for different slopes
for social and antisocial punishment, when applicable.27 Furthermore, we control
for different time trends, level effects and the dependency of observations within
groups. Table 2.4 reports regression results separated by the subjects’ type and
treatment. For l-types, we additionally include an h-type dummy to test whether,
ceteris paribus, punishment differs depending on whether the target person is a l-
or a h-type.
For l-types (Columns 2-4) we observe that negative deviations from their own
contributions are strongly and significantly punished in all three treatments. Com-
paring coefficients between both types of privileged groups reveals that this effect is
stronger in Cap than in Val (Wald test, p < 0.05). As h-types are almost always
the highest contributor in each group, negative deviations are found to primarily
occur relative to the other l-type in the group. Holding the amount of the deviation
fixed, this implies that l-types in Cap punish each other more severely than their
counterparts in Val. This result indicates that in the case of asymmetric prefer-
ences, low contributions have a higher likelihood of being tolerated, suggesting that
26We use Tobit regressions to account for the fact that the dependent variable exhibits censoring
from above and below at 10 and 0 points, respectively.
27In Val and Cap, only in 2.5% and 1.33% of the cases, respectively, contributions of h-types are
lower than contribution made by a l-type. Due to the small number of cases, we cannot reliably
estimate the effect of antisocial punishment for h-types in privileged groups. In this case, we
instead use the deviation from i’s contribution as the explanatory variable. However, results and
significances do not change when we do separate social and antisocial punishment for h-types as
well.
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Table 2.4: Tobit Regressions: Punishment assigned to j by i
Dependent variable: pij l-types h-types
Punishment given by i to j Base Val Cap Val Cap
Deviation from ci -0.145 -0.768
∗∗∗
cj − ci (-1.41) (-3.21)
Positive deviation from ci 0.242
∗∗ 0.149∗∗ 0.240
max (cj − ci, 0) (2.24) (1.97) (1.46)
Negative deviation from ci 0.719
∗∗∗ 0.890∗∗∗ 2.040∗∗∗
max (ci − cj , 0) (4.31) (6.92) (3.56)
Positive deviation from ck -0.057 -0.151 -0.203 0.111 -0.167
max (cj − ck, 0) (-0.44) (-1.18) (-1.14) (0.59) (-0.74)
Negative deviation from ck 0.163 -0.029 0.113 0.852
∗∗∗ 0.110
max (cj − ck, 0) (0.76) (-0.32) (0.76) (5.09) (0.41)
j is a h-type 0.410 -1.251
1 if δj = 1.5 or aj = 3 (0.57) (-1.11)
Period -0.315∗∗ 0.154 0.554∗ 0.357∗ 0.310
t (-2.10) (1.50) (1.67) (1.67) (0.90)
Constant -3.406 -9.609∗∗∗ -18.04∗∗ -14.32∗∗∗ -12.56
(-1.55) (-4.06) (-2.57) (-3.19) (-1.55)
# Observations 900 640 600 320 300
Log-Likelihood -591.3 -304.4 -179.4 -156.6 -171.4
Note: t statistics in parentheses; ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01; robust standard errors (clustered on groups)
the norm of equal contributions is enforced less consequently. In line with other
studies (see e.g. Herrmann et al., 2008), we also observe some amount of antisocial
punishment. This effect turns out to be statistically significant in Base and Val,
but not in Cap. Compared to the occurrence of altruistic punishment, however, such
“perverse” punishment is much less pronounced (Wald test, p < 0.01 in all treat-
ments). Regarding the relative contributions of the targeted person j compared to
k, we do not find any significant effects on subject i’s punishment behavior. Hence,
l-types seem to mainly take into account deviations from their own, rather than
from the other group members’ contributions, when making punishment decisions.
Furthermore, in privileged groups we do not observe that, ceteris paribus, h-types
get punished more severely than l-types.
We now turn to the behavior of h-types in privileged groups (Columns 5 and 6).
In Val, we observe that deviations from own contributions are not punished, but
that negative deviations from the third group member’s contributions are strongly
and significantly punished. In Cap, we find that only deviations from own contri-
butions matter for punishment behavior. The difference of both coefficients between
treatments is large and statistically significant (Wald test, p < 0.02 in both cases).
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This result implies that in Cap, h-types try to enforce a norm of equal nominal con-
tributions, punishing everyone who free-rides on their contributions. In contrast, in
Val h-types follow a more modest goal of trying to only increase contributions of the
lowest contributor, tolerating the fact that l-types contribute less than themselves.
The differences in punishment behavior are neatly summarized in Figure 2.3
which illustrates the number of punishment points received as a function of i’s devi-
ation from the punisher’s contribution. The size of each circle represents the relative
frequencies of a given tuple and the solid line indicates the fitted line of the locally
weighted regression of punishment received on the deviation from the punisher’s
contribution. In line with the regression results, for l-types, the punishment func-
tion in Val turns out to be very different compared to the other two treatments
(see Columns 1-3). In Base and Cap, negative deviations are frequently and con-
siderably punished. In contrast, in Val we observe a much less systematic pattern
of punishment behavior. This is indicated by a much flatter slope of the punishment
function, implying that negative deviations often get away unpunished. In fact, in
Base, Val, and Cap negative deviations from a group member’s contribution are
being punished in 57%, 22%, and 73% of the cases, respectively. Also for h-types
(Columns 4 and 5) we observe noticeable differences between treatments. While
there is hardly any case in which h-types contribute less than l-types, in the case of
positive deviations, h-types in Val are punished more strongly than in Cap. The
reason is that in Val, l-types are always worse off than h-types as long as they do
not free-ride completely. In these cases (80% of the cases), l-types can use antisocial
punishment with respect to h-types to decrease payoff inequalities in their group. In
Cap, such perverse punishment is not necessary, as h-types are only better off when
they contribute less than their group members, which is almost never the case.
The effectiveness of punishment, however, not only depends on the way group
members punish each other, but also on the way how they adapt contributions as
a response of being punished. Given the different incentives to contribute, we sur-
prisingly find no pronounced differences across treatments. Evidence comes from
OLS regressions with the change in contributions as the dependent variable and a
binary punishment variable interacted with the relative contributions within groups
as independent variables (see Table 2.5 in Appendix A).28 In all three treatments,
we find a negative and statistically significant effect of relative contributions when
being punished, i.e. as a response of being punished, subjects increase (decrease)
contributions when contributing less (more) than their group members. Most im-
28We restrict our analysis to the behavior of l-types, as contributions of h-types in Val and Cap
are very similar and exhibit very little variance over time.
52
Figure 2.3: Punishment as a function of deviation from punisher’s contribution
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portantly, however, when comparing coefficients across treatments, we do not find
any statistically significant differences of punishment responses (Wald test, p > 0.74
for all pairwise comparisons). Hence, we conclude that when sanctioning group
members is possible, it is the different punishment behavior, rather than differences
in the reactions to punishment, that induces contributions of l-types in both types
of privileged groups to further diverge.
2.4 Conclusion
In this article, we investigate the effect of heterogeneity on the provision of public
goods. In particular, we compare two kinds of privileged groups vis-a-vis to normal,
non-privileged, groups when punishment is possible or not. Under both conditions,
we find that the nature of group heterogeneity crucially influences cooperation and
coordination within groups. While asymmetric preferences for the public good have
detrimental effects on voluntary contributions, different capabilities in providing
the public good have a positive and stabilizing effect on contribution behavior. In
addition, the type of heterogeneity also affects the usage and effectiveness of informal
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sanctions in fostering cooperation. The main reason for our results are the different
externalities contributions have on the other group members’ payoffs, causing the
payoff structure to be asymmetric in one case and symmetric in the other. If people
are not only concerned by maximizing their own monetary payoff, but also exhibit
some form of other-regarding preferences, this can affect the principle of reciprocity
and cooperation in non-trivial ways. If group members benefit equally from the
public good, they have an incentive to match each other’s contributions which, in
turn, facilitates the agreement and establishment of a contribution norm that fosters
cooperation and coordination. In contrast, when individuals benefit differently from
the public good, this decreases their willingness to cooperate which, in turn, has
detrimental effects on voluntary contributions.
With regard to Olson’s (1965) theory on privileged groups, we find that, depend-
ing on the nature of their privilege, they do or do not fulfill their privileged status.
Besides that, our study also implies an extension of the findings of Glo¨ckner et al.
(2011), as we find that individuals are willing to reciprocate contributions even if
they do not constitute a sacrifice, but only if all group members benefit equally from
such contributions. All in all, we provide evidence that it is not the asymmetric na-
ture of groups per se that facilitates or impedes collective action, but that it is the
specific type of heterogeneity determining the degree of cooperative behavior and
the level of public good provision.
Our results highlight the importance of investigating the effects of diversity
within societies on collective action problems. We provide evidence that abstract-
ing from heterogeneity in social dilemma situations can be a serious shortcoming,
as inequality among group members can have opposing effects on cooperation and
coordination. Because in everyday-life, heterogeneous group environments are the
rule, rather than the exception, understanding the driving forces of cooperation in
these groups is of great importance. In line with previous research (Heckathorn,
1993; Varughese and Ostrom, 2001; Poteete and Ostrom, 2004; Reuben and Riedl,
2009; 2013), our findings stress the importance of a proper understanding of the con-
text dependent interplay of heterogeneity, institutions, social norms, and collective
action. In related contexts, other studies already have emphasized the relevance of
community heterogeneity on social capital (Alesina and La Ferrara, 2000), civic en-
gagement (La Ferrara, 2002; Costa and Kahn, 2003), or the maintenance of irrigation
systems (Bardhan and Dayton-Johnson, 2002).
Insights from this research can have important policy implications, for instance
by assisting organizations and policy-makers in developing institutions that effec-
tively alleviate cooperation and coordination failure in social dilemma situations.
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For example, in a firm context, our results suggest that the formation of teams in
which members have different interests in the success of a joint project, or paying
different team-performance related bonuses to otherwise identical agents may have
detrimental effects on the group output. On a higher level, e.g. in national or in-
ternational conflicts, group composition and valuations for a public good are often
given and cannot be changed exogenously. In these cases, if valuations are hetero-
geneous but private information, one possible solution that has been proposed to
increase social welfare is the bundling of (excludable) public goods (Hellwig, 2007;
Fang and Norman, 2010). In political decision making, something similar can be
observed in the guise of vote trading (logrolling). Furthermore, while relying on
informal sanctions to foster cooperation has shown to be ineffective in the case of
asymmetric valuations, when individuals differ in their capabilities they seem to
work quite well in encouraging collective action. In the latter situation, individuals
with high capabilities even impersonate potential candidates for leading-by-example
that could further increase contributions (Potters et al., 2005; 2007; Gu¨th et al.,
2007).
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2.5 Appendix to Chapter 2
A Regression on change in contributions
Table 2.5 shows regression results from OLS regressions with the change in con-
tributions as dependent variable, and the difference between i’s contribution and
the average contribution of the other group members in the previous period as the
independent variable. We also include a binary punishment variable and interact
it with the deviation in contributions to explore how subjects change contributions
depending on whether they got punished or not. We further control for different
time trends, intercepts, and the dependency of observations within groups by clus-
tering standard errors on each group. As contribution behavior of h-types in Val
and Cap are very similar and exhibit only very little variance over time, we restrict
our analysis to the behavior of l-types.
Table 2.5: OLS Regressions: Change in Contributions from period t to t+ 1
Dependent variable: ∆ci l-types
Change in contributions Base Val Cap
Received punishment 0.847∗∗ 0.870 -0.631
1 if pji + pki > 0 (2.26) (1.56) (-0.71)
Deviation from avg. contrib. others -0.074 -0.079∗ -0.059
ci − c¯−i (-1.13) (-1.97) (-1.29)
Deviation from avg. contrib. others × being punished -0.253∗∗ -0.288∗∗∗ -0.304∗∗
ci − c¯−i × 1 if pji + pki > 0 (-2.58) (-4.63) (-2.47)
Period -0.117∗ -0.026 -0.084
t (-2.01) (-0.29) (-1.44)
Constant 1.602 -0.392 1.297
(1.58) (-0.27) (1.48)
# Observations 405 288 270
Adj. R2 0.182 0.209 0.172
Note: t statistics in parentheses; ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01; Robust Std. Err. (clustered on groups)
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B Experimental Instructions (translated from German)
These are the instructions for h-types in the Cap treatment. Instructions for the
l-types and the other treatments are similar and available upon request.
Introduction
You are now taking part in a scientific experiment. If you read the following in-
structions carefully, additionally to the e2.50 you receive for your show up for sure,
depending on your and the other participants’ decisions you can earn a considerable
amount of money. How you can earn money is explained in the following instruc-
tions.
During the experiment communication with the other participants is prohibited.
If you have any questions, please contact us. If you violate this rule, we shall have
to exclude you from the experiment and all payments. If you have any questions,
please raise your arm. A member of the research team will come to you and answer
your question privately.
During the experiment your entire earnings will be calculated in tokens. At the
end of the experiment the total amount of tokens you have earned will be converted
to euro at the following rate:
75 tokens = 1 e
The converted amount will be paid in cash afterwards. The payment is done
anonymously, i.e. no participant finds out another participant’s payoff. All deci-
sions in the experiment are made anonymously as well, i.e. nobody of the other
participants finds out the identity of a person who made a particular decision.
The experiment
The experiment is divided into several periods. There are 10 periods in total. During
all 10 periods the participants are divided into groups of three. Hence, you act in a
group with two other participants. Note: The composition of the groups will remain
the same during all periods of the experiment. This means that in all 10 periods
you act with the same participants in your group.
The decision situation
You will learn later on how the experiment will be conducted exactly. In this part,
we first introduce you to the basic decision situation. The decision situation is the
same in all 10 periods. In each period, each group member has to decide on the
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use of a certain number of tokens. You can decide how many tokens you want to
contribute to a group project and how many tokens you want to keep for yourself.
Each token you do not contribute to the group project you automatically keep for
yourself.
From each token you or your group members contribute to the group project,
each group member will benefit. From each token you or your group members keep
for yourself, only you and your group members, respectively, will earn something.
After all group members have made a decision on the use of the provided tokens,
the period ends.
The initial endowment
At the beginning of each period each participant in your group receives 25 tokens.
We will refer to these tokens as your initial endowment.
Contributions to the project
In each period you decide how to use your initial endowment. You have to decide how
many tokens you want to contribute to a group project and how many tokens you
want to keep for yourself. You can contribute any amount between 0 and 20 tokens
to the group project. How many tokens you contribute is up to you. Each other
group member also makes such a decision. All decisions are made simultaneously.
This means that nobody will be informed about the decision of the other group
members before everyone else has made his or her own decision.
After all group members have made their contribution decision, an overview
screen will be displayed. This screen informs you and your group members about
each group members’ contribution to the group project and about each group mem-
bers’ payoff in this period. In addition, you and your group members are informed
about the total amount of tokens each group member has earned up to this period.
Earnings
Your earnings in tokens, in each period, are the sum of two parts:
1. The number of tokens that you kept for yourself.
2. Your income from the group project. This income is equal to:
Income from the group project = 0.5 × sum of outputs of all group members
We denote 0.5 as the multiplication factor of the group project. The output of each
group member is calculated as follows:
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Output = productivity × contribution to group project
The output of each group member results from her contribution to the group
project multiplied with her productivity. The productivity of a group member is
determined as follows: In each group, one of the group members receives a produc-
tivity of 3 and the other two group members receive a productivity of 1. Before
the experiment started, every seat was assigned productivity equal to either 1 or
3. Therefore, by randomly drawing a seat number, each participant was randomly
assigned to one of these values. In all periods, your productivity as well as the
productivity of the other group members does not change.
You are the group member who receives a productivity of 3.
Notice that for each token which you keep for yourself you earn exactly 1 token.
If instead you contribute this token to the group project, then the total output of
the project rises by three tokens. Your income from the group project rises by 1.5
token). Moreover, the other group members’ income from the project also rises by
1.5 tokens.
Your contribution to the group project therefore also raises the income of the
other group members. For each token contributed to the project the total earnings
of the group rise by 4.5 tokens. Note that you also earn tokens for each token
contributed to the group project by the other group members. For each token
contributed by any member you earn 0.5 tokens. In summary, your earnings in
tokens in each period are equal to:
Your total income = 25 - your contribution + 0.5 × sum of outputs of all group
members to the project
Announcement
(The following parts were given to the subject only after the end of period 10.)
Now we repeat the experiment with one single modification. As before, the experi-
ment is divided into 10 periods and in each period you have to make a decision on
how many tokens you contribute to the group project and how many tokens you
want to keep for yourself.
Note that the composition of the group remains the same. This means that in
the next 10 periods, you are playing with exactly the same participants in a group
as in the last 10 periods. Furthermore, also the initial endowment, the productivity,
and the multiplication factor, which were assigned to you and your group members,
remain the same.
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Modification
In the following 10 periods, there will now be a second stage in each period. In this
second stage, you must decide whether and if yes how many deduction points you
want to spend to reduce the first stage earnings of the other two group members.
The second stage
At the beginning of the second stage, everyone in the group is informed about how
much each of the other group members contributed to the project as well as their
earnings from the first stage. The decision each group member has to make in the
second stage is to either reduce or leave equal the other group members’ earnings.
Reducing other group members’ earnings can be done by allocating deduction points.
The other group members can also reduce your earnings if they wish to. All decisions
are made simultaneously. That means that nobody will be informed about the
decision of the other group members before everyone has made his or her decision.
More concisely, in this stage you must decide whether and if yes how many de-
duction points you want to spend to reduce the earnings of the other two group
members. If you want to reduce another member’s earnings, you do that by allo-
cating deduction points. For each deduction point you allocate to another group
member her or his earnings are reduced by 3 tokens and your own earnings are
reduced by 1 token. If you do not wish to change the earnings of another group
member then you must allocate 0 deduction points to him or her. Note that you
will be not allowed to reduce the earnings of a group member to less than zero.
Furthermore, remember that for any deduction point you receive from the other
members, your earnings will be reduced by 3 points (but never below zero).
Each group member can spend a maximum of 10 deduction points on each group
member in each period. After all group members have made their decisions, you will
be informed about how many deduction points you received from the other group
members and also what your total earnings for that period are. Note that you do not
get to know how individual group members spend their deduction points. In other
words, you will only be informed of the total amount of deduction points allocated
to you by the other group members but you will not know how many deduction
points each individual group member allocated to you.
Summary
In summary, your earnings in tokens in each period are equal to:
(Your first stage earnings - 3 × deduction points allocated to you)* - deduction
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points you allocated
* If the number between brackets is negative then replace it with zero.
Example for the second stage
Here are some arbitrarily chosen numbers that illustrate how your final earnings
are calculated. You, group member 1, and group member 2 are all members of the
same group. Suppose that after the first stage your earnings are equal to 30 tokens.
In the second stage you decide to allocate 3 deduction points to group member 1
(this reduces the earnings of group member 1 by 9 tokens) and 0 deduction points
to group member 2 (this does not change the earnings of group member 2). After
all have made their decision, you learn that the others allocated in total 4 deduction
points to you. In this case, your total earnings in tokens in this period are equal to:
(30 - 3 × 4) - 3 = 18 - 3 = 15 tokens.
Negative earnings
In principal, it is possible that you attain negative earnings in a period. However,
you can always avoid this by not spending any tokens in the second stage (that is,
by not distributing any deduction points to the other group members). Hence, you
can always avoid negative earnings with certainty through your own choices.
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Chapter 3
One rotten apple may spoil the
barrel - How information about
others’ individual contributions
affects cooperation
3.1 Introduction
Many important challenges in social and economic life such as environmental protec-
tion, voluntary provision of public goods, participation in collective action, charity
donations, tax compliance, or teamwork share a tragic dilemma: They are all char-
acterized by a discrepancy between individual and collective interest. Because it is
individually rational for self-interested agents to free ride on others’ contributions,
the socially desirable amounts of the public goods are not provided (Samuelson,
1954; Olson, 1965; Hardin, 1968). Yet, there is plenty of evidence that even in anony-
mous one-shot interactions, people often voluntarily contribute to public goods and
achieve higher cooperation levels than can be explained by the free-riding hypothesis
(see e.g. Ledyard, 1995; Ga¨chter and Herrmann, 2009, for overviews). While some
studies argue that individuals contribute independently of others’ contributions -
e.g. because of pure and impure altruism (Andreoni, 1989; 1990) or confusion (An-
derson et al., 1998)1 - recent studies find that a considerable fraction of people
condition their contributions on the behavior of others (see Chaudhuri, 2011, for an
overview). They increase contributions as others make higher donations and curtail
their contributions if they believe others are not pulling their weight (Fischbacher
1See e.g. (Andreoni, 1995; Keser, 1996; Palfrey and Prisbrey, 1997; Brandts and Schram, 2001)
for a test of these motives.
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et al., 2001; Frey and Meier, 2004; Kocher et al., 2008; Fischbacher and Ga¨chter,
2010; Rustagi et al., 2010; Carpenter and Seki, 2011).
In this paper we go one step further by investigating how the exact composition
of others’ individual contributions within a group affects conditional cooperation.
Think, for instance, of a group in which contributions are heterogeneous. In such
a situation it is not clear which, if any, contributions are (most) influential in de-
termining behavior. Are people more inclined to follow the bad example of an
uncooperative group member or do they tend to match the good example of a high
contributor? Or do they only orientate themselves towards the average of all group
members’ contributions?
These questions are highly relevant because on the one hand it is well known
that people have heterogeneous preferences for cooperation. For example, while
some people always free-ride, others are conditional cooperators (Fischbacher et al.,
2001, henceforth FGF). On the other hand, there is evidence for the importance of
so-called (social interaction effects) arguing that the composition of types within a
group is crucial in determining the level of voluntary contributions. For instance,
as shown by Ga¨chter and Tho¨ni (2005), cooperation is easier to sustain among
like-minded people with similar cooperative preferences. We extend this line of
research by investigating how people behave when simultaneously being grouped
with people who are like-minded and ones who are not. Ex-ante, it is far from clear
how conditional cooperators will react to such scenarios as prominent benchmark
models of other-regarding preferences (e.g. Fehr and Schmidt, 1999; Bolton and
Ockenfels, 2000; Charness and Rabin, 2002) would suggest different behavior.
To shed light on these questions, we report an experiment in which we employ a
reduced form of the strategy method to systematically vary the information subjects
receive about others’ behavior. To avoid confounds due to strategic concerns or
beliefs in a repeated environment, we use a one-shot linear public goods game. We
apply a variant of the design by FGF which allows to elicit people’s preferences for
cooperation in an incentive compatible way. While in one treatment subjects are
only informed about the average contribution of others, in another set of treatments
they learn about the full vector of others’ individual contributions.
Our main finding is that compared to the aggregate information treatment, in
the full information treatments contributions are significantly higher when others
contribute equally. This is not the case when others’ contributions are heteroge-
neous. In addition, in the full information treatments we find contributions to be
the lower the higher the variation in the other group members’ contributions. The
main reason for this result is the presence of a considerable fraction of conditional
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cooperators who are primarily guided by the minimum contribution of others. While
we also observe subjects who primarily condition their behavior on the median or
maximum contribution, the distribution of types tends to be skewed towards the
minimum. Taken together, we provide evidence that information about individual
contributions affects people’s willingness to cooperate in systematic ways. But there
is a substantial amount of heterogeneity in how individuals react to such informa-
tion.
Our results have several interesting implications. First of all, they may explain
why people usually fall short of matching others’ contributions perfectly when only
aggregate information is provided. It appears that some people are generally willing
to cooperate but prefer not to spend more than the lowest contributor. However,
when only receiving aggregate feedback, people face uncertainty about individual
behavior and therefore have to form beliefs about the other group members’ in-
dividual contributions. Believing that a “rotten apple” in the group contributes
little may then be a sufficient reason to justify low own contributions (i.e., less
than the average). In fact, the lack of information about individual behavior may
additionally provide individuals with moral “wiggle room” to self-servingly “form”
pessimistic beliefs about others’ contributions, i.e., as an excuse for contributing
little.2 Furthermore, our results provide hints on what kind of feedback might facil-
itate cooperation. This can be relevant, for example, in the case of fund-raising or
sequential public good provision when the organization has some discretion about
which information to make public. Likewise, in a team context within a firm, our re-
sults may be insightful for the design of feedback mechanisms and team composition
to help to sustain cooperation.3
Closely related to our work are studies by Croson (2007) and Cheung (2011).
Using a repeated public goods game, Croson (2007) analyzes the effect of feedback
about individual contributions within a group after each period. She is able to
distinguish between different types of reciprocity and she finds the median to be a
2Our results might also add to the understanding of previous findings that show that peer-
punishment typically stabilizes or even increases contributions. While in public goods games
without punishment subjects typically only receive information about average contributions, in-
troducing peer-punishment requires revealing individual contributions (see e.g. Fehr and Ga¨chter,
2000). In the light of our results this difference in information could add to the stabilization of
contributions in public goods games with punishment. For example, when punishment leads to
more equal contribution behavior in subsequent rounds, our results suggest that subjects become
inherently more willing to contribute at that level, so that the stabilizing effect is not exclusively
due to the threat of punishment.
3Our results are thus also related to the literature on seed money (Andreoni, 1998; List and
Lucking-Reiley, 2002), leadership (Hermalin, 1998; Potters et al., 2005; 2007; Gu¨th et al., 2007;
Levati et al., 2007; Glo¨ckner et al., 2011), and information in social dilemmas (Vesterlund, 2003;
Irlenbusch and Rilke, 2012).
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better predictor than either minimum or maximum. Because of the repeated nature
of her experiment, however, results may be biased by strategic and reputational
concerns. Furthermore, because she does not apply the strategy method, results
are also influenced by beliefs and she only draws inferences on an aggregate but
not on an individual level. In contrast, similar to our design, Cheung (2011) also
employs the strategy method to study how individuals respond to a variation in
others’ contributions. Yet, he does not compare behavior between treatments with
aggregate and individual feedback. Furthermore, he uses a different setting with only
three players and four possible contribution levels. This naturally precludes subjects
conditioning on the median contribution which Croson (2007) identifies as focal,
and also does not allow to analyze effects of heterogeneous contribution behavior
on an individual level. With our experiment we aim to fill these gaps, helping to
understand more precisely the factors that influence preferences for cooperation.
The paper proceeds as follows. The next section describes the experimental
design and procedures. In section 3, we discuss behavioral predictions based on dif-
ferent models of other-regarding preferences. The experimental results are presented
and discussed in section 4. Section 5 concludes.
3.2 Experimental Design and Procedures
3.2.1 The Basic Setup
The underlying decision situation of our experiment is a standard linear public
goods game. Subjects are randomly matched into groups of four and each subject is
endowed with 20 tokens which she can either keep or contribute to a joint project.
The payoff function for each individual i is given by:
pii = 20− ci + 0.4 ·
N∑
j=1
cj
where the amount of public good provision is equal to the sum of contributions
of all group members. Contributing one token to the public good yields a marginal
private benefit of 0.4 and a marginal social benefit of 1.6 tokens. If subjects are
only interested in maximizing their own monetary payoff, the dominant strategy
for each subject i is to completely free-ride and contribute nothing to the public
good, i.e., ci = 0 for all i. However, as marginal social benefits exceed marginal
private costs, social welfare is maximized when all group members contribute their
whole endowment. Hence, we have a typical social dilemma situation in which
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individual and group interests are at odds. Within this basic setting, we elicit
people’s preferences for cooperation using a similar design as FGF which allows
subjects to state their contributions conditional on the decisions of others in an
incentive compatible way. Specifically, subjects are asked to make two types of
decisions: an unconditional contribution and a conditional contribution to the public
good. The unconditional contribution is simply a single decision in which subjects
choose how many of their 20 tokens they want to contribute. For the conditional
contribution, we apply a variant of the “strategy method” (Selten, 1967). In a series
of decisions, subjects have to indicate how much they want to contribute conditional
on certain public goods contributions by the other group members.
3.2.2 Treatments
In total, we run four different treatments. In a baseline treatment (Avg), we apply
the original design by FGF. Participants are shown a table with the 21 possible
values of (rounded) average contributions by the other three group members, i.e.,
subjects only receive information about aggregate but not individual contribution
behavior. Then we ask subjects to state their contributions for each of the 21 values.
In the other three treatments, we enrich the information set subjects receive
by showing them the complete vector of individual contributions. This allows us
to investigate how subjects choose their contributions depending on the specific
composition of individual contributions in the group. Since the number of all possible
contribution levels from 0 to 20, amounts to
((
21
3
))
= 1771 possible combinations
of other players’ contributions, it is not feasible to let subjects make decisions for
each single instance. Therefore, we restrict our analysis to a manageable set of
selected cases. To ensure incentive compatibility of all decisions, we apply the so
called Conditional Information Lottery design (CIL) by Bardsley (2000). Similar
to a random lottery design and the strategy method, subjects have to solve several
tasks of which only one will become payoff relevant. In CIL subjects are told that all
but one task are fictitious and that only the single real task will determine payoffs.
Of course, participants do not know ex-ante which of the tasks is real, i.e., they have
an incentive to treat each task as if it is relevant for their outcome.
In total, subjects are confronted with 36 tasks displayed in a random order
on one screen in a contribution table. Among these, there are 35 fictitious tasks
which are the same for all subjects and one real task which depends on the actual
unconditional contributions of the subject’s group members.4 The fictitious tasks
4When the real task is identical to one of the 35 fictitious tasks, we add another fictitious
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are chosen such that (i) subjects cannot figure out which task contains the actual
contributions, and (ii) they exhibit sufficient variation to estimate the effects of
heterogeneous contribution behavior on the willingness to cooperate. To ensure (i)
we fit the distribution of contributions used in these tasks to a typical one-shot public
good experiment with the same parameters that was run as a pilot. To achieve (ii)
we implement several cases which can be systematically analyzed. For example, to
analyze the effect of heterogeneous contribution behavior, in one case an average of
5 is given by individual contributions of 5/5/5, and in another case the same average
is given by individual contributions of 0/5/10 (see Table 3.4 in the appendix for an
overview of all 35 fictitious tasks).
In the first of the three individual information treatments (Ind-Only), subjects
only see the (fictitious) contribution vectors representing the three individual contri-
butions of the other group members. In the second treatment (Ind-Avg), subjects
additionally receive information about the rounded average of the three (fictitious)
contributions, combining the elements of Ind-Only and Avg. In a third treat-
ment (Ind-Pg), conditions are the same as in Ind-Only except that subjects play
a regular one-shot public goods game before they decide on their conditional and
unconditional contributions. This is done because of another research question not
related to this paper. For an overview of our experimental treatments, see Table
3.1.
Table 3.1: Experimental Treatments
Treatment Part I
Part II: Information about
# Obs.
individual contributions average contributions
Avg - No Yes 64
Ind-Only - Yes No 64
Ind-Avg - Yes Yes 64
Ind-Pg one-shot PG Yes No 56
3.2.3 Procedures
The experiment was conducted at the Cologne Laboratory for Economic Research
(CLER) in February 2011. We used the experimental software z-Tree (Fischbacher,
task so that no task shows up twice. Furthermore, in the questionnaire following the experiment,
subjects were asked for their incentivized beliefs about which case they saw contained the actual
contributions. Only 6 out of 184 (3.3%) participants guessed this case correctly, which is in line
with random luck (1/36 = 2.78%).
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2007) and recruited student participants from the University of Cologne with the
online recruiting software ORSEE (Greiner, 2004). In total, we conducted eight
experimental sessions in which 248 subjects participated. Each session involved
24 to 32 participants who were not allowed to take part in more than one session.
About half of the subjects were female and about half studied economics or business
administration.
At the beginning of each session, participants were randomly assigned to cubi-
cles in the lab. After taking seats, subjects had to read the instructions explaining
the public goods problem, the incentives, and the rules of the game. After that,
participants had to answer several control questions to make sure that they under-
stood the game. Only after all participants had answered all questions correctly,
the experiment started. Unlike the other three treatments, in Ind-Pg subjects were
told that the experiment consisted of two parts and that they would learn about
the second part only after finishing the first one. Importantly, to avoid any kind
of income-, learning-, or reputational effects, subjects were informed that only one
part would be randomly chosen and paid out in the end. Furthermore, subjects
received no feedback about the outcome after the first part and groups were re-
matched so that subjects did not interact with each other twice. At the end of
each session, subjects were asked to fill in a short questionnaire on their motivation
and demographic data. Afterwards, they were informed about the decisions of their
group members and about their payoffs. Finally, participants were privately paid
their individual earnings in cash. On average, participants earned e14.23 (including
e2.50 show-up fee) and all sessions lasted approximately 1 hour. Since the game was
only played once and no information about behavior was given until the very end
of the experiment, the decisions of different subject can be treated as independent
observations.
3.3 Hypotheses
Evidence from public goods experiments has shown that the amount of public goods
provision is typically larger than what can be explained by pure self-interest. Many
different explanations have been proposed to explain this phenomenon. One of the
most prominent is the approach of conditional cooperation describing the tendency
to cooperate if others do so as well. Several papers have shown that there is a
considerable fraction of people who exhibit a willingness to contribute more the
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higher the average contributions of the other group members.5
Even though these studies have eliminated strategic concerns from repeated in-
teractions by using the strategy method in a one-shot design, by providing only av-
erages as information about others’ contributions in the group, they maintain some
uncertainty about individual contributions. If the composition of average behavior
is relevant for own contributions, subjects have to form beliefs about the individual
contributions of other group members. To eliminate uncertainty and beliefs, we
provide full information about individual contributions. In this case, several behav-
ioral reactions are conceivable because different theories of social preferences make
different predictions about how the composition of the others’ average contribution
should influence individual’s willingness to cooperate.
For instance, adjusting the own contribution down to the level of the lowest
contributor would be in line with the predictions made by the model of Fehr and
Schmidt (1999, henceforth FS-model) or Sugden’s principle of reciprocity 1984. Ac-
cording to the FS-model, individuals suffer both from advantageous and disadvan-
tageous inequality, with the latter looming larger than the first. Individuals with
such preferences are willing to contribute to the public good if others do so as well
if the reduction in (advantageous) inequity costs outweighs the monetary benefits
of not contributing. Given the payoff structure of our experiment and the assump-
tions of the FS-model, this condition can only be fulfilled until own contributions
match the lowest contributions of others, i.e., no player wants to be worse off than
the richest of the other group members. Hence, the FS-model could explain why
contributions decrease when information about heterogeneous individual behavior
is disclosed. In contrast, in the model of Bolton and Ockenfels (2000, henceforth
BO-model) individuals are assumed to suffer from inequity when the own payoff
differs from the average payoff implying that when holding the own payoff constant,
individuals prefer to receive the average. Because the average does not vary with the
specific composition of others’ contributions, in our context the BO-model predicts
no effect of disclosing others’ individual behavior compared to disclosing others’ av-
erage contributions. Finally, the model by Charness and Rabin (2002, henceforth
CR-model) assumes that people are concerned about efficiency and that they care
about the group member with the lowest payoff (maximin). Because in the pub-
lic goods game, the lowest payoff belongs to the group member contributing the
most, this model could explain why individuals are willing to contribute up to the
5(See e.g. Fischbacher et al., 2001; Keser and Van Winden, 2000; Frey and Meier, 2004; Ga¨chter,
2007; Kocher et al., 2008; Herrmann and Tho¨ni, 2009; Fischbacher and Ga¨chter, 2010; Chaudhuri,
2011; Fischbacher et al., 2012)
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maximum contribution of others when being provided with this information.6
Taken together, when holding constant the average contribution of others, an
increased spread of others’ individual contributions may have a negative (FS-model),
no effect (BO-model), or positive (CR-model) on own willingness to contribute (see
the appendix for the proofs). While the intention of our experiment is not to make
this yet another contest of the different models (see e.g. Engelmann and Strobel,
2004), we nevertheless use them to provide a rationale for potential reactions to the
composition of others’ contributions.
3.4 Results
To investigate whether and to what degree information about individual contribu-
tions influences people’s willingness to (conditionally) cooperate, we first compare
contribution behavior in the Avg treatment with behavior from the three Ind-
treatments providing feedback on individual contributions. After that, we look
more closely at behavior in the Ind-treatments to identify behavioral patterns de-
pending on the composition of others’ contributions. As a preliminary remark, it is
important to keep in mind that all the following results are based on our 35 selected
cases which we have selected because it was not feasible to incorporate all cases
(see above). While we have no indications that this selection affects our findings in
any systematic way, it should be mentioned that it might not be immediately clear
whether our results generalize to the complete set of possible cases.
Table 3.4 (see appendix) depicts all 35 cases that subjects face in the contri-
bution table in Ind-Only, Ind-Avg, and Ind-Pg.7 Columns 4-7 display average
contributions for each treatment and case, and column 8 shows aggregated data over
all three Ind-treatments. Since there are no pronounced or systematic differences
across the three Ind-treatments, in the following, we pool the data of these treat-
ments and refer to them as Ind.8 To compare behavior between the Ind-treatments
6Efficiency concern suggests people are willing to contribute unconditionally to the public good
to increase overall welfare, but there has been virtually no evidence for such behavior in the past.
7Note that in Table 3.4 the cases are sorted by their averages (Column 3) while they are
presented to the subjects in a random order. To guarantee comparability, for our analysis we
disregard the real case from each group and only analyze the 35 fictitious cases which are identical
for all subjects in all Ind-treatments.
8Irrespective of whether we compare contribution behavior in the three Ind-treatments sepa-
rately for each case or aggregated over all cases, and irrespective of whether we compare them
jointly using a non-parametric Kruskal-Wallis test, or pairwise using a non-parametric Mann-
Whitney U test, we do not find any significant differences for any of the comparisons. Hence, we
conclude that there are no significant differences between the three Ind-treatments. This means
providing information about the average contributions in addition to the individual contributions
has no significant effect on contribution behavior. Likewise, letting subjects play a one-shot public
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and Avg, for each case in Ind, we take the corresponding case in Avg with the
same (rounded) average of the other group members’ contributions.
3.4.1 Cooperation in Homogeneous Cases
We first compare behavior between Ind and Avg for cases in which others’ contri-
butions are homogeneous, i.e., cases in which all other group members contribute
equally. For these four cases (5/5/5, 8/8/8, 10/10/10, and 15/15/15), we find a clear
pattern of results: When revealing that contributions of the other group members’
are uniform, contributions in Ind are significantly higher than in the corresponding
cases in Avg. A non-parametric Mann-Whitney U test rejects equality of distribu-
tions for all these four cases (p < 0.051 for all pairwise comparisons).9 Furthermore,
also the proportion of players contributing exactly that amount significantly in-
creases. A Fisher’s exact test reveals that the proportion of contributions of 5, 8,
10, and 15, respectively, are significantly higher in Ind than in the corresponding
case in Avg (p < 0.046 for all pairwise comparisons), suggesting the presence of
a strong focal point which could be explained by conformity (Carpenter, 2004) or
an increased pressure to follow the social norm of contributing (Reuben and Riedl,
2013).10 Our results can be summarized as follows:
Observation 1: If individual contributions are the same, providing in-
formation about individual contributions of others tends to have a positive
effect compared to only providing average contributions.
This result can be further supported using OLS regressions with own contribu-
tion as dependent variable and average contribution of the other group members
as independent variable. To allow for differences in slopes between treatments, we
include a dummy variable for the Ind-treatments and interact it with the average
contribution of others. To ensure comparability, we only include data from the
good game before the FGF design does not affect conditional contributions in any systematic way.
9If not indicated otherwise, we use two-sided test statistics.
10In principle, there is also uniform behavior in the cases 0/0/0 and 20/20/20. However, as these
are border cases, there is no uncertainty about individual contributions in Avg either because it is
clear that all other group members must have contributed 0 and 20, respectively. Therefore, we do
not expect any differences between Ind and Avg for these cases. And indeed, a MWU-test does
not indicate any significant differences (0/0/0: p = 0.417; 20/20/20: p = 0.125). Likewise, also
the focal-point effect is less pronounced for these cases. A FE-test does not reveal any significant
differences in the proportions of choosing contributions of 0 or 20 across treatments (p > 0.290
for both pairwise comparisons). These results imply that compared to observing only aggregated
behavior, receiving feedback about individual behavior has a positive effect on contributions only
if the individual feedback provides formerly unavailable information about uniformity of individual
contributions.
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four no-variance cases in Ind and its corresponding cases in Avg. Furthermore,
we control for the dependency of observations by clustering standard errors on the
individual level. The results of the estimations are given in Table 3.2.
Table 3.2: OLS Regressions: Conditional Contributions depending on contributions
of other group members for no-variance cases in Ind and Avg
Dependent variable: ci ALL Cond. Coop.
Contributions by i (1) (2)
avg. others’ contribution 0.401∗∗∗ 0.765∗∗∗
c−i (6.00) (10.65)
Ind × avg. others’ contribution 0.159∗∗ 0.146∗
(2.02) (1.79)
Ind -0.035 -0.047
1 if treatment = Ind (-0.06) (-0.07)
Constant 0.520 -0.310
(1.05) (-0.52)
# Observations 992 556
Adj. R2 0.154 0.495
Note: t statistics using robust standard errors clustered on individuals are in paren-
theses; ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Using data from all participants (model 1), subjects in Avg contribute on aver-
age 0.4 tokens for each token of the others’ average contribution. In Ind, subjects
contribute on average 0.16 tokens more (+40%) for each token of the others’ average
contribution. This difference is statistically significant and corroborates the results
from the non-parametric tests. Importantly, these results are not driven by possible
treatment differences in the proportions of different contribution types but persist
if we only look at conditional cooperators. To test this, we follow the approach of
FGF and, depending on subjects’ conditional contributions, classify individuals into
free-riders, conditional cooperators, and others.11 The results from this categoriza-
tion reveal that the distribution of types is very similar across treatments and also
replicate FGF quite closely (see Table 3.5 in the appendix). Furthermore, as shown
in model (2) we still find a significant treatment effect between Ind and Avg if we
only include data from subjects being classified as conditional cooperators. Clearly,
for this type the relationship between own and others’ contributions is much closer
to one. While in Avg, conditional cooperators contribute 0.77 tokens for each to-
ken of the average contribution, in Ind they contribute an additional 0.15 tokens
(+19%), which is still significantly more.
11See the appendix for an exact description of our classification strategy in Avg and Ind.
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3.4.2 Cooperation in Heterogeneous Cases
An additional explanation for the results found above could be that it is not only the
uniformity of contributions but rather the revelation of information about individual
behavior per se that facilitates contributions. To investigate this hypothesis, we now
turn to cases in which contributions differ among group members. While in 28 out of
29 such cases, average contributions in Ind are higher than in Avg, Mann-Whitney
U tests only yields three weakly significant differences out of the 29 comparisons
which, however, may well be random outliers from multiple testing.12 These may
well be random outliers from multiple testing.
Furthermore, also the focal-point effect of the average vanishes if others’ con-
tributions differ. For none of the 29 cases a Fisher’s exact test reveals that the
proportion of players contributing exactly the average is higher in Ind than in Avg
implying that they condition their contributions on something else than the average.
This might not be too surprising as in 24 out of the 29 cases, none of the displayed
individual contributions equals the implied average (e.g. 0/11/13; ∅ = 8).
In the following, we investigate more closely how individuals in Ind react to
the composition of the other group members’ average contribution. Because free-
riders and others are not expected to react on the composition of the average, in
this analysis we focus on conditional cooperators only.13 As a first indicator, for
each individual we (using data from all 35 cases) calculate a Spearman’s rank order
correlation between the standard deviation in others’ individual contributions and
the deviation in own contributions from the average. We then use these correlation
coefficients and perform a binomial test to check whether a positive or negative
relationship between the two variables is equally likely. According to this test, the
correlation coefficients are significantly more often negative than positive (p < 0.001)
indicating that, on average, the more uniform others’ contributions are, the higher
the willingness to cooperate.
This result is supported by OLS regressions with individual contributions as de-
pendent variable, and different combinations of others’ contributions as independent
variables. As a benchmark, in model (1) we use the average contribution of oth-
ers as independent variable. To check whether conditional cooperators react to the
composition of the average, in model (2) we additionally include the standard devi-
ation of the other three group members’ contributions as a measure of variation.14
In both specifications, we use data from all 35 cases for subjects being classified as
12The three cases are: 0/5/7 (p = 0.093), 0/5/10 (p = 0.087), and 6/6/10 (p = 0.059).
13In fact, results do not change qualitatively when including data from all subjects.
14Using the range (defined as difference of lowest and highest contribution) instead of the stan-
dard deviation yields very similar results.
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conditional cooperators, and cluster standard errors on the individual level taking
into account the dependency of observations. The results from these regressions are
shown in Table 3.3.
Table 3.3: OLS Regressions: Determinants of contributions by conditional cooper-
ators in Ind
Dependent variable: ci Conditional Cooperators
Contributions by i (1) (2) (3)
Avg 0.832∗∗∗ 0.835∗∗∗
(27.73) (27.97)
STD. DEV. -0.132∗∗∗
(-4.74)
MIN 0.353∗∗∗
(14.94)
MED 0.269∗∗∗
(11.47)
MAX 0.215∗∗∗
(12.26)
Constant -0.402 0.147 0.111
(-0.43) (0.52) (0.40)
# Observations 3640 3640 3640
Adj. R2 0.424 0.430 0.431
Note: t statistics using robust standard errors clustered on individuals are in
parentheses; ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Not surprisingly, evidence from model (1) suggests that the average contribution
of others is a strong predictor for contribution behavior of conditional cooperators.
Interestingly, however, model (2) indicates that they do not only care about the
average contribution of others but also about its composition. While the average
still has a strong and significant positive effect, the standard deviation of others’
contributions has a significant negative effect on own contribution behavior, implying
that the more spread out the others’ individual contributions are, the lower is the
own willingness to contribute. This constitutes our second result:
Observation 2: The higher the variation in others’ individual contri-
butions, the lower, on average, the own willingness to contribute.
This result is nicely summarized by Figure 3.1. For conditional cooperators,
it depicts average contributions as a percentage of the others’ mean contribution
depending on the standard deviation of their individual contributions.15 As can be
15One possible objection of this analysis might be that the standard deviation of others’ contri-
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seen, relative contributions are highest when the other group members contribute
equally, and decrease the higher the variance in others’ contributions.
Figure 3.1: Contributions in percentage of the mean depending on the variation in
others’ contributions
50
60
70
80
90
100
Co
nt
rib
ut
io
ns
 in
 p
er
ce
nt
ag
e 
of
 th
e 
m
ea
n
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
Standard deviation of others’ contributions
The fact that the variation in others’ contributions has a negative effect on coop-
eration already indicates that individuals are more guided by the lowest rather than
the highest contributions of their group members. To investigate this more precisely,
in model (3) we analyze which contribution is, on average, best in predicting indi-
vidual behavior. We use the minimum, median, and maximum contribution of the
other three group members as explanatory variables and, consequently, compare the
relative importance of each of the factors. Testing the respective coefficients against
each other, we find the minimum to be relatively more important than the median
(Wald-test, p = 0.044) and the maximum (Wald-test, p < 0.001), and the median to
be more important than the maximum (Wald-test, p = 0.049).16 This means that
butions partly depends on the average. The reason is that by definition, for average contributions
in the middle of the choice set higher standard deviations are possible than for averages at the
boundaries. Yet, this is not the case for our selected cases. A Spearman’s rank order correlation
of the standard deviation and the average contribution yields only a very weak and insignificant
relationship (rho = 0.048, p = 0.784).
16In an extensive analysis, we also check for individual differences in the reactions to the com-
position of others’ contributions. Unfortunately, it is very difficult to directly test the average
contribution against the three individual contributions because of perfect multicollinearity. Gen-
erally, when we separately compare correlations with own contributions, more people appear to
condition primarily on the average contribution than on any of the individual contributions, but
only a handful is perfectly described by the average. Since we are primarily interested in what
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conditional cooperators are more likely to follow a bad example of a low contributor
rather than a good example of a high contributor. This is a novel result as previous
studies, restricted by their experimental design, could not investigate cooperation
preferences in this detail.
3.5 Concluding Remarks
Our experiment demonstrates that the type of information people receive about oth-
ers’ public goods contributions affects own willingness to cooperate in systematic
ways. In general, the willingness to give is significantly higher when others con-
tribute equally compared to when contributions are more spread out or when only
aggregate information is available. Furthermore, when providing full information
about individual contributions, higher variation in others’ contributions have, on
average, a negative effect on the willingness to contribute. On the individual level,
we find marked heterogeneity among conditional cooperators in what they condi-
tion their contributions on. A sizable fraction of subjects condition their behavior
predominantly on the minimum contribution of others and are therefore primarily
responsible for the aggregate effect. This is in line with the presence of a bad apple
effect implying that people are more likely to follow the bad example of an uncoop-
erative group member rather than the good example of a high contributor. While
it is important to mention that all our results are based on our selection out of all
possible cases and thus are not immediately generalizable, our approach constitutes
a first step to investigate more deeply how preferences of cooperation depend on
others’ individual contributions.
Our study adds to the literature on conditional cooperation and the importance
of social interaction effects in social dilemma situations. With regard to policy impli-
cations, our results suggest that policy makers striving to facilitate voluntary public
goods provision should reveal previous individual behavior only if it is relatively
uniform and instead give information about aggregate behavior if it varies a lot.
Likewise, when constructing teams, forming groups of equal performers is generally
preferable because in diverse teams, it is more likely that the negative effect of low
makes people deviate from the average, we estimate model (3) separately for each conditional co-
operator and subsequently classify them according to which factor is best in predicting behavior.
Overall, we find pronounced heterogeneity, yet in line with the aggregate results, there are more
conditional cooperators who are mainly guided by the minimum rather than by the median or the
maximum contribution. Notwithstanding, there is also a considerable fraction of individuals who
condition their contributions on each of the three factors equally (indicated by an insignificant
F -test between the three coefficients), and thus can be best described as true average types. The
results of this analysis are available upon request.
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performers outweighs any positive effects of the high performers. This, for example,
highlights why firing shirking workers can have additional positive effects on the
productivity of others.
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3.6 Appendix to Chapter 3
A Descriptive statistics by treatment and case
Table 3.4: Average Contributions by Treatment and Case
Case
Contribution ∅ Ind-Only Ind-Avg Ind-Pg Avg Ind
Vector (combined)
Uncond. Contrib - - 6.32 5.77 6.23 5.50 6.10
1 0/0/0 0 0.14 0.34 0.21 0.50 0.23
2 0/5/7 4 2.33 2.13 2.84 1.92 <* 2.41
3 5/5/5 5 3.11 3.00 3.39 2.33 <** 3.16
4 0/5/10 5 2.78 2.84 3.07 2.33 <* 2.89
5 0/5/13 6 3.39 3.34 4.00 2.78 3.56
6 0/0/20 7 2.70 3.30 2.43 3.30 2.83
7 5/5/10 7 4.28 3.83 4.21 3.30 4.10
8 4/4/12 7 3.44 3.77 4.54 3.30 3.89
9 6/6/10 7 4.25 4.22 4.68 3.30 <* 4.37
10 4/8/8 7 3.55 3.95 4.46 3.30 3.97
11 0/8/13 7 3.42 3.84 4.39 3.30 3.86
12 2/4/15 7 4.22 3.63 3.84 3.30 3.90
13 8/8/8 8 4.78 4.73 5.46 3.75 <* 4.97
14 5/5/15 8 4.72 4.33 4.52 3.75 4.52
15 4/8/12 8 4.30 4.33 4.34 3.75 4.32
16 0/11/13 8 4.19 4.27 4.55 3.75 4.33
17 2/7/15 8 4.06 4.23 4.38 3.75 4.22
18 3/8/13 8 4.45 3.95 4.52 3.75 4.30
19 8/8/12 9 5.30 4.75 5.09 4.02 5.04
20 4/12/12 9 4.55 4.59 5.25 4.02 4.78
21 8/10/10 9 5.06 4.81 5.16 4.02 5.01
22 6/8/13 9 5.06 4.75 4.91 4.02 4.91
23 2/10/15 9 4.58 4.84 4.84 4.02 4.75
24 5/10/12 9 5.19 4.64 5.18 4.02 4.99
25 10/10/10 10 6.17 6.36 6.46 4.88 <** 6.33
26 5/5/20 10 5.52 5.92 5.32 4.88 5.60
27 5/10/15 10 5.63 5.88 5.77 4.88 5.76
28 8/10/15 11 6.27 6.03 5.88 5.17 6.07
29 5/10/8 11 6.14 6.11 5.71 5.17 6.00
30 5/15/15 12 5.66 6.09 7.05 5.48 6.23
31 0/20/20 13 5.91 6.81 7.34 5.66 6.66
32 15/15/15 15 8.75 8.14 9.48 6.34 <** 8.76
33 10/15/20 15 7.98 7.28 8.20 6.34 7.80
34 10/20/20 17 7.50 8.16 8.91 7.22 8.16
35 20/20/20 20 10.16 9.39 11.61 8.38 10.33
Total - 9 4.84 4.82 5.20 4.11 4.94
Note: Stars indicate significant effects on a ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01 level using a MWU-test.
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B Classification of types
Following FGF, we categorize subjects in Avg as conditional cooperators if their
contributions are monotonically increasing in the average contribution of the other
group members, or exhibit a positive and significant (at the 1% level) Spearman’s
rank-order correlation coefficient between own and others’ contributions. In the
Ind-treatments, we employ the same criteria as before, using the six no variance
cases (0/0/0; 5/5/5; 8/8/8; 10/10/10; 15/15/15; 20/20/20) so that the lowest, me-
dian, average, and highest contribution all coincide (see Cheung (2012) for a similar
approach). If subjects’ contributions in these cases yield a positive and significant
(on 5% level17) Spearman’s rank-order correlation coefficient, or are monotonically
increasing, we classify them as conditional cooperators. The distribution of types
(see Table 3.5) is very similar and not significantly different between Ind, Avg, and
the original data from FGF (χ2 - test: p > 0.33).
Table 3.5: Distribution of Types by Treatment
Type FGF Avg Ind
Conditional Cooperators 50.0% [22] 54.7% [35] 56.5% [104]
Free-rider 29.5% [13] 32.8% [21] 22.3% [41]
Others 20.5% [9] 12.5% [8] 21.2% [39]
Note: Number in brackets display absolute frequencies.
C Predictions Fehr and Schmidt model
In the FS-model, besides getting utility from their own monetary payoff pii,
individuals are assumed to endure envy costs αi when their own payoff is lower than
the payoff of others, and endure compassion costs βi if it exceeds the payoff of others.
In other words, individuals maximize the following utility function:
Ui (pii, pij) = pii − αi 1
n− 1
∑
j 6=i
max [pij − pii, 0]− βi 1
n− 1
∑
j 6=i
max [pii − pij, 0]
with αi ≥ βi and 0 ≤ βi < 1, assuring that envy looms larger than compassion
and individuals never destroy their own payoff to decrease their costs of compassion.
17We lower the threshold to 5% because we only have six cases instead of 21 in Avg. If we
would also use this lower threshold in Avg, we would get exactly the same classification because
all p-values of the Spearman rank-correlations that are below 5% are also below 1%.
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Proposition:
According to the FS-model, in our public goods game a player never contributes
more than the minimum of the other group members’ contributions.
Proof :
Without loss of generality, assume that player 4 observes contributions c1 ≤
c2 ≤ c3 from her group members 1, 2, and 3, respectively. She then chooses her
contribution c4 to maximize the utility function mentioned above. With pii = 20−
ci + 0.4 · (c1 + c2 + c3 + c4) for i ∈ 1, 2, 3, 4, player 4’s utility is given by:
U4 (c1, c2, c3, c4) = 20− c4 + 0.4 · (c1 + c2 + c3 + c4)
− α4
3
(max [c1 − c4, 0] + max [c2 − c4, 0] + max [c3 − c4, 0])
− β4
3
(max [c4 − c1, 0] + max [c4 − c2, 0] + max [c4 − c3, 0])
Note that because of the linearity of the public good game and the symmetry
of the group members’ payoff function, differences in contributions translate one-to-
one into differences in payoffs. Therefore, depending on where c4 ranks among all
contributions, increasing the contribution of player 4 by one unit changes her utility
by the following amounts:
∂U4
∂c4
=

−0.6 + β4 if c4 < c1 ≤ c2 ≤ c3
−0.6 + 2
3
β4 − 13α4 if c1 ≤ c4 < c2 ≤ c3
−0.6 + 1
3
β4 − 23α4 if c1 ≤ c2 ≤ c4 < c3
−0.6− α4 if c1 ≤ c2 ≤ c3 ≤ c4
Given the model’s assumptions of αi ≥ βi and 0 ≤ βi < 1, only the first expres-
sion can be positive, hence the utility maximizing contribution for player 4 is:
c∗4 =
{
0 if β4 < 0.6
c1 if β4 ≥ 0.6
i.e., player 4 free-rides if her strength of compassion is lower than a threshold
value β˜ = 0.6, and matches the lowest contribution of the other group members c1
exactly if β4 exceeds that threshold. Although further increasing her contributions
would decrease advantageous inequity with regard to the two highest contributors
in the group, this would also decrease her own material payoff and increase disad-
vantageous inequity with regard to the lowest contributor. However, this can never
increase her utility because −0.6 + 2
3
β4 − 13α4 < 0 for all α4 ≥ β4 and 0 ≤ β4 < 1.
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Hence, players with FS-preferences will never contribute more than the lowest con-
tribution of the other three group members. 
D Predictions Bolton and Ockenfels model
The BO-model postulates that individuals maximize their motivation function
given by vi(yi, σi) with yi being the individual’s payoff and σi the individual’s share
of the total payoff. By assumption, vi1(yi, σi) ≥ 0, vi11(yi, σi) ≤ 0, vi2(yi, σi) = 0
if σi =
1
n
(where n is the number of players) and vi22(yi, σi) < 0. In other words,
ceteris paribus, individuals prefer more money over less and prefer to receive the
equal split.
Proposition:
Individuals with ERC-preferences never contribute more than the average con-
tribution of the other group members. Furthermore, the composition of individual
contributions that make up that average does not matter for contribution behavior.
Proof :
Without loss of generality, assume that player 4 observes contributions c1, c2,
and c3 from her group members 1, 2, and 3, respectively. Let C123 ≡ c1 + c2 + c3. It
follows that
y4 = 20− c4 + 0.4 · (C123 + c4)
and
σ4 =
20− c4 + 0.4 · (C123 + c4)
80 + 0.6 · (C123 + c4) .
so both the player’s material payoff, y4, and her relative share, σ4 strictly decreases
in c4, i.e.,
∂y4
∂c4
< 0 and ∂σ4
∂c4
< 0. For any given C123, c4 determines both, y4 and σ4,
so we can write v4(y4(c4), σ4(c4)) or v4(c4). The first derivative of v4 with respect to
c4 has two components: The payoff effect
v14 (y4(c4), σ4(c4))︸ ︷︷ ︸
≥0
· y′(c4)︸ ︷︷ ︸
=−0.6
≤ 0
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and the relative share effect
v24 (y4(c4), σ4(c4))︸ ︷︷ ︸
< 0 if c4 < C123/3
= 0 if c4 = C123/3
> 0 if c4 > C123/3
·σ′(c4)︸ ︷︷ ︸
<0
which is positive if c < C123/3, zero if c = C123/3, and negative if c > C123/3. When
v4(y4(c4), σ4(c4)) is maximized, it follows that v
′
4(y4(c4), σ4(c4)) = 0, hence
v14 (y4(c4), σ4(c4)) · y′4(c4) + v24 (y4(c4), σ4(c4)) · σ′4(c4) = 0
which requires c4 ≤ C123/3. Therefore, the player never contributes more than
the average contribution of the other three group members. Furthermore, since all
expressions only depend on the sum C123 and not on the individual contributions c1,
c2, and c3, changing the composition of C123 does not influence own contributions
in the BO-model. 
E Predictions Charness and Rabin model18
The CR-model assumes that individuals maximize the following utility function:
Ui (pi1, pi2, . . . , piN) = (1− λ)pii + λ [δ ·min [pi1, pi2, . . . , piN ]
+ (1− δ)(pi1 + pi2 + . . .+ piN)]
with pii being individual i’s payoff, λ ∈ [0, 1] the strength of social concern compared
to material self-interest and δ ∈ [0, 1] the strength of Rawlsian concern for the
individual with the lowest payoff compared to concerns for efficiency.
Proposition:
According to the CR-model, individuals are either willing to contribute irre-
spective of other group members’ contributions to increase overall efficiency, or are
willing to contribute up to the maximum contribution of the other group members
to increase the lowest overall payoff.
Proof :
Without loss of generality, assume that player 4 observes contributions c1 ≤
18For comparability with the other two models, we apply the outcome-based version of the
CR-model without reciprocity.
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c2 ≤ c3 from her group members 1, 2, and 3, respectively. She then chooses her
contribution c4 to maximize her utility function given by:
U4 (c1, c2, c3, c4) = (1− λ)(20− c4 + 0.4 ·
4∑
j=1
cj)
+ λ
[
δ ·min
[
20− c3 + 0.4 ·
4∑
j=1
cj, 20− c4 + 0.4 ·
4∑
j=1
cj
]
+ (1− δ)(80 + 0.6 ·
4∑
j=1
cj)
]
We have to differentiate between two cases depending on whether player 4 is the
highest contributor or not, i.e., depending on where c4 ranks compared to the highest
contribution of the other group members c3, increasing the contribution of player 4
by one unit changes her utility by the following amounts:
∂U4
∂c4
=
{
1.2λ− 0.2λδ − 0.6 if c4 < c3
1.2λ− 1.2λδ − 0.6 if c4 ≥ c3
From this it follows that
c∗4 =

0 if λ < 1
2(1− 1
6
δ)
c3 if
1
2(1− 1
6
δ)
≤ λ < 1
2(1−δ)
20 if λ > 1
2(1−δ)
i.e., player 4 free-rides if her overall social concern λ is lower than a lower thresh-
old λ = 1
2(1− 1
6
δ)
. Depending on the player’s concern for helping the worst-off player
versus maximizing total social surplus δ, this threshold can take values between 0.5
(for δ = 0) and 0.6 (for δ = 1), i.e., the threshold for contributing a positive amount
is monotonically increasing in δ. Given λ exceeds this threshold, player 4 exactly
matches the highest contribution of the other group members c3 if λ is smaller than
an upper threshold λ = 1
2(1−δ) , and contributes fully if λ also exceeds λ. Note that
λ ≤ λ for all δ ∈ [0, 1]. Furthermore, note that λ can, in principle, take values
between 0.5 (for δ = 0) and infinity (for δ = 1). However, as λ ∈ [0, 1], λ ≥ λ can
only be fulfilled as long as δ ≤ 1
2
. Taken together, player 4 free-rides if her overall
social concern is low. If she does not free-ride, she contributes her full endowment if
her efficiency concern is sufficiently strong compared to her Rawlsian concerns, and
matches the highest contribution of her group members otherwise. 
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F Experimental instructions for the Ind-Only treatment
(translated from German)19
You are now taking part in an economic experiment. If you read the following
instructions carefully, you can - depending on your decisions - earn a considerable
amount of money in addition to the 2.50 Euro which you receive in any case for
participating in the experiment. The entire amount of money which you earn with
your decisions will be added up and paid to you in cash at the end of the experiment.
These instructions are solely for your private information. You are not allowed to
communicate during the experiment. If you have any questions, please ask us. The
violation of this rule will lead to the exclusion from the experiment and all payments.
If you have questions, please raise your hand. A member of the experimenter team
will come to you and answer them in private. During the experiment we do not
speak of Euros, but of points. Your whole income will first be calculated in points.
At the end of the experiment, the total amount of points you have earned will be
converted to Euros at the following rate:
1 point = 50 Cents
Please also note the following:
• All participants will be randomly divided into groups of four members. Except
for the experimenters, no one knows who is in which group.
• All decisions are made anonymously, i.e., no other participants will know the
identity of someone who has a made a decision.
• The payment at the end of the experiment is also made anonymously, i.e., no
participant will know another participant’s payment.
The decision situation
You will learn how the experiment will be conducted later. We first introduce
you to the basic decision situation.
You will be a member of a group consisting of 4 people. Each group member
has to decide on the allocation of 20 points. You can put these 20 points into your
private account or you can invest them fully or partially into a project. Each point
you do not invest into the project automatically remains in your private account.
Thus, you and the members of your group have to decide how many points you
want to invest in the project and how many points you want to keep for yourself.
19The instructions for the other treatments are very similar any available upon request.
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All group members make their decisions simultaneously. This means that nobody
is informed about the other group members’ decisions before making his or her own
decision.
Your income from the private account
For each point you put into your private account you will exactly earn one point.
For example, if you put 20 points into your private account (and therefore do not
invest into the project), your income will amount to exactly 20 points out of your
private account. If you instead put 6 points into your private account, your income
from this account will be 6 points. No one except you earns something from your
private account.
Your income from the project
Each group member will benefit equally from the amount you invest into the
project. On the other hand, you will also benefit from the other group members’
investments. The income for each group member will be determined as follows:
Income from the project = Sum of all contributions × 0.4
If, for example, the sum of all contributions to the project is 60 points, then
you and the other members of your group each earn 60× 0.4 = 24 points from the
project. If the four members of the group contribute a total of 10 points to the
project, you and the other members of your group each earn 10× 0.4 = 4 points.
Total income
Your total income is calculated as follows:
Income from your private account (= 20 - contribution to the project)
+ income from the project (= 0.4 × sum of all contributions to the project)
= Total income
Example 1:
Every group member has 20 points. Assume you contribute 4 points to the
project and every other group member each contributes 8 points to the project.
Your income from your private account then amounts to 20-4=16 points. Your
income from the project amounts to 0.4× (4 + 8 + 8 + 8) = 0.4× 28 = 11.2 points
in this case. Altogether your total income amounts to 16 + 11.2 = 27.2 points.
Your group members each receive 20− 8 = 12 points from their private account and
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0.4× (4 + 8 + 8 + 8) = 0.4× 28 = 11.2 points from the project. Altogether each of
your group members receives a total income of 12 + 11.2 = 23.2 points.
Example 2:
Every group member has 20 points. Assume you contribute 16 points to the
project and all your group members each contribute 12 points to the project. Your
income from your private account then amounts to 20 − 16 = 4 points. Your
income from the project amounts to 0.4 × (16 + 12 + 12 + 12) = 0.4 × 52 = 20.8
points. Altogether your total income amounts to 4 + 20.8 = 24.8 points. Your
group members each receive 20 − 12 = 8 points from their private account and
0.4× (16 + 12 + 12 + 12) = 0.4× 52 = 20.8 points from the project. Altogether each
of your group members receives a total income of 8 + 20.8 = 28.8 points.
Before explaining the exact sequence of the experiment, we ask you to answer
some control questions regarding the decision situation. They are meant to increase
your familiarity with the decision situation and make sure that each participant has
fully understood the instructions.
Please answer the following questions
Every group member has 20 points. Assume that the four group members (including
you) each contribute 0 points to the project.
Question 1: What is your total income in this case (in points)?
Question 2: What is the total income of each of the other group members in
this case (in points)?
Every group member has 20. You contribute 20 points to the project. The three
other group members also each contribute 20 points to the project.
Question 3: What is your total income in this case (in points)?
Question 4: What is the total income of each of the other group members in
this case (in points)?
Every group member has 20 points. The three other group members together con-
tribute a sum of 30 points to the project.
Question 5: What is your total income in this case (in points) if you contribute
- in addition to the 30 points of the other three group members - 0 points to the
project?
Question 6: What is your total income in this case (in points) if you contribute
- in addition to the 30 points of the other three group members - 10 points to the
project?
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Question 7: What is your total income in this case (in points) if you contribute
- in addition to the 30 points of the other three group members - 20 points to the
project?
The Experiment
The experiment includes the decision situation just described. The decisions you
make in this experiment will be paid in cash after the experiment.
As you know, you will have 20 points at your disposal which you can either place
in your private account or contribute to the project. Each subject has to make two
types of contribution decisions in this experiment, which we will refer to below as
the “Contribution of Type I” and “Contribution of Type II”. On the next page you
will find detailed instructions on how to make your two decisions concerning your
contribution.
Contribution of Type I
In the Contribution of Type I you decide how many of your 20 points you want
to contribute to the project. Then you enter this amount into the input box.
Contribution of Type II
Your second task will be to make a decision on your Contribution of Type II.
This decision will be made by completing a contribution table. In this contribution
table you will find different possible combinations of contributions of the other group
members. For each of these combinations you have to decide how much you want
to contribute given these circumstances. That way, you can make your contribution
decision conditional on the contributions of the other group members. This will be
immediately clear to you if you take a look at the following table. The contribution
table will appear immediately after you have determined your Contribution of Type
I.
Contribution I Contribution II Contribution III Your Contribution
0 5 10
The numbers in the first three columns are possible Contributions of Type I
to the project by the other group members. In the Contribution of Type II you
simply have to enter the amount of points you want to contribute if the other group
members decided to contribute the given amounts as their Contribution of Type I.
For example, you can enter how many points you contribute to the project if one
group member contributed 0 points, another 5 points and the last one 10 points to
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the project.
All in all you will be shown 36 of such contribution situations. Please note, that
for each contribution situation you have to enter a number in the corresponding
input box. Also, please note that the Contributions of Type I for the other group
members are given in ascending order and therefore do not allow any inference on
the identity of the group members.
Experiment Payoff
After each participant in every group has made their Contributions of Type I
and Type II, three members of each group are chosen randomly. For these randomly
chosen members, only their Contribution of Type I are payoff-relevant, meaning that
those three randomly chosen members contribute their Contribution of Type I to
the project. For the fourth group member, who was not chosen randomly, only the
contribution table (Contribution of Type II) is payoff-relevant. The contribution
situation from the contribution table that is relevant will be determined by the
Contributions of Type I of the other three randomly chosen group members, meaning
that the fourth group member contributes the amount stated in the corresponding
contribution situation. The two following examples will clarify this.
Important:
• The experiment will only be conducted once, meaning that every decision is
made only once.
• When you decide on your Contribution of Type I and II, you do not know
whether you will be chosen by the random mechanism. Therefore, you have
to carefully think about both your contribution decisions, as both of these can
become relevant for your payoff.
• For each group member, it is made sure that one of the contribution situations
in the table corresponds to the Contributions of Type I of the other group
members.
Example 3:
Assume that the random mechanism did not choose you, meaning that your
contribution table is relevant for your payoff. For the other three members of the
group, the Contribution of Type I is relevant for payoff. Assume the other three
group members decided to contribute 0 points, 2 points and 4 points to the project
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on their Contributions of Type I. If you have entered in your contribution table for
the entry 0/2/4 that you will contribute 1 point, the total contribution of your group
to the project will be given by 0 + 2 + 4 + 1 = 7. Every group members therefore
earns 0.4 × 7 = 2.8 points from the project plus their respective income from their
private account. If you have instead entered in your contribution table that you will
contribute 19 points when the other three members contribute 0, 2 and 4 points, the
total contribution of the group to the project is given by 0 + 2 + 4 + 19 = 25 points.
All group members therefore earn 0.4 × 25 = 10 points from the project plus their
respective income from their private account.
Example 4:
Assume you have been chosen by the random mechanism, meaning that for you
and two other group members your Contribution of Type I is relevant for payoff.
Your Contribution of Type I is 16 points, the Contributions of Type I of the other two
group members are 18 and 20 points. If for the entry 16/18/20 the one group member
who was not randomly chosen now entered a contribution of 1 point when the other
three members contribute 16, 18 and 20 points, the total contribution of the group
to the project will be given by 16 + 18 + 20 + 1 = 55 Points. Every group member
therefore earns 0.4 × 55 = 22 points from the project plus the respective income
from their private account. If instead the group member that was not randomly
chosen entered in her contribution table that she contributes 19 points, when the
other three members contribute 16, 18 and 20 points, the total contribution of the
group to the project will be given by 16 + 18 + 20 + 19 = 73 points. Every group
member therefore earns 0.4× 73 = 29.2 points from the project plus the respective
income from their private accounts.
Please answer the following questions
Every group member has 20 points. Assume the Contributions of Type I are
given by the following distribution: You: 10 points, group member 1: 5 points,
group member 2: 10 points, group member 3: 15 points. Assume that the random
mechanism did not choose you, meaning your contribution table (Contribution of
Type II) is relevant for your payoff. For the three other members of the group, the
Contribution of Type I is relevant for payoff.
Question 8: What is your total income in this case (in points), if you entered
in your contribution table for the entry (5, 10, 15) that you will contribute 20 points
to the project?
Now assume that you, group member 1 and group member 3 have been chosen by
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the random mechanism, meaning that for you, group member 1 and group member
3 the respective Contribution of Type I is relevant for pay-off. For group member
2, which was not randomly chosen, the contribution table is relevant for payoff.
Question 9: What is your total income in this case (in points), if group member
2 entered in her contribution table for the entry (5, 10, 15) a contribution of 0 points
to the project?
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Chapter 4
Achieving Good or Preventing
Bad - On the Effects of Losses on
Cooperation
4.1 Introduction
Very often seemingly different decision situations inhere similar strategic circum-
stances. Likewise, in many cases the same decision problem can be represented
in more than one way. An important question is whether economic actors behave
equally in such situations or whether they are prone to be influenced by the re-
spective representation. According to rational choice theory, different formulations
of a logically equivalent problem should not affect behavior. Yet, evidence from
experiments in psychology and economics suggest that description often does mat-
ter to preferences and choice (Pruitt, 1967; Selten and Berg, 1970). Such evidence
have been subsumed under the term framing effect which is said to be present when
different representations of the same decision situation lead individuals to change
behavior, even though the underlying information and decision options remain es-
sentially the same (Cookson, 2000).1 In this study we investigate to what degree
people’s willingness to cooperate is affected by framing effects. In particular, we are
interested in the interplay of (frame-induced) loss aversion and cooperation, i.e., we
want to examine whether people are more or less likely to cooperate when this leads
to the achievement of something good compared to when it leads to the prevention
of something bad. For instance, while cooperation within a team that is striving
1As argued by Rabin (1998), one reason for such a framing effect is that even if two different
descriptions of a problem are logical equivalent, this does not necessarily imply that they are also
transparently equivalent, i.e., “... the presentation of a choice may draw our attention to different
aspects of a problem, leading us to make mistakes in pursuing our true, underlying preferences.”
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for the completion of a project can be seen as an example for achieving something
good, the original description of the prisoner’s dilemma in which two prisoners who
have to remain silent to avoid being imprisoned for long can be seen as an example
for preventing something bad.
One related question behind this idea is whether people take into account and
empathize with losses of others. So far, a huge amount of studies from the social
sciences has provided overwhelming and robust evidence for two behavioral regular-
ities in human decision making: (i) social preferences and (ii) loss aversion. The
former refers to people’s tendency to not only care about the own but also about
the well-being of others (cf. Sobel, 2005; Cooper and Kagel, 2009, for a survey). The
latter refers to people’s tendency to evaluate outcomes as gains and losses relative
to some reference point rather than in absolute terms, and to perceive losses to loom
larger than similar-sized gains (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979). As a consequence, a
given choice might be evaluated as less attractive when framed as a loss rather than
framed as a gain. While framing and loss aversion has been primarily studied on an
individual level, social preferences by definition needs at least two individuals to be
involved. Yet, to the best of our knowledge little is known about the interaction of
these two concepts and whether they can be combined.
In the present study we therefore try to combine both notions by analyzing
framing effects with respect to gains and losses in a social dilemma game, in which
outcomes not only depend on the own but also on the decision of others. Social
dilemma games have a long tradition in economic research and are frequently used
to study problems of cooperation and to investigate the presence of social prefer-
ences. The distinctive feature of social dilemmas is that they reflect a variety of
important challenges in social and economic life such as environmental protection,
voluntary provision of public goods, participation in collective action, tax compli-
ance, or teamwork. As diverse as these examples appear, they can all be thought of
as special cases of a more general problem in which individual and collective inter-
ests are at odds. This typically leads to an inefficient underprovision of the common
good (Samuelson, 1954; Olson, 1965; Hardin, 1968). In game theory, one of the
most prominent and simplest examples of such a situation is the so-called prisoner’s
dilemma in which two players have to simultaneously decide whether to cooperate
or not.
In this study we examine such a prisoner’s dilemma game and experimentally
manipulate the framing of the decision situation. In four different treatments, we
either induce a gain- or loss-framing (or a combination of both), and subsequently
study whether and to what degree people’s willingness to cooperate is sensitive to
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such framing. In line with previous studies, the results of our experiment indicate
the presence of a significant framing effect on cooperation.2 Yet, because of the si-
multaneous move structure of our design, we cannot disentangle the effects of beliefs
and actions which we find both to be affected by our framing. Although treatment
differences in behavior could, in principle, be perfectly explained by the differences
in beliefs, this would only shift the focus from the behavioral level to the level of be-
liefs which would leave us with the question why expectations are so different across
treatments. As a consequence, we (unfortunately) cannot conclusively answer the
question of how loss aversion and the willingness to cooperate interact with each
other. If anything, our results indicate that the involvement of losses tends to make
people less cooperative. In order to gain a deeper understanding of our findings,
it is planned to conduct a follow-up experiment in which the effects of beliefs on
behavior are ruled out by design, for example by implementing a sequential-move
structure.3
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. In the next Section we
provide an overview about the literature of framing effects and discuss how our
experiment relates to it. After that, Section 3 describes the experimental design,
the behavioral predictions, and the experimental procedures. The experimental
results are presented and discussed in Section 4. Finally, Section 5 concludes.
4.2 Related Literature
By now there is a rich body of evidence suggesting the presence of framing effects.
While research on this topic has been carried out in many different domains, the
term framing effect has been largely coined by the psychologists Amos Tversky and
Daniel Kahneman. In numerous studies they show that the way in which a task
is framed significantly affects individual decision making. For example, in their
experiment on the famous Asian disease problem (Tversky and Kahneman, 1981),
they find that the majority of subjects is willing to take risks when the task is framed
negatively, but tend to be risk-averse when being confronted with a positive-framed
version of the problem.4
While these authors mainly focus on individual choice tasks, the question of
how framing affects judgments and decision making has also been examined in more
complex situations. Starting with Deutsch (1958), many subsequent studies have
2See the next section for a discussion of the related literature.
3See Section 5 for a more detailed discussion of possible solutions that improve our design and
circumvent this problem.
4See Ku¨hberger (1998) for a meta-analysis of the influence of framing on risky decisions.
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investigated how different kinds of frame manipulations affect people’s willingness
to cooperate in social dilemma situations. While some studies have focused on
the effects of different labels/wordings of e.g. the game, players, or actions, other
studies have analyzed to what degree cooperation levels depend on whether essential
information about the game are represented in a positive or negative light. While the
latter manipulation is often referred to as valence framing (Levin et al., 1998), the
former is sometimes called label framing (Dufwenberg et al., 2011) or pure framing
effect (Elliott et al., 1998).
A well-known example for a pure labeling effect is given by Liberman et al.
(2004). In their experiment they find that cooperation rates in a prisoner’s dilemma
are significantly higher when the game is called “Community Game” compared to
when it is called “Wall Street Game”.5 In contrast, a typical example for valence
framing is to compare so-called give-some and take-some social dilemma games.
While in a give-some dilemma (or public goods dilemma), individuals have to de-
cide how much of their resources they want to contribute to a common pool, in a
take-some dilemma (or common-pool resource dilemma), individuals have to decide
how many resources they want to withdraw from it. Although being strategically
equivalent, the two games differ with regard to where the resources are allocated
initially. As a consequence, whereas in the former the externality on others is pos-
itive (giving increases social welfare), in the latter it is negative (taking decreases
social welfare).6
This difference has been shown to affect judgment of decisions by shedding differ-
ent light on the possible alternatives. While in give-some games failing to cooperate
can be described as an act of omission, in take-some games the corresponding equiv-
alent of taking is an act of commission. In a recent experiment, Cubitt et al. (2011)
find that subjects tend to judge the latter to be less immoral than the former. Inter-
estingly, in social psychology some studies report an opposite effect called omission
bias (Baron, 1988). For instance, Spranca et al. (1991) find that subjects evaluate
harmful commissions as worse or less moral than equally harmful omissions. In line
with this inconsistent evidence, on a behavioral level the results on framing effects
in social dilemmas are rather mixed, too. While contributions are often found to be
higher under a give- than under a take-frame (Andreoni, 1995; Sonnemans et al.,
1998; Willinger and Ziegelmeyer, 1999; Park, 2000; Cookson, 2000), other studies
5Rege and Telle (2004), Dufwenberg et al. (2011), and Ellingsen et al. (2012) provide further
examples for label-framing effects.
6As argued by Apesteguia and Maier-Rigaud (2006), there is an additional difference between
public goods and common resource games making them not completely identical. While the former
is characterized by non-excludability and non-rivalry, the latter is also non-excludable but possibly
rival.
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report neutral (Cubitt et al., 2011; Dufwenberg et al., 2011) or even opposite effects
(Brewer and Kramer, 1986; McCusker and Carnevale, 1995; Sell and Son, 1997). Al-
though these studies partly differ with regard to their experimental design, in general
it can be concluded that the evidence for framing effects in social dilemma games
is less conclusive than for individual decision tasks (Levin et al., 1998; Ku¨hberger
et al., 2002).7
In the past, framing effects have commonly been interpreted as evidence against
standard expected utility theory and as a violation of rationality. A possible expla-
nation that has been put forward is prospect theory (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979;
Tversky and Kahneman, 1991) that comprises many features that help to fit the
observed data from individual decision tasks. In strategic games, however, several
different explanations are conceivable and there is no unique “theory of framing”
that is consistent with the observed behavioral patterns. Two recent studies ex-
perimentally discriminate between some of the proposed explanations and provide
insightful evidence that helps to better understand the underlying principle of fram-
ing and its effects on decision making. In a one-shot public goods game, Dufwenberg
et al. (2011) find that framing affects not merely subjects’ behavior but also their
first- and second-order beliefs. By applying their results to psychological game the-
ory, they suggest that framing effects can be understood as a two-part process where,
as a first step, frames move beliefs, and, as a second step, beliefs shape motivation
and choice. Ellingsen et al. (2012) provide further evidence for that frames enter
people’s beliefs rather than their preferences. In a prisoner’s dilemma game they
find framing effects to only be in place when the game is played simultaneously
(and beliefs might be relevant for choices), but not when it is played sequentially
(and beliefs should not matter for decisions).8 They conclude that in a game with
multiple equilibria, frames may put different emphasis on actions and, thereby, serve
as a coordination and equilibrium selection device.9 Both studies have in common
that they make no reference to irrationality but explain framing effects within a
rational-choice-based framework.
Yet, as suggested by Ellingsen et al. (2012), further studies are needed to test
7See also Goerg and Walkowitz (2010) who, using participants from four different countries,
report subject-pool effects in the prevalence of framing effects on cooperation.
8Note that in contrast to Dufwenberg et al. (2011), they only make reference to first-order
beliefs, i.e., beliefs about other player’s actions. They thus do not test whether behavior might be
influenced by, e.g., guilt aversion via second-order beliefs.
9Note that if individuals are completely selfish, there is only one Nash equilibrium in the
prisoner’s dilemma game. However, if people do not only care about maximizing own payoffs but
exhibit some form of other-regarding preferences (cf. Sobel, 2005; Cooper and Kagel, 2009, for
an overview), the game may turn into a Stag hunt game in utilities with multiple Pareto ranked
equilibria (cf. Rabin, 1993; 1998; Fehr and Schmidt, 1999; Ga¨chter and Fehr, 1999).
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the robustness of these results. The experiment reported in this study is a first
attempt to contribute to this request by applying a different kind of framing than
they do. While Ellingsen et al. (2012) use a label framing (“Stock Market Game”
vs. “Community Game”), in our experiment we induce a gain- or loss framing (or
a combination of both) by varying an endowment subjects receive in addition to
their payoff from the prisoner’s dilemma which is adjusted accordingly. Although
in some respects our manipulation is similar to the give- vs. take-framing, it also
differs from that in important ways. First of all, the way in which the decision
situation is described is quite different between both approaches. Second, while
in the give- vs. take-framing actions have different connotations inducing different
(moral) judgments (see discussion above), this is less likely in our experiment as
actions in all treatments have the same label and reflect the same act. Last, while
in the former, subjects usually can either only take or only give, we gradually shift
payoffs from gains to losses. When transforming our game into a common resource
game, this would imply that subjects can both, take and give.
Besides that, an additional advantage of our experimental design is that unlike
many of the other studies cited above, we study a one-shot instead of a repeated
game. The major advantage of one-shot games is that they eliminate confounding
effects that might arise from strategic considerations in repeated interactions and,
thus, allow for a cleaner test for the existence of framing effects (Cubitt et al., 2011).
In the following, we explain our experimental design in more detail.
4.3 The Experiment
4.3.1 Experimental Design
The underlying decision situation of our experiment is a prisoner’s dilemma game
(PD) in which two players simultaneously and independently of each other have to
decide whether to cooperate (C) or to defect (D). The important property of this
game is that individual incentives are such that the collective desirable outcome is
often not reached. In particular, if agents are purely selfish, there is a clear be-
havioral prediction: Action D is the strictly dominant strategy because irrespective
of the other player’s decision, it yields a higher payoff than choosing C. Therefore,
(D, D) the only Nash equilibrium of the one-shot game.10 Yet, this outcome is
Pareto-dominated by the situation in which both players cooperate which leads to
10If the game is played repeatedly (iterated PD) with the final period being unknown to the
players, an equilibrium with mutual cooperation can be sustained (see Axelrod, 1980, for a test of
different strategies that facilitate cooperation).
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the social efficient outcome that maximizes joint payoffs.
Table 4.1: Game Matrix Prisoner’s Dilemma
Cooperate Defect
Cooperate a− e; a− e d− e; c− e
Defect c− e; d− e b− e; b− e
Within this basic setting, we investigate whether and, if so, to what degree
people’s willingness to cooperate depends on the framing of the decision situation.
In a between-subjects design we conduct four different treatments in which we vary
the initial endowment each player receives. At the same time, we adjust the payoffs
of the PD game accordingly such that economic incentives are completely identical
in all four treatments.
The general structure of the PD game is illustrated in Table 4.1 showing indi-
vidual payoffs depending on both player’s action, with c > a > b > d being fixed
numbers and e being the initial endowment given to the subjects. Importantly,
while in all four treatments parameters a, b, c, and d are identical and set equal to
a = 2, b = 1, c = 2.5, and d = 0.5 (in e), the endowment e varies across treatments.
In particular, starting from treatment 1 to 4, we stepwise increase the endowment
from e0 to e3 by increments of e1, and simultaneously lower the payoffs in each
cell of the respective matrix by the same amount. This leads to the payoff matrices
displayed in Table 4.2(a), (b), (c), and (d) which the subjects face in treatments 1,
2, 3, and 4 of the experiment, respectively.11
Our two main treatments are depicted by the payoff matrices in 4.2(a) and 4.2(d)
which either contain only positive (Gain) or only negative outcomes (Loss). The
comparison of these two treatments should give us a benchmark about how behavior
depends on whether the game is framed in terms of gains or losses. The other two
treatments are intermediate treatments in which some of the payoffs are positive and
some are negative. We refer to them as Int-I and Int-II. Together with the first
two treatments this allows us to gradually investigate the effects of shifting payoffs
from the gain into the loss domain.
11Note that while in Table 4.1 and 4.2 we use the terms “cooperate” and “defect”, in the
experiment we use a neutral language and refer to these actions as “option A” and “option B”,
respectively. The numbers in the payoff matrices represent Euro amounts. The experimental
instructions and a screenshot of the decision situation can be found in the appendix.
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Table 4.2: Experimental Treatments
Cooperate Defect
Cooperate 2.00; 2.00 0.50; 2.50
Defect 2.50; 0.50 1.00; 1.00
(a) Gain: Endowment = 0
Cooperate Defect
Cooperate 1.00; 1.00 -0.50; 1.50
Defect 1.50; -0.50 0.00; 0.00
(b) Int-I: Endowment = 1
Cooperate Defect
Cooperate 0.00; 0.00 -1.50; 0.50
Defect 0.50; -1.50 -1.00; -1.00
(c) Int-II: Endowment = 2
Cooperate Defect
Cooperate -1.00; -1.00 -2.50; -0.50
Defect -0.50; -2.50 -2.00; -2.00
(d) Loss: Endowment = 3
4.3.2 Behavioral Predictions
As discussed above, standard expected utility theory yields the same equilibrium
prediction irrespective of the frame. It thus cannot explain possible treatment
differences in terms of behavior. The most common and best-developed alterna-
tive theory that has been proposed to explain the occurrence of framing effects is
prospect theory (see above). While this theory of reference-dependent preferences
has originally been formulated to deal with individual decision problems, some stud-
ies have tried to also apply some of its features to strategic environments (cf. Sell
and Son, 1997; Iturbe-Ormaetxe et al., 2011). Comparing take-some and give-some
games, they conclude that contributions should be higher under the take- than un-
der give-frame. This prediction rests on their assumption that individuals take the
status quo as the reference point which in case of a public goods game is owning
the private good, and in the case of a resource game it is owning the common good.
Because prospect theory implies loss aversion which predicts that individuals value
things they own more than ones they do not (endowment effect), this should induce
group members to not contribute in the former and to cooperate (not take) in the
latter. However, as pointed out by Cookson (2000), in social dilemma games it is
not so clear what serves as a reference point. The reason is that in these games,
individuals’ income consists of two components: the private and the common good.
As a consequence, depending on which component is made more salient, under the
give-frame contributing can either be seen as a gain (increasing the income from the
public good) or as a loss (decreasing income from the private good). Similarly, under
the take-frame the reference point could be thought of as starting with nothing in
the private account and having the opportunity to gain, or, alternatively, as starting
with everything in the public account and being confronted with the possibility of
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a loss.
Given the description and presentation of our PD game, however, we argue that
our experimental design leaves less scope for such ambiguity in what serves as the
reference point. The reason is that instead of referring to a public and a private
account, we endow subjects with a fix endowment that is not affected by choices,
and present payoff consequences as gains and losses relative to this endowment.
Because of that, using this endowment as the reference point seems to be most
natural and plausible in our context. Of course, it could also be that subjects
mentally combine the endowment with the payoffs from the game. In this case, the
outcomes of each treatment would be equal to those in Gain which do not involve
any losses. However, engaging in such calculations requires cognitive effort and
evidence from social psychology suggests that individuals often behave as cognitive
misers (Fiske and Taylor, 1991) who apply cognitive shortcuts rather than using all
relevant information. Further empirical evidence suggests that many people tend to
bracket choices narrowly (Read et al., 1999) and to use different mental accounts (cf.
Thaler, 1999) which both is in favor of players treating outcomes separately rather
than jointly.12
Apart from that, irrespective of which outcome is used as a reference point to
evaluate relative payoffs, in our context loss aversion alone cannot predict differ-
ent cooperation rates across treatments. The reason is that even if people are loss
averse, free-riding remains the dominant strategy, either in terms of smaller losses
or in terms of larger gains. Similarly, while theories of social preferences can explain
why individuals decide to cooperate (especially when others do so as well), they
usually only depend on actual outcomes and, thus, cannot explain different coop-
eration rates across frames. As a consequence, a combination of both elements is
needed to make any novel predictions in our setting. In the following, we therefore
derive theoretical predictions based on such a model. In particular, we assume that
individuals maximize the following piecewise linear utility function:
Ui(xi, xj) =

xi + αi · xj if xi ≥ 0;xj ≥ 0
xi + αi · λxj if xi ≥ 0;xj < 0
λxi + αi · xj if xi < 0;xj ≥ 0
λxi + αi · λxj if xi < 0;xj < 0
(4.1)
with λ being the degree of loss aversion, 0 ≤ αi ≤ 1 agent i’s concern for agent j’s
12Note that if subjects disregard the endowment completely, the most natural reference point
is zero which would lead to the same predictions as derived below. Another possibility could be
that subjects’ reference points are shaped by their expectations about outcomes, as argued by e.g.
Abeler et al. (2011).
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well-being, and xi and xj agent i’s and j’s payoff from the game and the change
in outcomes relative to their endowment, respectively.13 Following the literature
(cf. Kahneman et al., 1990), we assume losses to loom twice as large as equivalent
gains, i.e. λ = 2. Importantly, we assume that individuals are not only loss averse
in their own but also in the payoffs of their opponents. Although we are not aware
of any study that empirically tests whether loss aversion also applies to the payoffs
of others, we find it plausible that loss-averse agents who care about others’ well-
being also empathize with their losses, i.e., that they take into consideration others’
perceived rather than their actual payoffs.14 Certainly, whether this assumption is
justified or not is an empirical questions that needs to be tackled.
Table 4.3: Transformed Payoff Matrices
Cooperate Defect
Cooperate 2 + 2α; 2 + 2α 0.5 + 2.5α; 2.5 + 0.5α
Defect 2.5 + 0.5α; 0.5 + 2.5α 1 + α; 1 + α
(a) Gain: Endowment = 0
Cooperate Defect
Cooperate 1 + α; 1 + α −1 + 1.5α; 1.5− α
Defect 1.5− α; −1 + 1.5α 0; 0
(b) Int-I: Endowment = 1
Cooperate Defect
Cooperate 0; 0 −3 + 0.5α; 0.5− 3α
Defect 0.5− 3α; −3 + 0.5α −2− 2α; −2− 2α
(c) Int-II: Endowment = 2
Cooperate Defect
Cooperate −2− 2α; −2− 2α −5− α; −1− 5α
Defect −1− 5α; −5− α −4− 4α; −4− 4α
(d) Loss: Endowment = 3
Given the utility function described in (1), the monetary payoffs from the games
13The two border case αi = 0 and αi = 1 reflect situations in which individual i only cares about
own payoff or cares about the other’s payoff as much as about the own. If αi is in between these
two boundaries, this means that agent i cares about agent j’s outcome but not as much as about
the own. Social preferences in our case can thus be best described as a notion of altruism.
14We also analyzed the case when this assumption is relaxed, i.e., when agents are only loss
averse about own but not about others’ payoff. See footnote 16 for a discussion of the results.
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depicted in Table 4.2 can be transformed into utility payoffs as shown in Table 4.3.
Based on these transformed matrices, we use player i’s best response function to
calculate minimum thresholds levels for α so that player i is better off by choosing
C rather than D.15 In particular, for each of the other player’s actions we compare
player i’s payoff for cooperation and defection and derive a condition for when the
former exceeds the latter. These thresholds values are shown in Table 4.4 and are
referred to as α.
As can be seen, for treatments Gain and Loss the threshold for α to make action
C the dominant strategy is identical and equal to 1/3. This means that if agent i’s
concern for player j’s well-being is larger than 1/3, she prefers choosing C over D.
The reason for why the thresholds are the same in both treatments is that because
payoffs in Gain and Loss are either all positive or all negative, respectively, utilities
in these cases can be expressed by an affine transformation of each other. This can
easily be seen by looking at equation 4.1. Because outcomes in the first and the last
row either lie all to the right or to the left of the kink in the utility function, in the
latter all arguments are multiplied by λ and the relationship between these two can
thus be expressed by g(x) = λf(x).
In contrast, for Int-I and Int-II no such transformation is possible. The reason
is that in these treatments, some of the payoffs are positive and some are negative
so that the slope of the utility function depends on whether a certain outcome is
above or below zero. As a consequence, in these treatments the threshold for α
changes asymmetrically depending on the other player’s action. When the other
player cooperates, α decreases below 1/3, and when she defects α increases above
1/3. Loss aversion and the social concern for others encourage players to avoid
these losses irrespective of whether they affect own or other’s payoff. Because losses
are particularly large when both players choose different actions, compared to the
other two treatments this means that in Int-I and Int-II players have an increased
incentive to match each other’s action.
Table 4.4: Minimum thresholds levels α by treatment
Gain Int-I Int-II Loss
Ui(C|C) ≥ Ui(D|C) α ≥ 1/3 α ≥ 1/4 α ≥ 1/6 α ≥ 1/3
Ui(C|D) ≥ Ui(D|D) α ≥ 1/3 α ≥ 2/3 α ≥ 2/5 α ≥ 1/3
Based on this, we expect cooperation rates to be similar in Gain and Loss, and
15Because of the symmetry of the game, it is sufficient to derive predictions only for player i
since the conditions for both players are completely identical.
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to be lower in Int-I compared to Int-II. The latter is the case because for each of
the other player’s action (C or D), the threshold α has to exceed to make C the
preferred option is lower (and thus easier to fulfill) in Int-II compared to Int-I.
Comparing the predictions of these two treatments with the ones in Gain and Loss
is not straightforward because depending on (the beliefs about) the other player’s
action, cooperation could both be lower or higher.16
4.3.3 Experimental Procedures
Because of its very short duration, it was decided to combine this experiment with
another short decision-making experiment focusing on coordination. Both parts
were referred to as independent experiments and the one reported in this study was
always conducted second.17 The whole experiment was conducted at the Cologne
Laboratory for Economic Research (CLER) in September 2012. We used the ex-
perimental software z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007) and recruited student participants
from the University of Cologne with the online recruiting software ORSEE (Greiner,
2004). In total, we conducted four experimental sessions in which 124 subjects par-
ticipated. Each session involved 30 to 32 participants who were not allowed to take
part in more than one treatment.
At the beginning of each session, participants were randomly assigned to cubi-
cles in the lab and afterwards were explained the first experiment. Only after all
subjects completed the first part, they were told that there is a second (unrelated)
experiment.18 Then, instructions for the second part were displayed on the com-
puter screen explaining the decision situation, the incentives, and the rules of the
game. Before starting the second experiment, we made sure that every participant
16Very similar predictions can be derived when the social-preference part of the utility function is
modeled as inequality aversion based on perceived outcomes. In contrast, when agents are assumed
to be altruistic and loss averse over own but not over others’ payoffs (see footnote 14), then the
threshold levels for α when agent j chooses C and D, respectively, are 1/3, 1/3 for Gain, 1/3, 2/3
for Int-I and Int-II, respectively, and 2/3, 2/3 for Loss. We thus would expect cooperation rates
to be highest in Gain and lowest in Loss. For Int-I and Int-II we would expect the same level
of cooperation lying somewhere between the levels obtained in Gain and Loss.
17To minimize problems that may arise due to order-effects (e.g. because of learning or
reputation-building), assignment to treatments was completely randomized and groups were re-
matched so that subjects did not interact with each other more than once. Because subjects were
informed about their earnings from the first experiment before the second experiment started,
behavior could be influenced by income effects. Yet, in our data we find no evidence for such an
effect. A Spearman’s rank-order correlation between earnings from the first experiment and the
decision to cooperate in the second experiment yields a very weak and insignificant relationship
(ρ = 0.011, p > 0.902). Therefore, in the following we assume that results are not systematically
influenced by the behavior and the earnings from the first experiment.
18This procedure ensures that behavior in the first experiment is not influenced by subjects’
prospect of the opportunity to earn an additional amount of money.
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had understood the game completely. After subjects had made their decisions, they
were asked for their beliefs about their partner’s action.19 At the end of each session,
subjects were asked to fill in a short questionnaire. Afterwards, they were informed
about the decisions of their opponent and about their payoffs. Finally, participants
were privately paid their individual earnings from both experiments in cash. On
average, participants earned e5.90 (including e2.50 show-up fee) and all sessions
lasted approximately 30 minutes.
4.4 Results
The results of our experiment are summarized in Table 4.5 and Figure 4.1 showing
the percentage of cooperative choices and beliefs separated for each treatment. As
can be seen, the frequency of cooperative choices is highest in Gain and Int-I (69%).
It then decreases to 61% in Loss and finally drops to 41% in Int-II. When testing
for the presence of an overall framing effect we find the frequency of cooperation to
be significantly different across treatments (χ2 - test: p = 0.071).20
Table 4.5: Percentage of cooperative choices and beliefs
Treatment Choice of C Belief of C # Obs.
Gain 69% [22] 72% [23] 32
Int-I 69% [22] 72% [23] 32
Int-II 41% [13] 38% [12] 32
Loss 61% [17] 57% [16] 28
Note: Numbers in brackets display absolute frequencies.
Yet, when comparing treatments pairwise the only pronounced differences are
found between Gain and Int-II, and Int-I and Int-II.21 With regard to our two
main treatments we find the fraction of subjects choosing C to be lower in Loss than
in Gain, but the difference is not statistically significant (χ2 - test: p = 0.515). This
is in line with our theoretical predictions. In contrast, when comparing the inter-
mediate treatments Int-I and Int-II we find evidence contrary to our predictions.
While it was predicted that irrespective of the other player’s decision cooperation
should be easier to sustain in Int-II than in Int-I, the frequency of cooperative
choices is significantly higher in the latter (χ2 - test: p = 0.024). To check the
19In this case, beliefs were not incentivized. For a discussion of the advantages and disadvantages
of incentivizing belief elicitation see Ga¨chter and Renner (2010).
20Throughout the paper we always use two-sided test statistics.
21See Table 4.6 in the appendix for a complete overview of the p-values of pairwise χ2 - tests.
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robustness of these results, we run logistic regressions with treatment dummies as
independent variables. The results are shown in Table 4.7 in the appendix and sup-
port the findings of the χ2 - tests. So while cooperation is fairly similar in Gain,
Int-I, and Loss, the question is why it is so much lower in Int-II. In the following
we discuss some possible explanations for this somewhat surprising result.
Figure 4.1: Fraction of cooperative actions and beliefs by treatment.
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One possible reason for why defection seems to be so much more attractive
in Int-II than in Int-I could be that in contrast to the latter, in Int-II action
D represents the only opportunity for players to receive a strictly positive payoff
(namely when the other player simultaneously chooses C ) which, in turn, may make
this option more attractive. The question that is raised by this difference is why
defection seems to be so much more attractive in Int-II or, analogously, why it is so
much less chosen in Int-I. Another possibility could be that because the perceived
payoff difference resulting from players choosing different actions is larger in Int-II
than in Int-I, this creates an extra incentive to match the other player’s action.
Combined with the first argument, or if players suffer from earning less than their
group member but not from earning more, this leads to an increased incentive to
defect in Int-II compared to Int-I.
Besides from that, another prominent candidate for explaining differences in
behavior are beliefs. For instance, as argued by (Costa-Gomes and Weizsa¨cker,
2008), “In most games of economic interest a player’s optimal choice of play depends
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on the belief that she may hold about her opponents actions.”22 When looking
at beliefs in our experiment, we find the frequency of subjects believing that the
other player cooperates to be significantly different across treatments (χ2 - test:
p = 0.014). In particular, we find the ranking and the magnitude of cooperative
beliefs to reflect the ranking and magnitude of cooperative choices quite closely (see
Table 4.5). Furthermore, all the significant differences across treatments that exist
for choices also hold for beliefs (see Table 4.6 in the appendix). As a consequence,
when including beliefs as a control variable into our regression analysis, all treatment
dummies turn insignificant (see model (2) of Table 4.7 in the appendix). Resulting
from this one could conclude that treatment differences in the choice of C can
be perfectly explained by the differences in beliefs which would be in line with
the argument of Dufwenberg et al. (2011) and Ellingsen et al. (2012) stating that
frames affect beliefs, and beliefs affect motivation and behavior. However, as noted
by Costa-Gomes et al. (2010), including beliefs into the regression is very likely to
cause problems of endogeneity which makes it difficult to draw any inference about a
causal link between expectations and actions. Furthermore, this would only shift the
focus from behavior to beliefs which would then raise the question why expectations
differ across frames and treatments. In fact, as pointed out by Dufwenberg et al.
(2011), developing a theory of framing that can explain how frames move beliefs
is an important challenge for future work. Unfortunately, with our experimental
design we are not able to answer this question conclusively. In the next section, we
therefore discuss some possibilities of how to improve our design.
4.5 Discussion and Conclusion
In this study we investigate whether the framing of a decision situation affect people’s
willingness to cooperate in one-shot prisoner’s dilemma games. In particular, we are
interested in the interplay of loss aversion and cooperation, i.e., whether people
are more likely to cooperate when this leads to the achievement of something good
compared to when cooperation is needed to prevent something bad. By gradually
shifting subjects’ payoffs from a positive into a negative domain, in four different
treatments we either induce a gain- or a loss-framing (or a combination of both),
and subsequently study whether behavior is sensitive to such frame manipulation. In
line with evidence from the related literature discussed in section 2, we find framing
to significantly affect the frequency of cooperation across treatments. However, the
22See also Costa-Gomes et al. (2010) suggesting the presence of a causal relationship between
actions and beliefs.
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ranking of cooperation rates across treatments is not entirely in line with what was
predicted by our model of loss aversion and altruism. Nevertheless, if anything,
our results provide evidence indicating that the involvement of losses tends to make
people less cooperative.
One constraint of our experimental design is that players choose actions simul-
taneously and, thus, behavior is likely to depend on subjects’ beliefs about other
players’ actions. These beliefs turned out to significantly differ between treatments.
While in principle, this could explain the differences found at the behavioral level,
this does not answer the question why expectations itself are affected by framing.
To answer this question, a more elaborate experimental design is needed that is
especially intended for studying the emergence of expectations. However, the in-
tention of our experiment was only to serve as a first benchmark of how people
behave in social dilemma situations that include the possibility of incurring losses.
Certainly, to understand more precisely how framing in such situations affects be-
havior, further studies are needed that either allow to infer the driving factors that
shape expectations depending on the frame or that allow to study the interaction of
frames and behavior independent of beliefs. With regard to the second alternative,
one possibility is to use the same design as in this study, but let subjects choose
actions sequentially. That way, by comparing behavior of the second movers one
would have a clean test of the effects of losses on cooperation without any distortions
due to beliefs. Unfortunately, we could not yet conduct such a follow-up experiment
and include it in this chapter.
Nevertheless, in general we think that the question of how the concepts of loss
aversion and social preferences interrelate with each other might be an interesting
topic that could be further explored in the future. A similar approach has been
initiated by some recent studies that investigate the connection between risk taking
and social context (Bohnet et al., 2008; Bolton and Ockenfels, 2010). While both,
risk behavior and loss aversion, have been originally studied in an individual context,
we argue that broadening these concepts to a richer and social environment is a
promising next step that may have many interesting fields of application such as in
financial services where advisors sell products to advisees that often not only include
high risks but also may entail the danger of incurring losses.
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4.6 Appendix to Chapter 4
A Treatment Comparisons of Cooperative Choices and Be-
liefs
Table 4.6: p-values of pairwise Pearson’s chi-squared tests comparing frequencies of
cooperation
Contributions Beliefs
Gain Int-I Int-II Gain Int-I Int-II
Int-I 1.000 1.000
Int-II 0.044 0.044 0.006 0.006
Loss 0.515 0.515 0.121 0.233 0.233 0.128
B Logistic Regression Analysis
As a dependent variable in model (1) and (2) we use a binary variable taking on
the value 1 if subjects choose action C and 0 otherwise. In model (3) the dependent
variable is whether or not subjects belief that their group member’s action is C. As
independent variables we use treatment dummies with Gain as the reference group.
In model (2) we additionally control for subjects’ beliefs.
Table 4.7: Logistic Regressions: Cooperation depending on treatment
Dependent variable: Contributions Beliefs
(1) (2) (3)
Int-I -0.000 -0.011 0.000
1 if treatment = Int-I (-0.00) (-0.03) (0.00)
Int-II -0.726∗∗ -0.232 -1.449∗∗
1 if treatment = Int-II (-2.25) (-0.60) (-2.70)
Loss -0.217 -0.050 -0.651
1 if treatment = Loss (-0.65) (-0.12) (-1.19)
Belief 1.902∗∗∗
1 if Belief = C (6.76)
Constant 0.489∗∗ -0.762∗∗ 0.938∗∗
(2.11) (-2.27) (2.39)
# Observations 124 124 124
Log Likelihood -80.125 -53.998 -78.316
Note: z statistics in parentheses; ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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C Experimental Instructions (translated from German)
General Information
Before you will receive your earnings from this experiment, there will be another
short experiment. In this experiment you can earn an additional amount of money.
This amount, combined with your earnings from the first experiment, will be paid
to you in cash after the experiment. The payment will be made anonymously,
meaning that no participant learns about the payoff of another participant.
The decisions during the experiment are also made anonymously, meaning
that no other participant gets to know the identity of the person who made a par-
ticular decision.
As in the first experiment, you are not allowed to communicate with the other.
If you have any questions, please ask us. In case of non-compliance we must exclude
you from the experiment and all payoffs. If you have questions, please raise your
hand. A member of the study team will come to you and answer your question in
private.
On the next screen you will find the instructions of the experiment. The in-
structions will explain what you have to do and how you can earn money. Every
participant gets the same instructions. Please read the instructions carefully. To do
this, please press [Continue].
The experiment
In this experiment we ask you to participate in a short decision situation. All
participants are divided into groups of two. This means that you will play in a
group with another participant. This participant will be randomly assigned to
you.
The decision situation
In the beginning of the decision situation you (Player 1) and your group member
(Player 2) receive an amount of money. We refer to this amount as your initial
endowment. Both players receive the same initial endowment.
After that, you and Player 2 each have to decide between two options: Option
A and Option B. You and Player 2 will make this decision simultaneously. This
means that no player knows which option (A or B) the other player has chosen when
making the own decision.
You make your decision by pressing one of the red buttons labeled A or B on
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the next screen. Important: This experiment will be conducted only once. This
means that you only have to decide between Option A and Option B once.
Payment
Your total payoff from this experiment results from your initial endowment and
an additional amount of money. The size of this additional amount depends
on your decision as well as the decision of the other player. The next screen will
displays your initial endowment as well as an overview table. In this table you
can see the additional amount of Euros you and your group member receive for
each combination of decisions (both players choose A; You choose A and your group
member chooses B; You choose B and your group member chooses A; both players
choose B).
In every cell of the table the following applies:
• For you (Player 1) the first (bold) amount is payoff-relevant.
• For your group member (Player 2) the second (small-printed) amount is payoff-
relevant.
Your initial endowment will be set off against the amount of money in
the table.
If you have understood these instructions completely and want to proceed with
the experiment, please press [Continue].
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D Screenshot of the Decision Situation (Gain-treatment)
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